CH. MUHAMMAD NAWAZ Versus GHULAM•RASOOL
ORDER
1. Petitioner pre‑empted the sale of land in favour of the respondents. On 17‑5‑1992, the trial Court decreed pre‑emption. in his favour subject to his paying.Rs.1,62,015 as purchase‑price for the land to the respondents within thirty days from the date of the decree. In default of payment by due date, pre- emption suit was to stand dismissed. On 30‑5‑1992, respondents preferred an appeal against the judgment and decree of the trial Court to learned District Judge, Sialkot It was marked to a learned Additional District Judge of the District. It came up before him on the same day. He admitted the appeal to hearing, and, meanwhile suspended the operation of the impugned judgment and decree subject to deposit of an adequate security for the mesne profits of the land‑in‑dispute to the satisfaction of the learned trial Court. Learned counsel says that security was furnished on 1‑6‑1992, and, the order, became operative then.
2. Petitioner soon complied with the terms of the decree and deposited the purchase‑price in Court on 28‑5‑1992, he executed his decree for delivery of possession of the land to him. On 30‑5‑1992, it was reported to the. Execution Court that possession was delivered to the petitioner on 6‑6‑1992. respondents applied to the Execution Court for re‑delivery of the possession of the land‑in‑dispute to them. It was stated that the proceedings taken for delivery of possession were "Farzi" and in face of a stay order from the appeal Court could not take place. Petitioner gave a reply to the application. As yet, Execution Court has not passed any order, in restitution proceedings, which stand adjourned to a later date,
3. Meanwhile, petitioner submitted an application to the lower Appellate Court for vacating the stay order passed on 30‑5‑1992, and, protecting his possession of the land taken in execution of the decree from disturbance in restitution proceedings by the Execution Court. Respondents contested the prayer. By the impugned order, dated 21‑7‑1992, lower Court referred the petitioner to Execution Court and himself did not interfere. It is this order that is being assailed in revision by the petitioner.'
4. On behalf of the petitioner, it is submitted that the lower Court ought to have either vacated the stay order or protected the possession of the petitioner from disturbance in the proceedings commenced at the instance of the respondents before the trial Court. Upon hearing the learned counsel, in my view, the learned Judge has taken the right and the fair course. It allowed I an opportunity to the Execution Court to decide on the merits of the execution proceedings taken by it for delivery of possession, if any, to the decree‑holder and bring on record as to how so soon the execution of the decree was complete and finalized, which in ordinary circumstances take long periods in the subordinate Courts. Within couple of days, pre‑emption decree was put in execution and within two days it was finalized and everything was over. My own experience at the Bar extending a little over quarter of a century tells me otherwise. Real trouble of a litigant is set in motion with the execution of the decree obtained by him after a long ordeal. Neither the Court machinery nor the Revenue Agency through which the execution of decrees pertaining to agricultural land are processed, move with required despatch and expedition. Consequently, proverbial delays occur which have become hallmark of our system. Despite full throated cries all around, things do not seem to improve. Reasons are not far to seek. Surprisingly, in the present case, execution of pre- emption decree took only two days. It looked miraculous Probably, good heavens were behind it. I wish, we could attain similar speed in alike matters to promote and inspire confidence of the persons approaching us for decision of their disputes. However, alacrity must be consistent with a desire to promote and maintain confidence in the Institution of Courts. Late Waheeduddin Ahmad‑J, in Mrs. Keays Byrne v. M. Obaidullah Khan PLD 1959 (W.P.) 146, on aspect of hurry by the Civil Courts observed:‑
5. "Before concluding I must express that the way in which the execution proceedings were proceeded before the Subordinate Court in this case cannot inspire confidence of the litigant public. The Subordinate Courts in such cases ought to give reasonable time to judgment debtors to vacate premises. If they will proceed in haste, it is bound to cause inconvenience and invite unnecessary criticism. The well‑known maxim, that justice should not only be done but appear to have been done, must always be the guiding principle of the Civil Courts. While practising at the Bar I have found in some of the judicial officers a tendency to proceed hurriedly with the execution of the decrees. This tendency some time results in miscarriage of justice. This should be discontinued and before issuing eviction orders they must always apply their mind whether .it is a fit case where immediate eviction order should be issued. I hope the Subordinate Court concerned in future will be more careful."
6. In quoting an extract from the judgment of my illustrious brother, I may not be taken to have expressed approval of undue delays. Golden mean must govern the action of the Courts, so that none goes back genuinely disappointed from them. In the above observations, I see a hope for the learned trial Judge to proceed with and decide the dispute before him judiciously.
7. With the above observations, civil revision is being disposed of. Copy of the final order passed on the petition for restitution of possession shall be forwarded to this Court for information.
8. AA./M‑572/L Order accordingly.