M.D. TAHIR Versus FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
ORDER
Through this Constitutional petition, Mr. M.D. Tahir, Advocate of this Court, seeks a direction to the respondents to take effective measures/steps for speedy disposal of the cases before the Courts of law.
2. The petitioner has been heard at length. It is contended by him that justice delayed is justice denied and that in spite of laws providing for expeditious disposal of cases being in force, cases are not being disposed of expeditiously as the various laws are not being strictly acted upon by all the persons concerned with litigation. Hence, the respondents may be directed to ensure that the laws are strictly implemented so that the cases could be decided within the shortest possible time.
3. Elaborating his argument, the petitioner contends that although there was a Law Commission established by the Government, which submitted a report that the laws are there but the same are not being acted upon, therefore, necessary steps should be taken to implement the laws, but the respondents have not adopted suggested measures so far and hence have failed to perform their lawful duty to provide speedy justice to people of Pakistan.
4. In order to demonstrate that the cases can be decided expeditiously, he has cited the example of case of "Ghazi Ilam Din Shaheed", in which case the investigation and the trial was completed within a short period of six months. Similarly in the recent past, the case relating to conviction of two Christians was decided up to the level of this Court within a short period of time and case of restoration of Assemblies was also decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan within a short span of time.
5. He has referred to the provisions of Article 203 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 which pertain to the supervisory' jurisdiction of this Court, in pursuance whereof this Court is competent to issue directions to the subordinate Courts for the purpose of achieving the ends of justice.
6. In the memorandum of writ petition, he has enumerated various causes of delay and suggestions, which, according to him if followed, can achieve the goal of speedy disposal of cases.
7. In support of his arguments, learned counsel has placed reliance on the cases of Jatindra Mohan Sen Gupta (AIR 1925 Calcutta 48); Indian Quarter Master's Union and others v. P.R. Dutt and another (AIR 1951 Calcutta 570); Moti Lal and others v. The Government of the State of Uttar Pradesh and others (AIR 1951 Allahabad 257); Union of India and another v. Elbridge Watson (AIR 1952 Calcutta 601); Muhammad Ibrahim v. The Government of Pakistan and others (PLD 1960 (W.P.) Lahore 1073); Muhammad Nawaz v. Government of Pakistan, through the Secretary Communication. and another' (PLD 1962 (W.P.) Lahore 443) and Syed Saeed Muhammad Shah and another v. The State (1993 SCMR 550).
8. I have considered the arguments addressed at the bar and have gone through the case‑law cited at the bar. There is no denial of the fact that justice delayed is justice denied and that every effort should be made that the causes of the people are expeditiously disposed of and it is nobody's version that the case should not be decided at the earliest, yet, the writ has to be issued by this Court against a particular person or set of persons who are performing their functions in the Federation, Province or the Local Authorities, who have failed to perform their statutory functions and has to be issued with a specific direction.
Delay in disposal of cases occurs not due to lapse or fault of any one individual or class of persons or Department. It is accumulative effect of the overall functioning of the various sections of the society who are concerned with litigation, including the litigants themselves, that decisions of cases is sometimes delayed. Therefore, the problem pertains to the mobilization of all concerned to strictly follow and implement the rule of law. According to the petitioner himself, laws exist, but the same are not being strictly followed. Therefore, the grievance of the petitioner is more of a social nature and has to be agitated on other forums as redress thereof does not fall within the domain of writ jurisdiction of this Court. This writ petition, hence, is misconceived and is not maintainable as held in case of Ghulam Haider and 7 others v. S.H.O., Police Station City, Quetta and 9 others (PLD 1989 SC 479). At pages 481 and 482 of the report, it has been held as under:‑‑
"A learned Division Bench of the Quetta High Court in a detailed and well‑considered judgment took note of all the pleas raised and pressed before them and disposed them of with adequate reasons. However, a learned counsel for the petitioners has raised two contentions and sought one relief as follows:‑‑ '
(a) That the petitioners are not committing any offence. However, they are not committing cognizable offence which would empower the police to take direct action against them.
(b) That if the petitioners exhibit a programme and they cannot do so by virtue of any provision of Motion Pictures Ordinance, 1979, that law would take its own course; and the police would thus be not competent to take any action against the petitioners unless the action is taken by a competent Authority and the complaint is also made competently under section 18(5) of the Ordinance.
Accordingly the learned counsel urged that the police should refrain from interfering with the petitioner's business in any manner except in accordance with law. And further that if an illegal action is taken against the petitioners they should be at liberty to proceed against the persons concerned.
If the petitioners were not committing any illegality and/or offence they should take up this plea before the forum where they are arraigned to answer an allegation, accusation or to face a criminal trial. Similarly, if the petitioners are not committing any cognizable offence the police will not treat so and would proceed accordingly. If despite this the petitioners have any complaint against any individual functionary of the State they can proceed against him in accordance with law for infringement of any right.
The second argument of the learned counsel also is too wide to be accepted as such. Petitioners cannot claim an uncontrolled unregulated right to exhibit anything/film in any manner before any audience in their business premises. Learned counsel admits that if the allegations made against the petitioners are kept in view their conduct might fall under the definition of several offences and other illegalities. He is, however, right that no accused or offender should be dealt with except in accordance with law. The argument that the police has not power to stop/prevent any illegality amounting to an offence if it is being done in their presence or within their view or knowledge cannot be accepted as presented. If, however, in so doing they (police) themselves commit an illegality/offence, this can be brought to the notice of the higher law enforcing agencies, the other relevant Government functionaries and/or the Courts for proper redress against the so‑called police high handedness. This might, if other remedy fails, include at proper stage a private complaint against a Police Officer who commits any offence, of course in accordance with the prescribed procedure. The plea that the action to be taken against the petitioners has to be by a competent authority and in a competent manner again involves questions of facts which when arising would be dealt with by the forums and Courts concerned. It is not possible to issue a general order or writ in favour of the petitioners in this case."
Similar view has been taken by me in case of Akbar Gul Khan v. Government of Pakistan (1995 CLC 1189). Although there is no cavil with the law declared in the cases cited at the bar, but the same does not in any manner advance the case of the petitioner.
9. Resultantly, I see no force in this petition, hence, the same is dismissed in limine. However, a copy of Memo, of Writ Petition shall be sent to the Ministries of Law of the four Provinces and of the Federation, for consideration of the possibility of adoption of various measures suggested by the petitioner, who is a Senior Advocate of this Court.
A.A./M‑10/L Petition dismissed.