TANVEER KHAN Versus MUHAMMAD HANIF
Briefly stated the facts are that suit property was purchased by Muhammad Hanif vide sale‑deed dated. 15‑9‑1996. He then issued 'a notice on 16‑10‑1996 to the respondent regarding change of ownership. He also demanded rent from him and further sought his eviction on the ground of his personal need. As the respondent neither paid rent nor vacated the premises, so the respondent was constrained to tile an. ejectment petition on 4‑1‑1997 seeking his ejectment on the grounds of default and personal need. The said petition vas resisted by the tenant by filing a reply, wherein he raised four preliminary objections and also controverted the contentions of the landlord on merits.
2. From the divergent ‑pleadings of the parties, the trial Court framed the following issues:‑‑
(1) Whether disputed shop is required .in good faith for personal use of applicant? OPA
(2) Whether the respondent has failed to pay rent with effect from 16‑9‑1996 knowingly at a rate of Rs.500 per month? OPA.
(3) Whether the application is not maintainable? OPA.
(4) Relief.
3. In support of their, contentions both the patties adduced evidence on the basis of which the trial Court passed an order of eviction of the tenant on 9‑12‑1997 which was called in question by filing an appeal which also met the same fate as is evident from the judgment dated 18‑1‑2000: The tenant has felt aggrieved of the said judgment and filed the instant SAO.
4. Pre‑admission notice was issued to the respondent who stands represented by his learned counsel.
5. Preliminary arguments have been heard and record perused.
6. Contention of learned counsel for the appellant is that ejectment has been sought on the grounds of personal need as well as default, that the respondent has failed to prove either his bona fide personal need or default on his part. While elaborating his contention, he has referred to the admission of respondent (A.W.1) wherein he admits that if the appellant increases rent, he would be ready to let him stay in the disputed property for another 12 years. He argued that this admission on the part of respondent tells upon his bona fide personal need, and it proves that he does not require property in good faith. He further argued that in notice Exh.R‑1, respondent talks of his own personal use, but while appearing as A.W.1 has changed his stand by deposing that he seeks eviction for the use of his son. So far as the question of default is concerned, he referred to the admission of A. W.1 wherein he admits that he visited the appellant after two months of purchase of suit property and demanded rent, that the property having been purchased on 15‑9‑1996, the demand of rent, as such, will be considered to have been made on 15‑11‑1996, that the instant ejectment petition has been filed on 4‑1‑1997 and if period of 60 days is counted from the demand of rent then the default will constitute w.e.f. 15‑1‑1997. He thus, submitted that neither the bona fide personal need of the landlord stands proved nor default on tile part of the tenant stands established.
7. Conversely, the impugned judgment has been supported by learned counsel for the landlord/applicant/respondent.
8. So far as question of demand of increase in the rent. is concerned, learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that it was his mere desire and it does not negate the bona fide personal need of the landlord and places reliance upon Shamsul Islam Khan v. Pakistan Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. (1985 SCMR 1996). So far as the question of default is concerned, he submitted that property was purchased on 15‑9‑1996 and appellant was informed vide notice dated 16‑10‑1996, that having received notice dated 16‑10-1996, the appellant came to know about its transfer, the period of 60 days shall be reckoned w.e.f. 16‑9‑1996 or at the most from 16‑10‑1996 and said period shall expire either on 16‑11‑1996 or 16‑12‑1996, that the rent for the month of September onwards has been deposited in January, 1997: He thus, submits that the tenant/appellant has committed default even in payment of rent. He further contended that the moment landlord makes statements on oath denying having received any rent, onus shifts to tenant who must affirmatively establish that he had paid/tendered rent as required bylaw and in this respect placed reliance upon Muhammad Luqman Ahmad v. Munir Ahmad and others (1997 CLC 651 (Lahore). He thus, submitted that on both scores, the Courts below have returned findings in accordance with law. He thus, submitted that no legal defect having been pointed out, SAO deserves to be dismissed.
9. The respondent has sought ejectment of appellant on the grounds of default as well as personal need. Initially the landlord has examined himself as A.W.l and has brought on record statement of his son as A.W.2 for whose need property in dispute is required. Admittedly need of a landlord includes the needs of his dependent member. Thus, the said fact that notice Exh‑R‑1 talks of his, own need does not make any different. Even otherwise he has examined his son as A.W.2 who has supported the respondent. So far as question of demand of higher rent is concerned, suffice it to say that the said offer was not accepted by the tenant. Had that offer been accepted, the matter would have come to an end. It is the earnest desire of each and every landlord to get the maximum rent so this desire to increase rent does not negate the bona fide requirement of a landlord.
10. The pleas raised by learned counsel for the appellant were raised before the appellate Court and both the Courts below have dealt with each and every aspect of the matter in an exhaustive manner. No justification or legal defect in the judgments 'of the Courts below has been pointed out by learned counsel for the appellant. Accordingly, the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. However, the appellant is granted one month's time for vacating the premises in dispute.
H.B.T./T‑14/L Appeal dismissed.