ABDUL HAMEED Versus MAHMOOD AHMAD
ORDER
The brief facts out of which the present writ petition arises are that Khadim Hussain Lambardar of village Raipur, Tehsil Shakar Garh, District Narowal was removed from the post by the District Collector vide order dated 26‑1‑2000 because he ceased to be land holder in the revenue estate as well as absentee. The District Collector directed the Assistant Commissioner concerned to call the applicants to fill in the vacancy. In response to the order of the Assistant Commissioner concerned, ten applications were submitted before the Assistant Commissioner‑I for appointment of the post of Lambardar in question. During the process five applicants had withdrawn their applications in favour of respondent No.1 whereas one applicant has withdrawn in favour of the petitioner. Subsequently one applicant has also withdrawn his candidature in favour of respondent No.1. The Tehsildar/Assistant Commissioner‑I after considering the applications of the remaining candidates recommended the name of respondent No.1 for appointment to the post in question as Lambadar. The District Collector after providing proper hearing to all the concerned appointed respondent No.1 as Lambardar. The petitioner being aggrieved filed an appeal in the Court of Executive District Officer Revenue, Narowal, who dismissed the same vide order dated 27‑3‑2002. The petitioner being aggrieved filed a revision petition before the Member Board of Revenue who dismissed the same vide impugned order dated 12‑7‑2003, hence, the present Constitutional petition.
2. The learned counsel of the petitioner submits that petitioner's Brathery in the village is larger one but all the Tribunals below have not considered this aspect of the case at all. He further submits that petitioner has better qualification in terms of rule 7 of the Punjab Land Revenue Rules, 1968 as compared to respondent No.1 but all the Tribunals below have appointed respondent No.1 in violation of the mandatory provisions of rule 17 of the said rules.
3. Mr. Muhammad Hanif Khatana, Addl. Advocate‑General entered appearance on Court's call, he submits that Constitutional petition is not maintainable.
4. I have given my anxious consideration to the contentions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
5. It is admitted fact that all the Tribunals below after application of mind decided the case against the petitioner. It is settled principle of law that Constitutional petition is not maintainable against the concurrent findings of the fact arrived at by the Tribunals below as, per law laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in the following judgments:‑‑
"Khuda Bakhsh v. Muhammad Sharif and others" (1974 SCMR 279),
"Muhammad Sharif and others v. Muhammad Afzal Sohail and others" (1981 SC 246).
"Abdur Rehman Bajwa v. Sultan and others" (PLD 1981 SC 522).
It is also settled principle of law that this Court has no jurisdiction to substitute its own findings in place of findings of Tribunal below while exercising powers under Article 199 of the Constitution, as per principle laid down by the Division Bench of this Court and the Honourable Supreme Court in the following judgments:
Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Lahore through Chairman and another v. M. Massadaq Naseem Sindhoo (PLD 1973 Lah. 600).
Syed Azmat Ali v. The Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore and others (PLD 1964 SC 260).
It is also settled principle of law that the petitioner has to point out that respondents Nos.2 to 4 have decided the controversy against the rules and regulations qua the appointment of the Lambardar in question. The learned counsel of the petitioner fails to point out any violation committed by respondents Nos.2 to 4 at the time of appointing respondent No.1 as Lambardar, therefore, Constitutional petition is not maintainable in view of the law laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Chairman Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Lahore and another v. Ali Mir (1984 SCMR 433). The Member Board of Revenue has considered the qualification, merits and demerits of both the candidates in para. 5 of the impugned order, which reveals that Member Board of Revenue has passed the impugned order after application of mind. Even otherwise it is settled principle of law that it is prerogative of respondents Nos.2 to 4 to appoint a Lambardar for the post in question on the well‑known principle that no one has a right to claim appointment on the basis of any preference and the main criteria is the fitness of the person qua the responsibilities and duties. Meaning thereby that the matter rests exclusively in the domain of the Revenue authorities, who because of their experience and training are in a better position to make a suitable choice than the Courts of general jurisdiction. In arriving to this conclusion, I am fortified by the law laid down in the following judgments:‑‑
Abdul Wahid's case (1971 SCMR 71).
Muhammad Yousaf's case (1996 SCMR 1581).
Liaqat Ali's case (2001 CLC 544).
Bashir Ahmad's case (2002 SCMR 1371).
In view of what has been discussed above, I do not find any infirmity or illegality in the impugned orders of the Tribunals below. Therefore, this writ petition has no merits and the same is dismissed.
M.I./A‑285/L Petition dismissed.