MEHFOOZ UR REHMAN Versus Mst. RIFFAT AHAD

NASIM SIKANDAR, J.-- -On 9-7-1984 Messrs Khan Amir Abdullah Khan Rokri, Ch. Eid Muhammad and Sh. Akhtar Ali (through the later Sh. Akhtar Ali) as arbitrators made an application under section 14 read with section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 praying the Senior Civil Judge, Lahore to summon the parties and to make their award, dated 16th May, 1984, the rule of the Court.

2. In the petition it was stated that on 3rd of May, 1984 Malik Abdul Ahad and his wife Mrs. Riffat Ahad, of the one part and Messrs Mahfooz-ur-Rehman, Habib-ur-Rehman, Muhammad Sharif, Muhammad Salim and Farrukh Javed through their general attorney Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak, resident of Sargodha, of the other part, appointed them arbitrators by way of. a written agreement for settlement of' their disputes with regard to Odeon Cinema, Abbot Road, Lahore. According to the petitioners/arbitrators they held proceedings on 6th, 10th and 16th of May, 1984 and having heard the parties they rendered their award on 16th of May, 1984. Further that both parties to the proceedings had signed the order sheet maintained for the three days in token of their acceptance of the proceedings. Following five documents were submitted by the petitioners/arbitrators along with their application:

"(1) Photostat of the General Power of Attorney executed by , Mahfooz-ur-Rehman etc. in favour of Mehr Ghulam Dastgir and registered on the 7th of April, 1984.

(2) The original Arbitration Agreement executed by the parties on the 3rd of May, 1984.

(3) The three original proceedings/interim orders, dated the 6th of May, 10th of May and 16th of May, 1984, signed by three Arbitrators and both the parties.

(4) A signed copy of our Award, dated the 16th of' May, 1984.

(5) A signed copy of the notice, dated the 9th of July, 1984, to the parties regarding the filing of the Award in this Honourable Court."

3. The present respondents Malik Abdul Ahad and Mrs. Riffat Ahad on 31-7-1984 also made an application under section 17 of the said Act seeking passing of a judgment and decree in terms of the award made by the arbitrators. The other respondents Messrs Mahfooz-ul-Haq etc. through their reply, dated 3-9-1984 however, objected the prayer and sought dismissal of the application for making award as the rule of the Court. As preliminary objections it was stated that the respondents had neither executed the arbitration agreement, dated 3-5-1984 nor they ever appointed the alleged arbitrators that Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak had no right or authority to refer the matter to arbitration or to appoint the alleged arbitrators. For these reasons the award in question was described to be void ab initio and a nullity in the eyes of law. On merits the holding of proceedings by the arbitrators on the above mentioned three days of May, 1984 was also stated to be factually incorrect. The signing of order sheet maintained qua proceedings before the arbitrators was also denied. The alleged general power of attorney in favour of Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak was completely denied. In that regard it 'was alleged that Mehr Muhammad Sharif one of the alleged executants of the powers of attorney was living in United States of America at the relevant date; that the general power of attorney otherwise suffered from inherent legal defects and contradictions. In reply to para.2 of the petition it was further stated that:--

"Needless to mention that a written intimation was given to the alleged arbitrators, informing them about the fact that they had no authority to arbitrate and that no valid appointment or reference was ever made."

Without prejudice to the other objections, it was further submitted that the so called arbitrators had committed misconduct in making the award inasmuch as they proceeded with arbitration proceedings even after receipt of the above notice, that as a matter of fact there was no dispute between the parties which could possibly be referred for arbitration or to be resolved by the arbitrators and lastly that it was beyond the powers of any alleged arbitrators to act as conciliator or to create a contract which never existed between the parties.

4. These objections were replied by the present respondent Malik Abdul Ahad and his wife on 13-10-1984. In a nutshell it was submitted that Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak was a close relation of the petitioners/objectors and had always been posing and acting as proprietor of their half share in the Odeon Cinema; that as their attorney he executed a number of documents including the arbitration agreement; that his position as such was accepted on production of a photocopy of the general power of attorney, dated 7-4-1984 which was duly registered with the Sub-Registrar Sargodha; that he has been receiving the share of the petitioners/objectors from Malik Munawar Hussain and other authorized persons who were managing the affairs of the Odeon Cinema with the consent of the parties; that the attorney Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak submitted a bank draft in favour of one of the three arbitrators Khan

Amir Abdullah Khan Rokri for an amount of Rs.300,000 by way of security; that the two stamped papers viz. for agreement to arbitrate and for execution of award were also purchased by him; that Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak has been appearing before the arbitrators and has also been signing the proceedings acting as their general attorney; that the petitioners/objectors during all that period never objected to his appearance and acting as their general attorney; that even earlier to the arbitration agreement Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak has been acting as a representative of the interest of the petitioners/objectors with regard to the affairs of the Odeon Cinema which included attending meetings of Exhibitors Association; he signed the interim order passed by the arbitrators, dated 16-5-1984 as a token of his acceptance of that order; that after the signing of the award the present respondents Malik Abdul Ahad and his wife were obliged to deposit the amounts in government treasury in accordance with the direction contained in the award and that said Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak has been receiving thousands of rupees as general attorney of the objectors even after recording of the award. On merits it was specifically denied that Muhammad Sharif, present appellant/objector was not in Pakistan on the date when the general power of attorney in favour of said Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak was executed. It was also alleged that the period of absence of Mehr Muhammad Sharif from Pakistan had purposely not been mentioned in the objection petition. Also that even an implied consent of the principal was sufficient to enable a general attorney to enter an agreement to arbitrate. On merits it was further stated that the arbitrators were within their authority and jurisdiction to receive the bids by the parties and to decide the matter in accordance with the wishes of the attorney of the objectors; that the price fixed by the arbitrators was not at all unconscionable inasmuch the objectors had purchased their half share in the Cinema for a consideration of Rs.600,000 only and by virtue of the award in question, their share was valued at Rs.35,50,000 and lastly that in fact the price was arrived at with the active participation of Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak and Malik Abdul Ahad as well as the arbitrators.

5. Based upon the pleadings of the parties, on 24-10-1984 learned civil/trial Court framed the following issues:--

(1) Whether agreement of appointment of arbitrators and reference for arbitration was executed between the parties? OPP.

(2) Whether Mehr Ghulam Dastgir was not appointed as general power of attorney by the objectors? OP Objectors.

(3) Whether Muhammad Khuda Bux is duly constituted attorney of the objectors'? OP Objectors.

(4) Whether objections are not within time? OP Objectors.

(5) Whether award, dated 16-5-1984 is void, illegal and ineffective for the reasons mentioned in the objection petition? OP Objectors.

(6) Relief."

6. In the trial the objectors produced three witnesses while Muhammad Sharif one of the objectors himself appeared as AW-4. Also as documentary evidence Exh.A-1, Exh.A-4, Exh.AW-3/1 to Exh.AW-3/3, Exh.AW-4/1 to Exh.AW-4/2 and Mark "A" were placed on record. The petitioners/present respondents produced eight witnesses and Malik Abdul Ahad one of the petitioners/present respondents himself deposed as RW-9. Also they tendered in evidence Exh.RW-9/1 to Exh.RW-9/8, the agreement of arbitration was tendered as Exh.RW-3, the award as Exh.CW-2/1, the letter written by Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak to the arbitrators as Exh.CW-1/1 and the letter by the objectors as Exh.CW-1/3. The agreement to arbitrate and copy of general attorney in favour of the Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak were also placed on record as Mark "A/3" and Mark "B" respectively.

7. Learned trial Court taking up issue No.2 first noted that the objectors had built up their claim on the ground that they never appointed Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak as their general attorney. While finding against the objectors the trial Court noted that general power of attorney, the copies whereof was produced in evidence as Exh.RW-9/6 and RW-9/7 belied their claim. It was further noted that they had not been able to establish that one of the five objectors namely Muhammad Sharif AW-4 was out of country when the said document was executed and registered in Pakistan at Sargodha. The passport and other documents relied upon by the objectors were found to be lacking in support of the claim of absence of the said objector. Earlier it was also noted that except for Muhammad Sharif objector, other objectors were silent regarding the fact if they had executed a general power of attorney in favour of Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak. The trial Court also noted that the registered power of attorney, dated 7-4-1984 was never got cancelled by the objectors till that day. Their contention that since they had not executed the document its cancellation was not needed was rejected by the Court. The silence of the objectors to get the document cancelled was taken as one of the grounds to hold that Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak was a duly appointed attorney of the objectors.

8. From the oral evidence produced from both sides learned trial Court concluded that Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak has been holding himself out and acting as owner of the Cinema from the very beginning. Further that he had rather been physically living in the upper portion of the Cinema till the year, 1985 and was looking after the accounts of income of the Cinema as also receiving the share of income as an owner. The opening and maintaining of a joint account by Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak with Malik Abdul Ahad one of the two respondents was also considered by the Court as an important factor to establish the claim of the present respondents that Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak had all along been involved in the running of Cinema as a co-owner, These findings were recorded in the perspective of the complete denial of the objectors of their having authorized Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak to share the administration of the Cinema or to have any connection therein. Learned trial Court also rejected the contention put forth by the objectors that the said joint account had something to do with the share purchased by Malik Abdul Ahad in the Capital Cinema owned by Mchr Ghulam Dastgir Lak. It was in that regard observed that Malik Abdul Ahad/present respondent purchased some shares in Capital Cinema in the year, 1986 while the joint account was opened in the year, 1982. It was accordingly concluded that the objectors had authorized Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak to act on their behalf who had always been acting and holding himself out as owner and that he was received and acknowledged by the employees of the Cinema as such. While deciding issue No.1 learned trial Court observed that signatures of Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak on the agreement to arbitrate Mark "A" were not disputed. It was also noted that Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak as general attorney of the objectors handed over a cheque of Rs.300,000 to the arbitrators which was placed on record as Exh.RW-3/3. A reference was also made to his letter to the arbitrators Exh.C-1/1 which was written when he was holding the office of Provincial Minister for Food and Agriculture in the Province of Punjab. Both documents in the view of the trial Court remained uncontroverted.

9. Issue No.5 was also decided against the objectors. It was observed that in the general power of attorney executed in favour of Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak the objectors had given him the authority to act on their behalf with regard to the Cinema in question and his power included to alienate or to make any settlement with the co-sharers (present respondents) to the extent of their shares. The appearance of the general attorney before the arbitrators, in the view of the trial Court answered the legal requirements and, therefore, the arbitrators were not obliged to issue notices to the objectors as co-sharers of the Cinema. The allegation of misconduct levelled by the objectors against the arbitrators was also repelled on the ground that being the higher bidder they rightly decided in favour of the present respondents. As far Exh.CW-1/3 the letter claimed to have been written by the objectors to the arbitrators asking them not to proceed with the arbitration proceedings learned trial Court found that it was written on 25-6-1984 while the award had already been made on 16-5-1984. Learned trial Court also disagreed with the objectors that there was no occasion for making a reference to the arbitrators inasmuch as the co-owners had no dispute at all as far the ownership or affairs of the Cinema were concerned. It was observed by the Court that sufficient evidence had been brought on record to show that the co-owners, objectors on one side and the two respondents on the other wanted to buy out the other and, therefore, the need to refer the matter to the arbitration and the impugned award, dated 16-5-1984.

10. For the appellants it is claimed that Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak was never appointed by them as their attorney; that their signatures on the power of attorney, dated 7-4-1984 RW-9/7 were forged; that Muhammad Sharif one of the appellants was out of country on the alleged date of execution of the power of attorney; that signatures on the face and reverse side of the alleged power of attorney are clearly different which proves the forgery; that the power of attorney was said to have been executed on 5-12-1982 while it was registered on 7-4-1984 after a period of almost one and a half year which was sufficient to render the same void under section 23 of the Registration Act and that admittedly the objectors/appellants were never summoned in the arbitration proceedings and, therefore, the award announced as a result of these proceedings was not binding upon them. It is further claimed that even otherwise the so-called power of attorney lacked the power of alleged attorney to enter into an agreement to arbitrate; all proceedings before the arbitrators were illegal and that the impugned award instead of speaking of any adjudication between the parties or the so-called dispute was rather based upon the bidding alleged to have been taken place before the arbitrators. On legal plane it is alleged that the respondents were required to produce the alleged attorney to substantiate their claim of his having power to enter into an agreement to arbitrate and that the failure on their part to produce him as witness had rendered the whole proceedings to be a farce. Also that even marginal witnesses of the attorney were never produced to prove the execution. On the authority of ratio settled in re. Syed Mazhar Haider and another v. Ali Ahmad through legal heirs, (2000 MLD 1117) it is stated that in absence of production of the Sub-Registrar or the person who identified the executant no credit could be given to such power of attorney even if it was a registered document. Reliance is also placed upon re. Rashida Begum v. Ch. Muhammad Anwar and others, (PLD 2003 Lahore 522) to claim that general powers/recitals contained in a power of attorney could not be construed as an authority by the agent to seek resolution of disputes through arbitration. Reference is also made to re. Muhammad Akhtar v. Mst. Manna and 3 others, (2001 SCMR 1700), re. Fida Muhammad v. Pir Muhammad Khan (Deceased) through legal heirs and others, (PLD 1985 SC 341) and re. Muhammad Fazal Paracha v. Mst. Fauzia Begum (PLD 2003 Peshawar 40) to claim that where an attorney was not authorized in clear words to do a particular act then the same could not he performed by the attorney and lastly that the original passport placed on record Exh.A-2 sufficiently proved that Muhammad Sharif one of the objectors/present appellant left Pakistan in the year, 1983 and did not return till the expiry of date given in that passport as 17th November, 1986.

11. For the respondents on the other hand it is claimed that Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak was a duly constituted attorney as per R.W.-9/6 and 7 when he signed the arbitration agreement Exh.RW-3/1; that he was brother-in-law of Khuda Bakhsh AW-3; that Muhammad, Sharif and Muhammad Saleem, appellants were sons of Khuda Bakhsh AW-3 while Mahfooz-ul-Rehman and Habib-ur-Rehman, appellants were his real nephews and Farrukh Javed the 5th appellant was his partner in business; that it is a fact admitted by AW-3 Khuda Bakhsh father of the two appellants and AW-4 Muhammad Sharif one of the appellants that they never participated in the affairs and management of the Cinema; that the joint account Exh.RW-9/2 in the name of Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak and Malik Abdul Ahad respondent is a complete answer to the denial of the objectors that their attorney had nothing to do with the affairs of the Cinema; that receipt of Cinema income by the attorney for and on behalf of respondents is supported by the persons/witnesses employed in the Cinema; that the statement of respondent Malik Abdul Ahad R.W.9 remained uncontroverted and unchallenged with regard to the vital points in issue; that the cheque Exh.RW-3/3 for payment of Rs.300,000 which was demanded back and was returned to Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak on his letter Exh.CW-1/1. dated 15-10-1985 written by him on the official letter head of Provincial Minister for Food supports the conduct of the arbitration proceedings and his participation therein as attorney of the respondents; that the power of attorney was registered at Sargodha where the appellants/respondents wielded a lot of political influence and, therefore, it was impossible that any kind of fraud could be played upon them; that in the light of the ratio in re. Sadiq Ali Khan and another v. Abdur Rehman and 4 others, (1995 CLC 977) the objectors having not cancelled the power of attorney till date he was competent to act on their behalf on the basis of unchallenged power of attorney; that no civil or criminal proceedings was ever initiated against Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak who acted as their attorney on the basis of the aforesaid document; that Exh.CW-1/3 sent by all the appellants/objectors to the arbitrator Sh. Akhtar Ali through registered post on 25-6-1984 bearing their signatures including that of Muhammad Sharif clearly controverts their claim that he never returned to Pakistan after leaving for America till the expiry of his passport on 17th November, 1986; that the contents of letter Exh.CW-1/3 also give at least the starting point of the knowledge of the objectors who did not make resort to any civil or criminal Court against the execution of general power of attorney and the execution of agreement to arbitrate on their behalf by Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak; that in re. Hafiz Muhammad Din v. Allah Ditta and others, (PLD 1954 Baghdad-ul-Jadid 56) it was held that the arbitrators being Judges of both facts and law an error in law did not vitiate the award; the reliance of the learned trial Court on the ratio settled in re. Guran Ditta and others v. Pakhar Ram and another (AIR 1927 Lahore 362) is also supported; a specific reference is made to the statement of Muhammad Sarfraz AW-1 who in his cross-examination admitted to have appeared before the arbitrators in the company of one of the objectors namely Habib-ur-Rehman; he also admitted to have seen the agreement to arbitrate executed by Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak; the witness expressed his ignorance if Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak was general attorney of the appellants and stated that he was informed by the learned counsel for the objectors that the agreement to arbitrate had been manufactured; the respondents have also placed their reliance in re. Messrs Qamar-ud-Din and Co. v. Haji Din Muhammad and another (1970 SCMR 402) to contend that the party acquiescing in reference by participating in the proceedings was estopped from challenging validity of reference, also refer the ratio settled in re. Muhammad Ibrahaim Khan and others v. Maulvi Behram (through his heirs) (1972 SCMR 608) to contend that an agreement could be inferred from the conduct of the parties. Reliance is also placed upon re. Sh. Saleem Ali v. Sh. Akhtar Ali and 7 others (PLD 2004 Lahore 404). On the findings by the trial Court on issue No.5 it is stated that the award in question could not be described as unconscionable inasmuch as the objectors investing Rs.5/6 lac in the Cinema were awarded Rs.35,50,000 after only two years of the purchase and lastly that the three arbitrators namely Ch. Eid Muhammad, Khan Amir Abdullah Khan Rokri and Sheikh Akhtar Ali were known personalities having no motive or other reason to favour the respondents. Therefore, their award and acceptance of an offer made by Malik Abdul Ahad at Rs.71 lac as against that of Rs.70 lac made by Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak on behalf of appellants was absolutely a just and fair decision.

12. Having heard the parties I have concluded as under:

(i) That quality of oral evidence coming from the objectors is too poor to be considered seriously. The two witnesses produced by them have not advanced their case in any manner. AW-1 Muhammad Sarfraz has rather demolished whole of their case based upon complete denial of any authority in favour of Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak as also their knowledge of arbitration proceedings. He contradicted the claim of the objectors completely when he stated that he had appeared before the arbitrators once and that Habib-ur-Rehman objector was also with him. A. W.2 Muhammad Khan also did not lag far behind

A. W.1 when he claimed against the record and the stand of the objectors, that it was in his personal knowledge that there has been no arbitration at all. He admits to have no direct knowledge of the facts pertaining to the arbitration and the other matters between the parties. He admits that whatever he was deposing was based upon the information provided to him by the objectors. A.W.3 Mehr Khuda Bakhsh, father of two of objectors and real uncle of the other two while he holds a special attorney for all the objectors and A.W.4 Muhammad Sharif one of the objectors himself have not contributed anything except for repetition of the complete denial of any authority in favour of Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak and the conduct of the arbitration proceedings. A.W.3 Mehr Khuda Bakhsh by admitting the fact that the objectors were never associated with the affairs of the Cinema has supported the case of the appellants/present respondents. Also A.W.4 Muhammad Sharif failed to support his claim of being out of Pakistan on the day when the general power of attorney was executed. His claim is further refuted by the notice of the objectors, dated 25-6-1984 (Exh.C.W.1/3) served upon one of the arbitrators Sheikh Akhtar Ali through registered post. The notice bears- the signature of A.W.4 Muhammad Sharif. If his claim as A.W.4 that he left for America in August 1983 and returned in February, 1989 is correct then who signed for him on the notice Exh.C.W.1/3, dated 25-6-1984 remains a big question mark. The complete denial on the part of the respondents of the fact that Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak has not been running the Cinema in question on their behalf is certainly incorrect. They may have had a case if a collusion between the gentleman and the present respondents was alleged. However in view of the close relationship of four out of five objectors since that was not possible they made a defence which was not only out of place but also factually wrong.

(ii) As observed earlier, the oral evidence produced by the objectors does not inspire confidence. On the other hand the witnesses produced by the petitioners/present respondents are all relevant and concerned persons who had first hand knowledge of the conduct of affairs and management of the Cinema in question. R.W.1 Safdar Khan owns two Cinemas in the city and knows the parties quite well including Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak. R.W.2 Fayyaz Khan is a Producer as well as Distributor of Motion Pictures. He also knows the parties well and has first hand knowledge of the facts in dispute. R. W.3 Sheikh Muhammad Ashraf claims to be the Managing Director of General Insurance Company in which Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak and Khan Amir Abdullah Rokri, one of the arbitrators were stated to be directors. He knew the parties and also recognized the signatures of Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak and the arbitrator Khan Amir Abdullah Khan Rokri. His claim that the sums of Rs.300,000 each submitted as surety by the parties before the arbitrators was credited in the account of Amir Abdullah Khan Rokri arbitrator and it was shown due to the parties in his wealth tax return filed for the relevant financial year has not been seriously challenged by the objectors. R.W.4 Gul Muhammad served the Cinema in question first as a watchman and then as a booking clerk for quite some time. He is also possessed with first hand knowledge of the facts, the relationship between the parties as well as the desire of the two parties to become full owner of the Cinema. R.W.5 Shah Jehan Khan is associated with the Cinema in question since, 1952 when his father worked as a booking clerk and then he himself came in as a contractor to provide services at the Cinema premises. R. W.6 Shahid Ali is again a booking clerk in the Cinema since, 1982. His statement also supports the case of the petitioners/present respondents that Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak on one part and Malik Abdul Ahad on the other wanted to buy out the other in order to become the sole owner of the Cinema. Further that all employees as well as other persons concerned with the Cinema used to receive and acknowledge Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak as a co-owner with Malik Abdul Ahad respondent. R.W.7 Muhammad Younas Chaudhry is also an owner of a Cinema. He is son of one of the arbitrators Ch. Eid Muhammad. He also appears to be in full picture of the facts. R.W.8 Malik Safdar Hassan is Manager of the Cinema in question. He supported the claim that the owners represented by Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak and the present respondents on the other side, wanted to take over of the whole of the Cinema and to buy out the share of the other party. In their cross examinations all witnesses retrain consistent and confident of the statements made by them. R.W.9 is one of the present respondents Malik Abdul Ahad himself. In his statement in chief he states the facts with all necessary details. He also claims to have purchased some shares in the Capital Cinema owned by Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak. In his cross-examination nothing material against the facts stated by him could be brought home. All witnesses including the respondent himself were subjected to lengthy and grilling cross-examination. However nothing could be extracted which could directly or indirectly be taken to be favourable to the case of the appellants.

(iii) The opening of joint account by Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak and Malik Abdul Ahad stands proved from Exh.RW-9/2 to Exh.RW-9/3. The fact that it was opened in the year, 1982 also supports the claim of the petitioners/present respondents that the former was participating in the affairs and administration of the Cinema in question including receipt of income on behalf of owners/objectors. Learned trial Court rightly rejected the defence that opening of' joint account was in any manner relatable to subsequent purchase of some share by Malik Abdul Ahad, present respondent in the Cinema owned by Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak in the year, 1986. A joint account opened in the year, 1982 could not be said to have any connection with the transaction which took place four years thereafter and that too of out right purchase of some shares. Generally speaking opening of a joint account by a seller and a purchaser is totally out of place. The defence taken in that regard is, therefore, patently incorrect.

(iv) The registered power of attorney in favour of Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak completely supports the claim of the respondents not only to the competency of the attorney to sign the agreement to arbitrate but also to participate in the arbitration proceedings on their behalf. A registered document cannot be thrown out on - simple denial of the executants. Particularly when it is fully supported from the attending circumstances. The claim of the objectors that signatures on the front and reverse of the attorney are different does not find support from the record. The fact that the document was executed almost one and a half year before its registration and was, therefore, violative of section 23 of the Registration Act does not by that reason alone stands discredited. Section 23 of the Registration Act only contains a direction to the registration authorities not to accept a document after four months of its execution. These provisions arc merely directly as no penalty is provided either for the proper officer accepting the document for registration after expiry of the period of four months or for the person presenting such document for registration. Learned trial Court in this regard is correct in pointing out that except for a total denial of the existence of the document nothing has been brought on record to discredit the same. Further the alleged absence of A.W.4 Muhammad Sharif from the country and his having not signed the general power of attorney, as observed above is neither supported from the record nor it otherwise appears to be correct in view of the fact that Exh.C.W.1/3 notice to petitioner/arbitrator, dated 25-6-1984 was signed by him personally.

(v) The recitals of the general power of attorney certainly support the case of the petitioners/respondents that between the parties as co-owners of Cinema there was a kind of declared desire to buy out the other. The admission on the part of A.W.1 of his appearance once before the arbitrators along with one of the objectors makes the reliance of the petitioners/present respondents on the ratio settled in re. Messrs Qamar-ud-Din & Co. v. Haji Din Muhammad and another, (supra) and re. Sh. Salem Ali v. Sh. Akhtar Ali and 7 others, (supra) to be pertinent and relevant. The recitals, as contained in the general attorney provide sufficient power for him to settle the matter. The import of the word " ﺗﺼﻓﻴﻪ " is wide enough to make settlement in every sense of the term including through arbitration. A photocopy of the power of attorney Mark `A' and certified copy of the attorney is available on record as Mark `B'. The photocopy as well as the certified copy of that document show that all the executants not only signed it but also affixed their thumb-impressions. During the proceedings before the trial Court no request was ever made by the objectors/appellants to get the signatures or the thumb-impressions verified from the experts. The petitioners/present respondents are also correct in pointing out that keeping in view the political clout and influence of the executants it was simply not possible that a person could get their fabricated general power of attorney executed in the city of Sargodha. The case-law relied upon by the appellants/objectors on the subject particularly re. Rashida Begum v. Ch. Muhammad Anwar and others, (supra) is clearly distinguishable while the ratio settled in re: Fida Muhammad and Pir Muhammad Khan, (supra) and re: Muhammad Fazal Paracha v. Mst. Fauzia Begum, (supra) is rather supportive of the ease of the present respondents.

(vi) The date of registration of the general power of attorney viz. 7-4-1984 followed by the agreement to arbitrate Mark A/3, R.W.-3/1, dated 3-5-1984 the proceedings before the arbitrators, dated 6th, 10th and 16th of May, 1984, and the award, dated 16th May, 1984 to me appear in a natural sequence. The ending edge of these proceedings can be seen in the letter Exh.C.W.1/1 written in October, 1985 by the attorney Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lac then holding the portfolio of Minister for Food in the Province of Punjab.

(vii) The three arbitrators were known figures of the city. Two of them namely Khan Amir Abdullah Rokri and Ch. Eid Muhammad have been members of the legislative assemblies. The petitioner/arbitrator Sh. Akhtar Ali and Ch. Eid Muhammad both were owners of Cinema Houses. It is not believable that any one of them could be a part of any shady transaction or be a party to a dubious deal, as alleged by the appellants.

(viii) I am also in agreement with the learned trial Court that the award in question cannot be said to be unconscionable. The objectors invested a sum of Rs.5/6 lac to purchase the shares of Cinema in question in the year, 1982 and after two years by way of the award in question they were found entitled to a sum of Rs.35,50,000.

(ix) During proceedings before the trial Court the parties sought adjournments on at least three occasions for settlement of the matter out of Court. If, as alleged by the objectors/appellants their attorney was not possessed with any authority or that the arbitration proceedings were never conducted as a fact, what was thereto be settled?

(x) Having considered the evidence both documentary as well as oral I am of the considered opinion that the appellants/objectors had appointed Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak as their attorney and they were fully aware of the arbitration proceedings; that Mehr Ghulam Dastgir Lak had always been acting on their behalf and was rather known and received to be the co-owner of the Cinema by the employees as well as the other concerned persons. The objectors/appellants certainly wanted to buy out the other party/respondents. However, having lost only by a margin of Rs. 100,000 instead of accepting the decision in good grace they turned around and created the aforesaid defence.

13. For the aforesaid reasons no case for interference with the order of the trial Court is made out. Therefore, I will maintain its judgment and decree in making the impugned award a rule of Court.

14. Appeal dismissed.

H.B.T./M-586/L Appeal dismissed.