Pakistan Case Law
1997 MLD 993

SADDIQA SHAHEEN Versus STATE

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Citation1997 MLD 993
CourtPeshawar High Court
Case No.Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application No.602 of 1996
Judge(s)Jawaid Nawaz Khan Gandapur
ResultBail allowed

Tahir Ali complainant, aged about 17/18 years, has charged petitioner Mst. Siddiqa Shaheen, his step‑mother, for having killed his father (her husband), by slaughtering him in his house on 9‑5‑1996, vide F.I.R. No.65 registered under section 302, P.P.C. on 9‑5‑1996 at about 6‑30 p.m. lodged in Police Station Kotwali, Peshawar.

2. Consequently the petitioner was arrested and moved the lower Courts for her release on bail. Having failed to get the relief sought for has now come to this Court for the redress of her grievance. She has, in the main, alleged that she is innocent and falsely charged, for ulterior motives and therefore entitled to the concession of bail in accordance with law.

3. The learned counsel for the parties present and heard. I have also gone through the record of the case carefully.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently urged for the grant of bail on two grounds. Firstly, on merits in that accordingly to him the case in hand was a case of "no evidence" and therefore the petitioner was entitled to bail not as a matter of grace but as a matter of right. According to him it was apparent, on the face of the record, that nobody had seen the occurrence and that it was for this reason that even the complainant, the son of the deceased, who was residing with the deceased and the accused in the same house, could not involve the petitioner for committing the offence for any valid reason. All that he could allege, in the F.I.R. was:‑‑

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner next stated that in the ordinary circumstances it is not conceivable that a weak woman could be so cruel and stone‑hearted so as to slaughter a male victim with a knife. According to him, on the other hand, the complainant had himself stated before the police that he had visited the house, twice, on the day of occurrence, on various pretexts, as mentioned in the very F.I.R. and that it was quite possible that he might have killed his father because he, at least, had a motive to do so and that is that his father had contracted a second marriage with the petitioner a few days earlier than the occurrence. He alleged that under these circumstances the murder was shrouded in mystery and accordingly reasonable grounds do exist for believing that the petitioner's case is that of further enquiry and that there was nothing on the record to suggest, even remotely, that she has committed the crime. Secondly, that the petitioner, being a woman, was entitled to be released on bail under the first proviso of section 497, Cr.P.C.

6. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the complainant stated that the petitioner has been directly charged for killing her husband in the promptly lodged report and since she also had a motive to kill the deceased, therefore, she could not be extended the concession of ball. However, he failed to explain as to what had factually prompted the petitioner to kill her husband to whom she was married only 22 days before the occurrence. The contention of the learned counsel for the complainant that the petitioner was a woman of bad character and therefore, she had a motive to kill her husband has not impressed me. Nor can it persuade me to presume that she must have, in all probability, committed the crime in question. Lastly, the contention of the complainant's counsel that since the petitioner was last seen in the company of the deceased and therefore, it should be taken for granted that only she had killed her husband has no substance inasmuch as the complainant nowhere stated in the F.I.R. that it was he who had seen the petitioner last in the company of the deceased on the day of occurrence: The FI.R. is absolutely silent about this fact.

7. The learned counsel for the State, to some extent, repeated the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the complainant by alleging that the petitioner was last seen in the company of the deceased and therefore, only she could kill her husband. In addition he raised another point and submitted that the weapon of offence was recovered on the pointation of the petitioner and therefore, though the occurrence had not been witnessed by anybody, reasonable grounds do to exist to believe that only the petitioner had committed the murder. He stated that in these circumstances she was not entitled to be released on bail.

8. Without dilating upon the merits of the case, at this stage, lest it may not prejudice the judicial mind of the trial Court and keeping in view the available record, specially the F.I.R. and the statements of the complainant and Zafar Ali, the other son of the deceased, recorded under section 161, Cr.P.C., I am of the considered view that reasonable grounds do not exist for believing that the petitioner is connected with the commission of the offence charged with and that her case is that of further enquiry. Apart from this the petitioner lady is behind the bars for the last more than 3‑1/2 months and is definitely not required for any purpose i.e., further investigations etc., therefore no useful purpose would be served if she is allowed to remain locked up in the jail. Since the petitioner is a Purdahnasheen lady, therefore, I am inclined to release her on bail under the first proviso of section 497, Cr.P.C. Resultantly this bail petition is accepted.

9. The petitioner shall be released forthwith, if not wanted in any other case, provided she furnishes bail bonds in the sum of Rs.1,00,000 (Rupees one lac) with two sureties, each to the like amount, to the satisfaction of Senior Civil Judge or Sub‑Divisional Magistrate, Peshawar. The Senior Civil Judge/Sub-?Divisional Magistrate shall see that the sureties are respectable persons, hail from the settled area of Peshawar and have sufficient property in their names.

N.H.Q./2018/P ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Bail allowed.

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