Haji AINUDDIN Versus GOVERNMENT OF SIND
ORDER
1. ABDUL HAYEE KURESHI, C.J.‑‑ It is admitted case that the petitioner had been dispossessed much before the riling of the present petition. An earlier petition had been made, which was registered as C.P. No. 534/1982, by the present petitioner, alongwith one Taj Muhammad Baloch, to challenge some contemplated action by the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation. This petition came up before a Division Bench of this Court on 25‑8‑1982, when Mr. S M. Muslim Naqvi for the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation, made a statement that the said Corporation will not "allot, transfer, or alienate the portion of the strip of land, which was occupied by the petitioners, and from which they have been evicted." On such statement, Mr. Malik Muhammad Sayeed had withdrawn that petition, and it was disposed of as such. Even the above order would clearly show that the petitioner in the instant petition was not in possession of the strip of land, which is the subject‑matter of this case.
2. This case came up for Katcha Peshi on 23‑8‑1983, and the D.B., of which one of us was a Member, passed an order, calling for comments, and ‑directed that, in the meanwhile status quo shall be maintained. Again on 22‑9‑1983, another D.B. of this Court re‑affirmed the order of grant of status quo by stating that the respondent No. 2, viz. the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation, shall maintain status quo as obtaining today.
3. Mr. S.M. Muslim Naqvi states that the land in question falls within the road alignment. He has filed a counter‑affidavit, alongwith which he has filed a sketch marked D‑2. The sketch shows that the portion of the road, marked in green, was already existing carpeted road, and the portion, marked in red is the newly‑constructed carpeted road. He states that a small portion in front of Spencer's Eye Hospital, which is shown in yellow, remains to be carpeted, although the other work on this road is complete. The learned counsel states that these are public works, and, regard being, had to the circumstances, the superior Courts of this country have always refrained from granting such injunctions as would impede public works, which are for the benefit of the society at large. We are in general agreement with such proposition.
4. The allegations contained in the application for contempt have been denied and it is stated in paragraph 5 of the counter‑affidavit of Ghulam Rabbani that the status quo order passed by this Court is being strictly obeyed, although the petitioner and other encroachers have been removed from the site much before the order of status quo was passed. No rejoinder affidavit has been filed so that we will assume the correctness of such statement. What is more that even in the previous Constitutional Petition, the only undertaking was that the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation shall not allot, transfer, or, alienate the land is question. This they have obviously not violated, because it is not the case of the petitioner, that this land had been allotted, or, transferred, or, alienated.
5. We would, however, clarify our order of grant of status quo. We, therefore, state that the order of status quo will not restrain the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation from completing the construction of the road which is, at present, in hand. This order will only relate to maintaining the piece of land in the ownership of the Karachi Metropolitan Corporation, so that it is not transferred to any other person.
6. The application for contempt is dismissed, subject to the above ~C observations.
7. M.Y.H./A‑402/K Application dismissed.