S. MOHSIN IMAM Versus THE MAYOR, KARACHI METROPOLITAN CORPORATION

AJMAL MIAN, J.‑‑ The petitioner at the relevant time was working as Punchayat Co‑ordinator in Grade‑17 and was officiating in Grade‑19. Respondent No. 1 in exercise of the powers conferred by Rule 4(a) of the West Pakistan Local Councils and Municipal Committees Servants Retirement tt ides, 1966 read with Rule 3(b)(1) of Sind Councils (Delegation of Financial and Administrative) Powers Rules, 1980, retired the petitioner with immediate effect or on the expiry of the leave preparatory, to retirement, if applied for by him within 10 days of the receipt of the said order and sanctioned by the competent authority. The above order was superseded by another order-dated 6‑1‑1987 which was issued under the aforesaid provisions and the petitioner was retired from service with effect from 25th October, 1986(A.N) or on the expiry of leave preparatory to retirement, if applied for by him within 10 days from the receipt of the said order and sanctioned by the competent Authority. The petitioner being aggrieved by the, above orders has filed the present petition.

2. The question whether a civil servant or an employee of a Corporation or Local Authority under the control of the Government can be retired without issuing any show‑cause notice prior to the issuance of such order of retirement had been subject matter inter alia of an appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the casse of Pakistan and others versus Public at Large and others reported in P L D 1987 S C 304 in which the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court held that section 13(i)(ii) of the Civil Servants Act (LXXI of 1973), section 12(i)(ii) of the Punjab Civil Servants Act (VIII of 1974), section 13(i) of Sind Civil Servants Act (XIV of 1973), section 13(i)(ii) of the Baluchistan Civil Servants Act (IX of 1974), section 13(i) of N.‑W.F.P. Civi: Servants Act (VIII. of 1973) and Pakistan Cantonment Servants Rules, 1954, Rule 44(3) are repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam in so far as they do not provide for due notices of action proposed to be taken and opportunity of showing cause against such action. The competent Authorities were allowed six months' period from the date of decision of the Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court, that is, from 11‑3‑1987 to amend the law so as to bring it into conformity with the Injunctions of Islam, failing which specified provisions .were to cease to have legal effect. It may be observed that the above provisions empowered the Authorities specified to pass an order of retirement of the nature which is in issue. The question whether the above judgment was applicable to the employees of Cantonments or local Authorities was also dilated upon by the Hon'ble Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court in the following words:‑‑

"All this would also apply to Cantonments' employees. There is no valid reason for creating any distinction between these and. the civil servants covered by the Civil Servants Acts. The Cantonment Boards are the institutions acting in connection with the affairs of the Federation. Moreover, th" are such local Authorities who are subject to even the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Their employees perform public service. For purpose of the questions involved in this case relating to the application of the Injunctions of Islam to the rules of service of the employees of Cantonment Boards, which admittedly fall within the definition of law for this purpose, the case of those employees cannot be treated differently."

The above judgment is binding on us in view of Article 203‑GG of the Constitution which provides as follows:‑‑

"203 GG. Subject to Articles 203‑D and 202‑F, any decision of the Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under this Chapter shall be binding on a High Court and on all courts subordinate to a High Court:"

3. In Constitutional Petitions Nos. 12, 211, 289 and 387 of 1987 decided by us on 29‑9‑1987, we have followed the above judgment of the Hon'ble Appellate Shariat Bench of the Supreme Court and have declared the impugned orders as being without lawful authority and of no legal effect subject to the proviso that A the respondent may pass a fresh order after issuing a show‑cause notice and providing to the petitioner an opportunity of being heard in case the respondent so wish. We follow the above judgment and dispose of the above petition in the above terms. There will be no order as to costs.

H.B./S‑170/K Petition allowed.