MUSLIM COMMERCIAL BANK LTD. Versus IMTIAZ HUSSAR,
1. TANZIL-UR-REHMAN, J. -- This is First Appeal against the judgment dated 4-12-1985, passed by the learned Special Judge, Banking, at Karachi, dismissing Suit No. 518 of 1984, as time barred. We have heard Mr. Abdul Razzak Siddiqui, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. A. Q. Halepota, learned counsel for the respondent.
2. Admittedly, the loan was granted to the respondent by the appellant on 1-2-1979 and the suit was filed in the Court of learned Senior Civil Judge, Mirpukhas on 4-10-1983. Since the said Court had no jurisdiction, the plaint was returned to the appellant on 29-3-1984 for presentation to the proper Court. The plaint was, then, presented to the Special Court Banking on 2-10-1984 after about six months of the return of the plaint to the appellant. No reason was shown to the learned Special Court for late presentation except that the time was consumed by the appellant in taking approval.
3. The learned counsel submits that section 6-A of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 empowers the Court to condone the delay in filing the suit upto two years.
4. It is apparent from the facts stated above, that the suit originally filed before the learned Senior Civil Judge; Mirpurkhas was already barred by time for about one year and eight months. If the period during 4-10-1983 and 29-3-1984 when the appellant was prosecuting his case in a wrong forum is excluded under Section 14 of Limitation Act, the suit would still be barred by time for about two years and two months, calculating the periods of late presentation of the plaint before the two Courts.
5. Although, in our view as well, no sufficient cause has been shown by the appellant for not filing suit within the period of two years, as contemplated by section 6-A of the Ordinance, the suit would still be barred as the plaint was presented to the Special Banking Court after two years and two months.
6. For reasons as aforesaid, the learned Presiding Officer, Special Court has rightly held the suit to be time-barred and it does not call for any interference by us. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed but in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.
7. M.A.K./M-795/K
8. Appeal dismissed.