MEHTAB HUSSAIN Versus ABDUL AZIZ KHAN
ORDER
On 19‑3‑1981, the appellant had filed an application for ejectment against the respondent in respect of Ist floor of the building situated on Plot No.4/2, Commercial Area, Liaquatabad, Karachi on the grounds of default in payment of rent and personal requirement. The case proceeded before the Rent Controller and was dismissed vide order dated 11‑5‑1985. The appellant challenged this order in F.R.A. No: 384 of 1985, which was allowed by this Court vide judgment dated 27‑11‑1988. The respondent was, however, allowed two months' time to vacate the demised premises
2. On 25‑1‑1989, the respondent made an application under section 151, C.P.C., praying therein that he may be allowed one year's time to vacate the premises. The appellant has contested this application.
3. I have heard Mr. Nisarally, learned counsel for the respondent and Mr. R.H. Farooqui, learned counsel for the appellant. The learned counsel for the appellant has raised a preliminary objection about the powers of this Court to extend time, by stating that the judgment recorded by this Court on 27‑11‑1988, in terms of subsection (3) of section 21 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, has attained finality and this Court having become "functus officio" has ceased to be an Appellate Court. The expression "Functus Officio", as defined in Law Lexicon Venkatraramaiya, means having fulfilled the function, having discharged the duty, having discharged the office, or accomplished the purpose and, therefore, of no further force or authority. The case reported as Kewal Chand and another v. The State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1966 Madhya Pradesh 20), is relevant in this behalf. In my view this) Court after having decided the appeal has become ""functus officio" and is note empowered to extend time for vacating the premises. Mr. Nisarally, learned counsel for the respondent has contended that such orders are being passed by other Judges of this Court. He has in particular referred to F.R.A. No.640 of 1986, in which such extension was allowed by my brother Muhammad Mazhar Ali, J. The order by which such extension was granted is, however, not placed before me.
4. The Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, is again a special law. The provisions of section 151., C.P.C. are not attracted to a case of this nature. The existence of power is the prerequisite for the exercise of power. The application made under section 152, C.P.C., seeking extension of time for vacating the demised premises, being not maintainable, is dismissed.
A.A./M‑1634/K Application dismissed.