ANSAR HUSSAIN Versus RASHIDA BEGUM
This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a property dispute under settlement laws where the petitioner and respondent both sought transfer of an evacuee property in Lahore. The Assistant Settlement Commissioner transferred the property to the petitioner, treating it as indivisible. After a series of conflicting administrative appeals and revisions, the Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner passed two contradictory orders on separate dates regarding the revision petitions. The respondent challenged the final order via a writ petition under the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958 before the High Court. The High Court set aside both contradictory orders and remanded the case for a fresh joint hearing. A Letters Patent Appeal against this decision was dismissed. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in setting aside the inconsistent orders passed by the revisional authority. The Supreme Court held that the High Court committed no illegality in ensuring substantial justice by setting aside patently conflicting orders and ordering a rehearing, thereby refusing to grant special leave to appeal.
- Whether the High Court can set aside conflicting orders passed by a revisional authority on separate dates in the same matter?
- Can an administrative authority exercise suo motu review to cure contradictory decisions resulting from separate hearings?
- Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with a High Court order remanding a case for a joint rehearing to prevent injustice?
- Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958
1. HAMOODUR RAHMAN, J .‑The petitioner was an allotted of a portion of a building situated in Ram Gali, Lahore, being a claimant displaced person he applied for the transfer thereof. On a CH Form. The Assistant Settlement Commissioner treated the property as indivisible and transferred the same to the petitioner, as he was in possession of a major portion thereof. The respon dent No. 1 appealed from the said order. She had, it appears, put in her CH Form on the 30th of December 1959, after the expiry of the prescribed period for the acceptance of such forms. This form was returned to her on 4‑1‑60. Her claim was, therefore, not considered on the 31st of December 1959, when the property was transferred to the petitioner.
2. She filed this form along with an appeal, but her appeal was also dismissed on the ground that since her CH Form had not been accepted she could not be considered to be a proper applicant. She thereafter went up in revision before the Settle ment and Rehabilitation Commissioner contending that she had filed her forms after obtaining the permission of the Additional Settlement Commissioner. The Settlement Commissioner on the 4th of October 1960, directed the Inspector of the Department to inspect the property and to report if the house could be divided. Thereafter, on the basis of the Inspector's report the Settlement Commissioner, by his order of the 24th of October 1960, divided the property and transferred a portion to the said respondent. Against this order both the petitioner and the said respondent went up in second revision before Malik Fateh Khan, Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, with powers of Chief Settle ment Commissioner. The petition of the respondent came up for hearing on the 19th of May 1961, but the aforementioned learned Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner purported to dispose of both the revision petitions by his order of the said date and dismissed both of them.
3. Thereafter, the second revision filed by the present petitioner came up before the same learned Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner on the 7th of July 1961, and on this occasion he allowed his revision petition holding that the property was incap able of division, set aside his previous order as also that of the Settlement Commissioner and restored that of the Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner exercising the powers of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner as confirmed by the Additional Settlement Commissioner transferring the entire house to the present petitioner.
4. Against this order the respondent Rashida Begum moved the High Court by a writ petition under the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1958. A learned Single Judge took the view that the second order of Malik Fateh Khan could be treated as an order made in the exercise of suo motu powers of review but nevertheless set aside both his orders, as clearly "the hearing of the two revision petitions on two separate dates has resulted in contradictory orders." The case was thereupon remanded to the Chief Settlement Commissioner with a direction to hear both the revision petitions together and dispose them of in accordance with law.
5. Against this order the present petitioner went up in Letters Patent Appeal but a Division Bench of the High Court agreed with the learned Single Judge and upheld his order by dismissing the Letters Patent Appeal.
6. The petitioner now seeks special leave to appeal and it is contended on his behalf that the High Court was clearly wrong in setting aside the orders of Malik Fateh Khan after holding that his second order could be justified as an order passed in exercise of his jurisdiction to review suo motu.
7. We have heard the learned counsel at length but having regard to the fact that patently there are two conflicting orders by the same authority we are of the view, that the High Court has done substantial justice by setting aside both orders and directing both the revision petitions to be reheard again. We, therefore, do not consider this to be a fit case for the grant of special leave.
8. The petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
9. Leave refused.
Cited by 1 case
- Mst. RESHAM JAN vs ALLAH DITTA AND 2 OTHERS 1980 CLC 739