GOURANGA MOHAN SIKDAR Versus CONTROLLER OF IMPORT AND EXPORT

ORDER

1. HAMOODUR RAHMAN, C. J. ‑This appeal by special leave arises out of an order of a Division Bench of the High Court of East Pakistan, Dacca, dismissing a writ petition filed by the appellant herein by the following order :‑

2. "This application is rejected, as there is no substance in it:"

3. The leave was granted to consider whether this was a proper disposal of the case as from the writ petitions filed in the High Court it appeared that "some Important questions of law were presented for consideration of the Court, but the Court without recording any reasons, though an appeal lies to the Supreme Court, dismissed the writ petition summarily."

4. The writ petition was filed in the following circumstances

5. The appellant who carried on export and import business at Chittagong in the name of a partnership firm of Messrs Sikdar Brother & Co. was duly registered with the Deputy Chief Controller Imports and Exports, Chittagong, in the year 1953, for the import of drugs and medicines and was categorized as an importer entitled to receive licence up to the value of Rs. 22,000 in every half year. It actually received such licenses until the 20th of April 1961 when its registration certificate was illegally cancelled. He challenged the validity of the cancellation by a writ petition in the High Court (No. 592 of 1966) and the High Court declared the cancellation to be illegal.

6. In consequence of this declaration the registration certificate of the appellant was restored on the 3rd of August 1967 and import licences were issued to him for the period July to December 1967 only, without making any allowances for the period from January 1961 to June 1967, during which period it had been so illegally deprived of its licences.

7. His efforts to get redress from the relevant authorities having failed he again invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court by filing the Petition (No. 103 of 1968) from which the present appeal arises.

8. The contention of the petitioner before the High Court was to the effect that the consequence of the order of the High Court in Writ Petition No. 592 of 1966 was that since the petitioner had been illegally deprived of his licences since the 20th of April 1961, therefore, those licences for the entire period from 1961 to 1967 should have been restored to him upon the principle that the appellant should have been put back in the position in which he would have been if his registration certificate had not been illegally cancelled in 1961 and the licences stopped as a result of such illegal cancellation.

9. The writ petition did, therefore, raise a serious question of law as to whether as a consequence of the declaration granted by the High Court itself the appellant was entitled to be restored to the position in which he would have been if the illegal cancellation had not taken place.

10. The learned Advocate‑General, appearing before us on behalf of the respondents, does not dispute that this question of law did arise for consideration in the case but he contends that such restitution is legally not possible in the circumstances of this case. It is not for us to express any opinion as to the respective merits of the opposing contentions advanced before us but we have merely indicated them in order to show that this was not such a simple question as could have been disposed of by merely saying that there is no. substance in the application:

11. Such an order, we regret to say, does not disclose a proper application of the mind of the High Court to the merits of the case that was before it. As was pointed out by this Court in the case of Adamjee Jute Mills Limited v. The Province of East Pakistan (P D 1959 S C (Pak.) 272):

12. "There are two basic objections to this procedure (1) the Supreme Court has no idea of the grounds on which the I application was dismissed and (2) the non‑suited party has no means of knowing that the questions raised by him were considered by the High Court."

13. These objections apply with equal force to the case before us. J In view of the fact that a substantial question was raised by the applicant invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, it was, as observed by Munir, C. J., "the undoubted duty of the High Court to state what the precise point raised by the applicant was and the grounds on which it was rejected". To the same effect are the observations of this Court in the case of Mollah Ejahar Ali v. Government of East Pakistan and others (P L D 1970 S C 173) where an identical single sentence order had been made. This Court was at pains to point out that "A judicial order must be a speaking order manifesting by itself that the Court has applied its mind to the resolution of the issues involved for their proper adjudica?tion" because "litigants who bring their disputes to the law Courts with the incidental hardships and expenses involved do expect a patient and a judicious treatment of their cases and then determination by proper orders."

14. We regret to observe that these repeated observations of the Court are not receiving the attention that they should by the High Court in spite of the clear mandate contained in Article 63 of the Constitution, which is still applicable that any decision of the Supreme Court shall, to the extent that it decides a question of law or is based upon or ‑enunciates a principle of law binding on all other Courts in Pakistan". The above‑mentioned decisions did enunciate a principle of law which it was the duty of the High Court to follow.

15. For the reasons stated above, we have no alternative but to allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and send the case back to the High Court for disposal in accordance with they principles enunciated by this Court.

16. Since the impugned order was made without the issuance of notice to the respondent, the latter cannot be made liable for costs of this appeal. There will, therefore, be no order as to costs.

17. Appeal allowed.