JAMSHED AHMAD Versus MUHAMMAD AKRAM KHAN

ORDER

MUHAMMAD AFZAL CHEHMA, J .‑Jamshed Ahmad petitioner has felt aggrieved by the order of a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, dated 8‑7‑1974, whereby his petition under Clause 22 of the Letters Patent read with section 154 of the Cr. P. C. praying for the issuance of a direction to respondent No. 1 who is S. H. O,, Police Station, City Khanpur, Rahimyar Khan, for the registration of a; case under section 467/468/420/ 471/109(114/116, P. P. C. read with section 81/82 of the Registration Act and conduct of preliminary investigation by some higher police officer was dismissed in limine on the ground that in respect of the same transaction a case had already been registered with the petitioner as one of the accused therein.

2. In support of the petition for leave, learned counsel contended that respondent No. 1 was under an obligation to register the case at the instance of the petitioner reflecting his own version of the incident notwithstanding the fact that in respect of the same transaction a case had already been registered. In support of this, learned counsel has relied on the plain language of the statutory provision contained in section 154, Cr. P. C.

3. We are not impressed by the argument. A perusal of the record shows that on receipt of the petition, the learned Judge had called for a report from respondent No. 1 who gave three reasons for the non‑registration of the case at the instance of the petitioner: Firstly, that no case could be registered against the Tehsildar/Sub‑Registrar, whom the petitioner wanted to rope in as one of the accused‑persons, without the previous approval of the Provincial Anti‑Corruption, Council /Divisional Anti‑Corruption Com mittee. Secondly, that according to his information the report sought to be recorded was false, and Thirdly, that a case of forgery and cheating etc. was already under investigation in respect of the same transaction, the petitioner having been named as one of the accused therein.

4. The petition could be thrown out on the short ground that the High Court was under no obligation to grant the relief prayed for by the petitioner. It was a matter resting entirely in its discretion and there is nothing to indicate that it was improperly exercised. Even otherwise, by no means does the impugned order shut the door on the petitioner who is at liberty to initiate criminal proceedings by lodging a complaint. The position is too well known to be reiterated that the Supreme Court does not sit as a Court of appeal and interferes only in cases of grave injustice, the present case being certainly not one of those. The petition is, therefore, dismissed.

Petition dismissed.