PRESIDENT SARHAD CHAMBER OF COMMERCE Versus CHAIRMAN EVACUEE TRUST PROPERTY BORD GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN

1. Muhammad Gul. J. ‑This petition is from the judgment of the Peshawar High Court dated 25‑6‑1975, dismissing, what purported to be an appeal by the ‑ petitioner herein, under subsections (3) and (4) of section 4 of the Act 28 of 1958, in the circumstances set out below.

2. The Deputy Commissioner, Peshawar acting as the Chairman District Evacuee Trust Committee Peshawar, leased out about 16000 sq. feet situate in the area called Panj Tirath' for a period of five years to the petitioner herein on annual rental of Rs.

160. There is no dispute that the lease hold was evacuee trust property and the petitioner was put in its possession and started construction on a plot measuring about 37298 of which area actually leased to the petitioner formed the part. The Chairman. Evacuee Trust Property Board Lahore (respondent 1) being apprised of the lease and the construction started by the petitioner, sent a telegraphic notice to the petitioner to immediately stop the construction. The petitioner it appears ignored the notice and proceeded with the construction. The matter was then examined by the Chairman (respondent 1) in exorcise of his sun motu revisional jurisdiction. He again issued a notice to the petitioner on 19‑2‑1973, to stop the construction. The petitioner appeared before the Chairman through his counsel in support of its right to raise the impugned construction. The Chairman after considering the matter as aforesaid, ordered the petitioner's ejectment. He held the lease of 16000 sq. feet of evacuee trust property in favour of the petitioner by the Deputy Commissioner Peshawar as "ab initio void" ‑ and of no legal effect and the possession of the entire plot measuring 38,130 sq. ft. by the petitioner was unauthorised.

3. The petitioner went in appeal purporting to be under section 4 (3) and (4) of Act 28 of 1958, against the above order. On a preliminary on taken on behalf of respondent 1 that the nature of the trust property not teeing in question, no appeal lay under section 4 (3) and (4) of the Act 28 of 1958, the High Court gave effect to this objection and dismissed the appeal as being incompetent.

4. We have heard Mr. Peer Bakhsh Khan, Advocate at some length in support of the petition. In our opinion, on the facts of the case, the view taken by the High Court was unassailable and calls for no interference by this Court. The aforesaid provisions of the statute contemplate an appeal where the question is whether the property in dispute is in the nature of trust or not.

5. The petition is accordingly dismissed:

6. Petition dismissed.