KARAM KHAN Versus STATE
This matter concerns a review petition filed against a Supreme Court judgment that upheld the petitioner's conviction and death sentence for murder. The petitioner sought review primarily on the grounds of mitigating circumstances regarding the motive, a compromise reached between the families of the deceased and the petitioner, and the alleged inconsistency of the death penalty with Shariat law. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that a review petition requires demonstrating an error apparent on the face of the record, which the petitioner failed to establish. The Court affirmed that concurrent findings by lower courts regarding sentencing discretion should not be interfered with in review proceedings. Furthermore, the Court held that a private compromise between parties does not constitute a legal ground for reviewing a criminal conviction or sentence, though it may be relevant for executive clemency. Finally, the Court ruled that it must apply the law as it stood at the time of the offense, rejecting arguments based on subsequent legal developments or potential future legislative changes.
- Does a compromise between the families of the deceased and the accused constitute a valid ground for reviewing a criminal judgment?
- Can a court in a review petition interfere with the concurrent exercise of sentencing discretion by lower courts?
- Is a court required to apply the law as it stood at the time of the offense rather than subsequent legal developments?
- Is a private compromise between parties a relevant consideration for executive mercy under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Chapter XXIX, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898
ORDER
1. DORAB PATEL, J .-The petitioner was tried with another accused for the murder of his brother-in-law by the Sessions Judge, Campbellpur, and sentenced to death. He challenged his conviction in an appeal in the Lahore High Court which was heard with the reference from the Sessions Court. His appeal was dismissed and as the death sentence was. confirmed, he filed a petition for leave in this Court. Leave was granted, but we dismissed the appeal by our judgment dated 31-5-1980.
2. The petitioner now seeks a review of our judgment and Mr. Anwar opened his arguments by submitting that the two eye-witnesses who proved the murder were not disinterested witness. We had examined this argument and rejected it, and, as learned counsel was not able to show any error, much less an error apparent in this finding, he very fairly stated that he would seek a review only on the question of sentence.
3. In order to appreciate the grounds on which a review of the sentence passed against the petitioner is sought, we may point out that the petitioner's sister was married to the deceased and even according to the prosecution, the motive for the murder of the deceased was that the deceased had turned his wife out and served her with a notice of divorce. Therefore, learned counsel submitted that this furnished the petitioner with a genuine grievance and, as this was a mitigating cirumtance, the imposition of the death penalty was not justified.
4. Now, the question before us was not merely whether the sentence of death was to be preferred to that of life imprisonment, but whether we were justified in a second appeal in interfering with the concurrent exercise of discretion by the Courts below against the petitioner. And after examining learned counsel's submissions and the ocular evidence, we had declined to interfere with the sentence of death pronounced by the Sessions Court and confirmed by the High Court. We see no error, much less any error apparent in our refusal to interfere with this concurrent findings of the two Courts against the petitioner with regard to his plea of provocation.
5. Learned counsel then submitted that the parties had settled their disputes and forgiven the petitioner therefore, the further submission was that unless the sentence of death was altered to life imprisonment, in accordance with the compromise reached between the family of the deceased A and the family of the petitioner, it would lead to another cycle of murders. In support of this plea, learned counsel relied on a compromise deed filed before us which according to learned counsel had been signed by the families of the deceased and the petitioner. Reluctant as we are to reject a compromise, which could lead to a reduction of violence and hatred, the compromise arrived at between the parties would be no ground whatever for a review of a judgment, because the fact that the parties have decided to bury their' past hatreds does not mean that there is any error much less an errorl8 apparent in our judgment. However, this is a circumstance which could] be taken into account by the Government if the petitioner files an application in for mercy under Chapter XXIX of the Criminal Procedure Code.
6. Learned counsel's only other submission was that the imposition of the death penalty would be very harsh as the same was inconsistent with the Shariat and he relied on the latest pronouncement on this question by the Federal Shariat Court in Muhammad Riaz v. Federal Government (1) In advancing this submission learned counsel assumed that section 302, P. P. C. would be modified to the light of this judgment, but we had to construe the law as it stood at the time of the murder. Therefore, once again this plaa does not furnish any ground whatever for a review of our judgment of 3 st May, 1980, but it is open to the petitioner to raise it in an application under Chapter XXIX of the Criminal Procedure Code. With these observations, the petition is dismissed.
7. Review petition dismissed.