MANSHA Versus STATE
The petitioner, Mansha, was convicted by the trial court for the murder of two individuals and a murderous assault, receiving a death sentence. The High Court acquitted some co-accused, acquitted the petitioner of the assault charge, but maintained his conviction for murder and confirmed the death sentence, while reducing the sentences of other co-convicts to life imprisonment based on their age and influence by elders. The petitioner sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, challenging the conviction on merits and the sentence. The Supreme Court found no evidence of misreading or ignoring material evidence by the High Court, declining to grant leave on the merits of the conviction. However, the Court granted leave specifically to consider the question of sentence, particularly whether the petitioner was entitled to a lesser penalty due to the alleged influence of his elders, despite their subsequent acquittal by the courts below. The matter was set for further consideration regarding the legal permissibility of applying the 'influence of elders' doctrine when those elders have been acquitted.
- Can a convict be granted a lesser penalty on the ground of being under the influence of elders if those elders were acquitted by the courts?
- Is it permissible to reappraise evidence in a criminal appeal where the High Court has not ignored or misread material evidence?
- Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 324, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
ORDER
ASLAM RIAZ HUSSAIN, J. ‑Mansha petitioner was tried along with five others including his father Shahu, his maternal uncle Ahmad and his maternal uncle Maulu, for the murder of Shera and Dosa and murderous assault on Mst. Rasoolan (P. W. 7). Maulu died before the commencement of the trial and the remaining five accused were tried. Out of these, the learned trial Court, acquitted Ahmad, a maternal uncle, of Mansha petitioner, but convicted the remaining four accused namely, Mansha, his father Shahu, his cousin Muhammad Nawaz son of Maulu and Inayat (the son‑in‑law of Maulu and sentenced all of them to death under section 302, P. P. C. on two counts each. They were also sentenced to a fine of Rs. 1,000 each or in default of payment each one of them was ordered to undergo further R. I. for one year. under section 324/34, P. P. C. all of them were sentenced to 2 years R. I. each for causing injuries to Mst. Rasoolan P. W.
All of them filed an appeal before the High Court against their convictions and sentences. The learned High Court acquitted all the accused of the charge under section 324, P. P. C. It also acquitted Shahu of the two charges under section 302 P. P. C. but maintained the conviction of Mansha, Muhammad Nawaz and Inayat. It confirmed the death sentence of Mansha petitioner on two counts but reduced the sentence of remaining two convicts (i. e. Inayat and Muhammad Nawaz) to imprisonment for life. The reason for reducing the sentence of Muhammad Nawaz who had inflicted two spear blows to the deceased and proved to be fatal is that he was under 16 years of age at the time of occurrence and was under the influence of his uncle Shahu and cousin Mansha petitioner.
2. Before us the learned counsel for the petitioner first argued the case on merits and wanted us to reverse the findings of the High Court against Mansha by reappraising the evidence who is the only person who has challenged the impugned judgment of the High Court.
We have gone though the relevant portions of evidence with the help of the learned counsel but he has not been able to show that either the High Court has ignored any piece of evidence or misread any material portion thereof. We do not, therefore, consider this to be a fit case for grant of Leave on merits.
3. Leave is, however, granted on the question of sentence to consider whether Mansha petitioner, in the circumstances was also not entitled to the lesser penalty in view of the fact because he too, was under the influence of his father and maternal uncle as well as paternal uncle, who, according to the prosecution were present at the spot and participated in the occurrence.
It may be mentioned that this would also involve consideration of then question whether Mansha petitioner can be said to have acted under the influence of his elders, notwithstanding the fact that they have been acquitted by the trial Court or the High Court' by giving them the benefit of doubt on the ground that they were probably not present. The learned defence‑counsel has relied on Sher Hassan v. The State P L D 1959 S C (Pak.) 480 and Sheikh Hassan v. Bashir Ahmad and another P L D 1966 Pesh. 97 to contend that such a course was permissible.
Order accordingly.