MUHAMMAD ASLAM Versus MUHAMMAD SARWAR
This petition is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 8th February, 1987, whereby the respondents' conviction under Section 302/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 for murder was altered to Section 334, Part I, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, reducing their sentence to ten years' rigorous imprisonment. The core legal question was whether the High Court was justified in altering the conviction and sentence based on the finding that the occurrence took place as a single transaction during a sudden quarrel without premeditation, rather than being split into two parts as claimed by the prosecution. The Supreme Court held that the view taken by the High Court was not perverse and could reasonably be formed upon the evidence. The petition was consequently dismissed. The key principle laid down is that the Supreme Court will not interfere with an appellate court's appreciation of evidence regarding whether an occurrence constituted a sudden quarrel in a single transaction unless the view taken is perverse.
- Whether the High Court was justified in altering the conviction from murder to a lesser offence upon finding the occurrence was a sudden quarrel in one transaction?
- Will the Supreme Court interfere with the High Court's appreciation of evidence regarding the sequence of events during an occurrence?
- Section 302/34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 334, Part I, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
ORDER
1. JAVID IQBAL, J .‑‑This petition has been filed by Muhammad complainant‑petitioner and is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Lahore dated 8th February, 1987. The background is that the respondents Allah Yar, Sher and Maman were tried for an offence under section 302/34, P.P. C. for the murder of Sher Muhammad and the Additional Sessions Judge, Jhang vide his judgment dated 20th June, 1984 awarded death sentence to each of them plus fine under section 302/34, P.P.C. On appeal the Lahore High Court Lahore altered the conviction of each of them under section 334, Part I, P.P.C. and sentenced each of them to ten years' R.I. plus fine. Muhammad petitioner is brother of the deceased and he is first cousin of Allah Yar and Sher respondents. The cause of the occurrence was Vatta‑Satta marriage between the families of the accused and the complainant sides. Three years before the present occurrence the deceased was married to Mst. Saheb Khatun daughter of Inayat. In exchange Mst. Akram Bibi sister of the present petitioner was married to Allah Yar respondent. A day before the present occurrence Mst. Akram Bibi quarrelled with her husband and came to the house of the petitioner. On that Inayat father of Mst. Saheb Khatun in retaliation took her away to his house. However, in the morning of the day of occurrence Mst. Saheb Khatun on her own left the house of her parents and came to the house of her husband i.e. the deceased. The accused party suspected that the deceased and the present petitioner had forcibly brought Mst. Saheb Khatun to their house and thus it led to an exchange of hot words between the parties. It was in this background that the three respondents launched an attack on the deceased with their respective weapons. The appellate Court altered the conviction and sentence awarded to the respondents for the reason that it found that the occurrence took place in the form of one transaction and that it was not split into two parts as claimed by the prosecution. In other words the finding of the appellate Court is that the injuries were caused to the deceased when hot words were being exchanged between Inayat and the deceased about the forcible bringing of Mst. Saheb Khatun to their house and it was thus a sudden quarrel which erupted and in the heat of passions without premeditation the deceased was attacked by the respondents.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued before us that even if Mst. Saheb Khatun had come on her own there was no justification in altering the conviction and sentence of the respondents on the part of the High Court through arriving at the conclusion that the occurrence had taken place in one transaction. It was argued that hot words were exchanged between Inayat and the deceased and thereafter Inayat had left the spot and the respondents subsequently in order to avenge the insult had attacked the deceased. According to the learned counsel the prosecution version should have been accepted as the correct version. We have carefully considered the arguments of the learned counsel. But in our considered opinion the view taken by the High Court was not perverse and could be taken. In that view of the matter no case is made out for interference. The petition, is therefore, dismissed.
3. M.I./M‑407/S Petition dismissed.