STATE Versus MUHAMMAD ANWAR
This petition for leave to appeal was filed by the State against the judgment of the Lahore High Court acquitting the respondents of charges under sections 302, 307, 452, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. The core legal question involved the effect of a compromise between the parties and whether interference with an acquittal based on such a compromise was warranted. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that since the factum of compromise stood admitted and was genuine, as affirmed by the legal heirs and eye-witnesses who appeared in court, no case was made out for interference with the acquittal. The Court established the principle that an appellate acquittal founded on a genuine and admitted compromise between the parties will not typically be interfered with by the Supreme Court.
- Whether the Supreme Court will interfere with an acquittal judgment when a genuine compromise has been effected between the parties?
- Can eye-witnesses affirm a compromise before the appellate court through affidavits and personal appearance?
- Is a petition for leave to appeal against acquittal maintainable where the complainant party refuses to press the conviction due to a compromise?
- Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 307, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 452, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 34, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
ORDER
1. JAVID IQBAL, J.‑‑ This petition for leave to appeal has been filed by the State against the judgment of the Lahore High Court Lahore, dated 8th April 1986 whereby the respondents were acquitted of charges under section 302/307/452/34, P.P.C. At page 26 of the paper‑book and paras 11 and 12 of the impugned judgment it is stated that the learned counsel for the complainant submitted that he had instructions to submit that the complainant party had compromised with the respondents. He produced affidavits of the three eye‑witnesses to that effect and further stated that he had no instructions to argue for the maintenance of the conviction and sentence of the respondents. The eye‑witnesses were present in the appellate Court. They were identified by Sardar Mohammad Akram, Advocate (their counsel) and they re‑affirmed their depositions in their affidavits. Thus the finding of the appellate Court is that the factum of compromise which had been effected between the parties stood admitted and was genuine due to the affirmation of the same by the son of the deceased and the other two eye‑witnesses. It was in this background that the appellate Court proceeded to decide the appeal of the respondents on merits and acquitted them of the charge as stated above. Since the parties had compromised in this case, in our considered view no case is made out for interference. The petition therefore dismissed.
2. M.I. /S‑133/S Petition dismissed.