BASHIR AHMAD Versus GHULAM SAKINA

ORDER

MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.‑‑ Leave to appeal has been sought from Judgment dated 25‑1‑1987 of the Lahore High Court, whereby petitioner's Civil Revision, arising out of a pre‑emption matter, was dismissed.

2. The respondents' suit for pre‑emption was decreed against the petitioner, ex parte. An application filed for setting aside the ex parte order by the petitioner was dismissed. His appeal against the dismissal of that application was also dismissed by the District Court. His Revision in the High Court having met the same fate, leave to appeal has now been sought.

3. The learned counsel has contended that the petitioner having shown sufficient cause for his absence, before the trial Court, his revision should have been accepted by the High Court. Secondly that one of the pleas in support of the sufficient cause taken in the revision petition was not examined by the High Court in the impugned Judgment. Thirdly, the learned counsel has contended, that although the registered deed of transfer in favour of the petitioner showed a sale consideration of Rs.20,000, the trial Court fixed it at about 6,000. This, according to him, was in‑contravention of the rule laid down by this Court in Malik Hussain and others v . Lala Ram Chand and others P L D 1970 S C 299.

4. None of the contentions of the learned counsel has any force. The question of sufficient cause stands concluded by findings of fact against the petitioner. His explanation, for absence, having been examined by us also, is untenable. The alternative plea mentioned by, the learned counsel was not pressed during the arguments before the High Court, therefore, we have declined to entertain it now.

5. The proceedings out of which this petition for leave to appeal has arisen, were started by the petitioner by filing an appeal against the rejection of his' application for setting aside the ex parte proceedings. This appeal was filed by him after a long time when his application was dismissed and the ex parte decree had achieved finality. He had not independently challenged that decree within time. It has been so stated by the learned counsel. That being so, the decree itself is not for examination before us in the present leave to appeal petition. Even if the ground could be taken with regard to the amount of pre‑emption money, it cannot now be entertained as pre‑emption decree passed in favour of the respondents was not challenged by way of an appeal at proper time. This petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed.

M.I. /M‑51/S Petition dismissed.