MUHAMMAD ISHAQUE Versus MST. SARDAR BIBI
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by vendees/defendants against a judgment of the Lahore High Court dismissing their civil revision in a pre-emption suit. The core legal question was whether a suit wherein the trial court decreed pre-emption and directed payment of a disputed pre-emption amount constituted a compromise decree, thereby barring an appeal and stripping the appellate court of jurisdiction to extend time for depositing the pre-emption money. The Supreme Court held that the case was not one of a compromise decree, as the suit had been vigorously contested and the agreement regarding the payment amount was seriously disputed by the pre-emptors. Furthermore, because a stay order had prevented the pre-emptors from depositing the money within the originally specified time, the appellate court lawfully possessed jurisdiction to grant an extension for the deposit. The petition was accordingly dismissed, establishing the principle that a disputed agreement on a collateral matter during a contested trial does not convert a judgment into a consent decree.
- Does a disputed agreement regarding the payment of pre-emption money in a contested suit render the resulting decree a compromise decree?
- Is an appeal barred against a pre-emption decree where the parties disputed the amount payable rather than entering into a genuine compromise?
- Does an appellate court have the jurisdiction to grant further time for the deposit of pre-emption money when the appellant was prevented from paying by a stay order?
ORDER
MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.‑ ‑The vendees/defendants in a pre‑emption suit, have sought leave to appeal from the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 30‑6‑1981; whereby their civil revision was dismissed.
2. The petitioners contested the suit of the respondents/ pre‑emptors by filing a written statement of contest. The respondents' right to pre‑empt was held superior and the suit was decreed. The learned Trial Judge, however, directed them to pay the pre‑emption money alleged to have been agreed between the parties before the trial Court. The respondents filed an appeal with regard to the pre‑emption amount on the assertion and ground that they had not agreed to pay the specified amount. On appeal a stay order was issued. However, the respondents' plea with regard to the agreement was not accepted and the appeal was dismissed granting them time to pay the pre‑emption money. The petitioners challenged this order of the first appellate Court in a Revision before the High Court. The same having been dismissed, they have now sought leave to appeal.
3. The learned counsel has reiterated the same argument which was advanced before the High Court from the petitioners‑side. According to them the trial Court's decree was passed in favour of the respondents as a result of compromise between the parties; therefore, their appeal was not competent and that being so, the first appellate Court had no jurisdiction to grant further time for deposit of the pre‑emption money.
We do not agree with him. It was not a case of compromise between the parties. The petitioners had contested the respondents' suit. The mere fact that there was, as alleged from the petitioners‑side, an agreement on the question of payment of the pre‑emption money (which was seriously disputed. by the respondents‑side) would not make it a case of consent decree on compromise. In any case the respondents had disputed the factum of compromise before the District Court. And lastly the said Court had granted a stay order on account of which the respondents were prevented from making the deposit of the pre‑emption money within time specified by the trial Court. That being so, the appellate Court was within its jurisdiction to grant further time for the deposit. There is no force in this petition and the same is dismissed.
M. B.A./M‑462/S Petition dismissed.