SARFRAZ Versus GENERAL MANAGER (LEAF), PAKISTAN TOBACCO COMPANY LTD

1. MUHAMMAD HALEEM, C.J.‑ ‑Leave to appeal was granted to consider as to which of the ratio decidendi in the two cases namely Syed Mir Muhammad v. N.‑W.F.P. Government (P L D 1981 S C 176) and Dawood Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Guftar Shah (P L D 1981 S C 225) was attracted to the facts and circumstances of the case for determining its result.

2. The appellant was employed as a seasonal worker in the respondent's Company. He was charge‑sheeted under section 15(3)(h) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, for having attempted to assault the Leaf Buying Manager on 4th of October, 1984, and he was asked to submit his reply which he did alleging therein that the allegations were false. Accordingly, an Inquiry Officer was appointed to hold inquiry into the allegations. After examining such evidence as was produced by the parties, he held him to be guilty in his report dated 7th of October, 1984, and as a result thereof he was dismissed from service on 10th of October, 1984. The appellant thereafter served a grievance notice under subsection (1) of section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, which went unheeded and he thereupon filed a petition in the Labour Court for his re‑instatement and payment of back benefits. The Labour Court by its order dated 11th of March, 19666, set aside the order of dismissal and re‑instated him as prayed. The appeal against this order failed as it was dismissed on 3‑4‑1986.

3. The controversy before the Labour Appellate Tribunal turned on the question as to whether a second show‑cause notice and supply of a copy of the inquiry report to the appellant was a must before imposing any penalty upon him. In this connection the decisions referred to in the leave granting order were taken into consideration and the Labour Appellate Tribunal relied on the ratio decidendi of the case reported as Syed Mir Muhammad v. N.‑W.F.P. Government (P L D 1981 S C 225) .

4. Against this order the respondent filed a Writ Petition No.276 of 1986 and succeeded as the High Court held that the ratio decidendi of the case reported as Dawood Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Guftar Shah (PLD 1981 S C 225) was applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case.

5. We are informed by the counsel for the appellant that there were no Rules for holding an inquiry. Be that ,as it may, it is the procedure prescribed under section 15(4) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, which will be applicable to the inquiry proceedings; and in terms is:

6. "No order of dismissal shall be made unless the workman concerned is informed in writing of the alleged misconduct (within one month of the date of such misconduct or of the date on which the alleged misconduct comes to the notice of the employer) and is given an opportunity to explain the circumstances alleged against him."

7. This provision was interpreted in Dawood Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Guftar Shah (P L D 1981 S C 225) and it was held that neither the giving of second show‑cause notice nor the supplying of the report of the inquiry officer is a requirement of principles of natural justice. All that is needed in the circumstances is to give a fair opportunity of hearing and defence to the other side so as to fulfill the requirement of natural justice. Therefore, the assumption that a second show‑cause notice and a copy of the inquiry report was necessary to be supplied before the penalty is imposed is erroneous as this requirement was spelt out from the N.‑W.F.P. Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973, on the facts and circumstances of the case to satisfy the requirement of prejudice said to have been caused to the Government servant. It is always now a question to be resolved on the facts of each case as to whether such a requirement was necessary considering the element of prejudice. The Tribunal, therefore, erred in law to rely upon the decision in Syed Mir Muhammad's case.

8. We have also examined the merits of the case and we find nothing to show any violation of the principles of natural justice.

9. The appeal is accordingly without substance and is dismissed but with no order as to costs.

10. M.I./S‑144/S Appeal dismissed.