KOHINOOR INDUSTRIES LTD. Versus FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of the petitioner's writ petition by the Lahore High Court concerning a claim for the refund of excess excise duty paid to the department. The core legal question involves whether the High Court erred in dismissing the writ petition while directing the relevant authority to dispose of the pending application for condonation of delay expeditiously in accordance with the law. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the High Court's direction was a positive one requiring the authority to act in accordance with the law and that the petitioner could approach the authority for proper relief upon hearing and consideration of relevant questions. The Court further noted the appropriateness of examining whether the respondent department had a voluntary obligation to refund admitted amounts and whether rules barring such refunds are ultra vires the law and the Constitution. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition.
- Whether a direction by the High Court to an authority to dispose of a time-barred refund application expeditiously constitutes a sufficient positive direction?
- Is it the duty of a government department to discharge its obligation voluntarily to refund admitted amounts of excess duty?
- Whether rules preventing the refund of excess duty without a formal timely demand are ultra vires the law and the Constitution?
ORDER
1. MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.‑ ‑Leave to appeal has been sought against the dismissal of petitioner's writ petition by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in an excise duty case.
2. It seems from the High Court judgment and the orders impugned before the High Court that the liability of the Department to refund the excess duty paid by the petitioner, is not denied. However, the claim for this refund has been rejected mainly on the ground that it was not made within the prescribed time limit. As it further appears from the record, the request for condonation of delay was not examined on its own merit; therefore, the learned Judge in the High Court made the observation, that the application made in that behalf "shall be disposed of expeditiously, in accordance with law preferably within two months". This it seems amongst others, was one substantial reason, for the High Court to dismiss the writ petition.
3. Learned counsel contended that the High Court has left the matter in confusion without giving one or the other positive direction.
4. We do not agree with him. The observation noted above is positive direction to the authority to act in accordance with the law. The petitioner's writ petition, at least indirectly fructified to that extent. The Authority is now to be approached for proper relief oil hearing and consideration of the relevant questions. We may add that it would also be appropriate to examine whether; regardless of any demand from the petitioner, was it not the duty of the respondent side to discharge its obligation/ liability voluntarily to refund the admitted amount. If not whether the rule preventing them to do so, is not ultra vires the law and the Constitution. With these remarks this petition is dismissed, accordingly.
5. M.I . / K‑65/S Petition dismissed.