MUHAMMAD SAEED Versus MUHAMMAD ASHRAF
This matter concerns three appeals arising from rent restriction eviction proceedings where the Lahore High Court had set aside eviction orders against tenants. The primary legal question was whether the High Court, in the exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction, was justified in interfering with the discretion exercised by the special rent forum regarding the alleged default in rent payments. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court could substitute its own discretion for that of the special forum when determining if a default had occurred. Upon review, the Court found that in one case, there was no default if the rent payment made to the landlord's father was accepted as valid. In the other two cases, the High Court had correctly reviewed the record and receipts, which demonstrated that no actionable default remained. The Supreme Court affirmed that payment to the landlord's father, in the absence of ill-will, constituted a valid discharge of the tenant's liability. Consequently, the Court held that the High Court's interference was justified, and the appeals were dismissed as lacking substance.
- Can a payment of rent made to the father of a landlord be considered a valid discharge of a tenant's liability?
- Is the High Court's exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction appropriate when it reviews the discretion exercised by a special rent forum regarding rent default?
- Does the High Court have the authority to re-examine factual findings regarding rent payment receipts in Constitutional petitions?
1. MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J .‑‑These three appeals through leave of this Court arise out of Rent Restriction eviction application filed by a landlord against different tenants. They are directed against the judgments of the Lahore High Court, whereby Constitutional petitions against the orders of eviction of respondents‑tenants were allowed and the said orders set aside.
2. Leave to appeal was granted to examine whether the High Court could have interfered with the question of exercise of discretion by the special forum concerned in favour of respondents‑tenants, on the question of default in payment of rent.
3. The arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant and the relevant part of order for grant of leave to appeal are reproduced below: ‑
4. "The learned counsel, inter alia, has contended: that the deposit of rent in the name of the father of the petitioner being a payment to a wrong person, the High Court should not have exercised Constitutional jurisdiction; that; late deposit of other rent having been established, the High Court could not have exonerated the tenants in this behalf in the exercise of its Constitutional Jurisdiction.
5. After hearing the learned counsel, we do not consider it a fit case for grant of leave to appeal on the first point, noted above, as in the peculiar circumstances, the recipient of the rent via‑a‑via the point raised is the father of the petitioner. There being no ill‑will between them, we will consider it as payment to the petitioner. The question, however, whether the High Court should have exercised its Constitutional Jurisdiction with regard to the remaining default in payment of rent by the respondents/ tenants and other questions raised 'in these petitions, require examination. Leave to appeal is, accordingly granted."
6. We have examined the question of default in payment of rent in each case with reference to the period of default therein. While granting leave to appeal our impression was that leaving aside the payment made to the father of the appellant, some default would still remain actionable. That being so, it needed to be determined whether the High Court notwithstanding this remaining default, could substitute its own discretion in Constitutional jurisdiction for one exercised by the special lower forum. But on deeper examination of the facts it has been revealed that in one case, there was no default as admitted by the appellant's Counsel before the High Court, if the payment to the father of the appellant is treated as valid discharge of tenants' liability. In the other two cases, the High Court made reference to the record before it (several annexures) showing that if the position with regard to payment to the father remains the same, there was no default left to be taken note of. Not only this, the learned counsel for the respondents with bundle of receipts in his hands, threw a confident challenge to the learned counsel for the appellant with regard to the aforestated position regarding payment of rent.
7. Learned counsel for the appellant could not meet this situation particularly when, it was found that all the necessary documents which were before the High Court had not been filed on the record.
8. Learned counsel for the appellant however, reiterated his argument advanced and rejected at the time of grant of leave to appeal; namely, that payment to the father of the appellant was not a valid tender of rent. This argument was rejected in the said order after due consideration and we, accordingly, declined to re‑open this question.
9. In the light of the foregoing discussion, there is no substance in these appeals. They are dismissed with costs.
10. M.I./M‑530/S Appeals dismissed.