MUHAMMAD HUSSAIN Versus ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, GUJRANWALA
This appeal by leave of the Supreme Court of Pakistan is directed against the dismissal of the appellant's constitutional petition regarding an ejectment order passed by the Rent Controller. The core legal question was whether the Rent Controller had the jurisdiction to determine if the nature of the property in dispute was evacuee trust property. The Supreme Court held that once a Permanent Transfer Deed (P.T.D.) had been issued by the Settlement Department in favor of the predecessor-in-interest and the property transferred, neither the Rent Controller, the Additional District Judge, nor the High Court possessed the jurisdiction to go behind the P.T.D. and re-examine the nature of the property. The Court established the principle that a P.T.D. issued by the competent settlement authorities is conclusive regarding title in rent proceedings, and the relationship of landlord and tenant having been established through cogent evidence, the ejectment order was validly maintained.
- Whether the Rent Controller has the jurisdiction to decide if the nature of a property is evacuee trust property after a Permanent Transfer Deed has been issued?
- Can the High Court or appellate courts go behind a Permanent Transfer Deed issued by the Settlement Department in ejectment proceedings?
- Does the issuance of a Permanent Transfer Deed establish conclusive title for the purpose of determining the relationship of landlord and tenant?
ALI HUSSAIN QAZILBASH, J.‑ ‑Leave in this appeal was granted to consider the soundness of the argument raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that the Rent Controller, Gujranwala, had no jurisdiction to decide whether the nature of the property was evacuee trust or not.
2. A burnt site bearing Khasra No.678, situate in Street No.11, Gobind Garh, Gujranwala City, described in detail in para.1 of the ejectment petition, was an evacuee property and transferred to one Faqir Muhammad by the Settlement Department as back as 27th May, 1968 and P.T.D. was issued in his name. The said transferee subsequently sold this plot to Faiz Muhammad (Respondent No.3) through a registered sale‑deed dated 30‑5‑1973. The appellant was then inducted as a tenant in the suit property and on his failure to pay the rent he was proceeded against before the Rent Controller, Gujranwala, or a number of grounds. This application was resisted and the appellant also questioned the ownership of respondent No.3 and asserted that the property in his possession is owned by the Auqaf Department. A preliminary issue as to the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties was framed, and the Rent Controller after recording the evidence in the case held the respondent as owner of the suit property. It was also found that the appellant was a rent defaulter and, therefore, his ejectment was ordered on 12‑7‑1979. The appeal filed by the appellant was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Gujranwala, on 2‑3‑1980, and his constitutional petition was also dismissed in limine on 11‑8‑1980.
3.We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The proposition raised in the leave granting order has been considered by us and we find that it has no substance. Since the property was an evacuee property and transferred to the original owner in May, 1968 and P.T.D. issued to him, who then sold it to respondent No.3, therefore, neither the Rent Controller nor the Additional District Judge, or the High Court had any jurisdiction to go beyond the P.T.D. and hold the property other than the evacuee property. The existence of relationship of landlord and tenant having been established through cogent evidence, the ejectment order was rightly passed. As the further determination of the nature of the property, the to approach the relevant authorities, if so advised.`
4. In so far the objection in recording the statements of Mat.Latifan, the wife of respondent No.3, and the other witnesses, this has been considered and repelled by the Courts below on sound reasoning and no ground exists for us to come to a different finding.
5. Finding no force in the appeal the same is dismissed with no order as to costs.
M,Y.H./M‑558/S Appeal dismissed.