SHER AFZAL KHAN Versus ADRIAN AFZAL
ORDER
1. JAVID IQBAL, J.‑‑ This petition for leave is directed against judgment of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, dated 17 April, 1984 whereby writ petition of the petitioner was dismissed.
2. Briefly the facts are that respondent No.1 through his mother filed an application for maintenance under section 488, Cr.P.C. against the present petitioner his father, in the Court of Judge Family Court Sialkot. The petitioner did not appear and ex parte proceedings were taken against him. However, subsequently the ex parte proceedings were set aside on the application of the petitioner and the case proceeded on merits. Afterwards since no one appeared on behalf of the petitioner, he was again proceeded ex parte. Eventually the. Judge Family Court accepted the petition of respondent No.1 and directed the petitioner to pay maintenance of Rs.200 per month to him from the date of the application. Thereafter, the petitioner again applied for setting aside the ex parte decree but his petition was dismissed in his absence. He again moved for restoration. The trial Court restored his application but since the petitioner had again absented himself on the next date, it was dismissed for non‑prosecution. Thereafter, he again moved an application before the Family Court for recalling its order but this application was also dismissed as no one had appeared. On the other hand he challenged the initial order passed by the Judge Family Court about the grant of maintenance of Rs.200 per month to respondent No.1 upto the level of the Supreme Court but he failed. In the subsequent stage of litigation. the petitioner attempted to take the stand that respondent No.1 was not his son. His case also was that since he was serving in the Army on the active service, the order had been passed when he was on duty. It appears from the proceedings that he had tried his level best not to appear before the Court so that he may not have to deposit the amount of maintenance. Since this is the position in our view the application of the petitioner, dated 31 July, 1982 was rightly dismissed by the Judge Family Court. Again the Additional District Judge was justified in refusing to interfere, and in the circumstances in view of his conduct the learned Judge of the High Court was correct in arriving at the conclusion that he was disentitled to' invoke the discretionary jurisdiction by way of writ petition. In the light of the above discussion we find no substance in this petition which is accordingly' dismissed.
3. M.A.K./S‑403/S Petition dismissed.