PUNJAB EMPLOYEES SOCIAL SECURITY INSTITUTION, LAHORE and others Versus MANZOOR HUSSAIN KHAN and others

SHAFIRUR RAHMAN, J. ---Leave to appeal was granted in two connected appeals arising out of two writ petitions disposed of by judgments of the Lahore High Court dated 12th of February, 1989 to examine whether the power to grant advance increments as an award was possessed by the Commissioner, Punjab Employees' Social Security Institution (hereinafter referred to as the Institution) and could not be revoked, once granted, by the Governing Body of the Institution.

2. The Institution is a body corporate founded under the West Pakistan Ordinance No: X of 1965. Its Chief Executive happened to be the Commissioner. In order to encourage and recognise efficient service within the Organisation, a system of reward in the form of grant of Honorarium and advance increments was devised. In accordance therewith, the Commissioner had been granting advance increments at his discretion to those whom he considered efficient. It appears that at certain stages protests against grant of such increments were voiced. The Governing Body, thereupon, in its meeting held on 8-11-1987 took a decision which is now a matter of dispute between the parties. The resolution which it passed was as hereunder:--

3. This aggrieved the respondents/the beneficiaries of the advance increments who challenged this Resolution of the Governing Body by resort to Constitutional jurisdiction. The learned Judge in the High Court examined the various aspects of the case, the practice of the Department, the Regulations and the Orders in the field and came to the conclusion that the aforesaid Resolution and its implementation by order, dated 14-11-1988 were without lawful authority and of no legal effect. This has aggrieved the Institution which has come up in appeal.

4. A preliminary objection was taken to the competence of these or such an appeal on the ground that the decision of the Governing Body was not open to appeal, review or revision in any forum. Therefore, an Intra-Court Appeal was competent and the Institution having not preferred it, it could not maintain these appeals in this Court.

Technically this preliminary objection has force. Nevertheless, as the question involved on merits is substantially of law and also Fundamental Rights, we would rather not give effect to it.

5. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties at length and going through the various documents on record we find that there are three material defects in the impugned decision of the Governing Body which render it without lawful authority and of no legal effect, so far as the denial of such advance increments to those who were already in receipt of it is concerned.

The first is that in its meeting in 1966, the Governing Body had decided to recognise and reward meritorious service by grant of Honoraria and increments and the financial allocation for that purpose had been enhanced. There existed in the background, a policy decision of the Governing Body on the subject. The mere fact that the Rules or Regulations on the subject were not framed, such recognition could not take place, would not be a correct view on the legal plane.

Secondly, the Governing Body, while upholding such grant of advance increments prior to 1986 recognised the authority of the Commissioner to grant it. Even otherwise, being the Chief Executive and also the competent authority to make the appointment, such a power would appear to be a part of the power of appointment and execution of the policy decisions as such.

Thirdly, and finally, the Governing Body has demonstrated an unreasonable discrimination by fixing a date prior to which the grant of such advance increments had been protected and after which such grants have been revoked. No sanctity attaches to that date or period. The criteria adopted that such grants against which protests have been made and those against which protests have not been made, is neither a rational criteria nor a criteria which can be approved for adoption by public authorities. This will encourage protests and protest by itself will become a good ground for doing away with actions otherwise good and commendable. Each case had to be examined on its own merit or a pervasive evil had to be identified before such a discriminatory decision could be taken.

6. We find that the judgments and orders of the High Court suffer from no such legal infirmity as may require our interference. Hence, both the appeals are dismissed with no-order as to costs.

AA./P-176/S Appeals dismissed.