ZARINA DOOSANI Versus ABDUL MEHDI
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed by a tenant against the dismissal of her First Rent Appeal by the High Court, which affirmed her eviction order passed by the Rent Controller on the ground of property reconstruction. The core legal question examined by the Supreme Court of Pakistan was whether the sanction for reconstruction obtained by the landlord continues to enure for his benefit even after the original period for which it was granted has expired. The Court held that whether a sanction enures in favour of the landlord till the conclusion of proceedings depends upon the circumstances of each case, noting that eviction proceedings ordinarily take longer than the standard one-year validity of such sanctions. Furthermore, the Court observed that the building was in a dilapidated condition, other tenants had already vacated, and the tenant had a statutory right to reoccupy after reconstruction. Consequently, the Court refused to grant leave to appeal. The key principle laid down is that the validity of a reconstruction sanction during protracted litigation depends on the facts and circumstances of the case.
- Whether the sanction for reconstruction obtained by a landlord enures for their benefit notwithstanding the expiration of the original period for which it was granted?
- Does the expiration of a reconstruction sanction prior to or during eviction proceedings invalidate the landlord's right to seek eviction for reconstruction?
- Is resistance to eviction by a tenant based on bona fide reasons when the building is in a dilapidated condition and other tenants have vacated?
ORDER
1. MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, C.J --- Leave to appeal has been sought by the tenant in an urban rent restriction matter against the dismissal by the High Court of her First Rent Appeal whereby the order of her eviction on account of re‑construction of the property in question, passed by the learned Rent Controller was affirmed.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner rightly pointed out that the only question now left for examination is whether the sanction for re‑construction which was admittedly obtained by the respondent landlord, enures for the benefit of the landlord notwithstanding the fact that the original period for which it was granted, had expired.
3. Learned counsel tried to distinguish the case relied upon in the impugned judgment and stated that while. in the said case the period of sanction had expired during the pendency of the case, in this matter accordingly to him, it has expired prior to the filing of the application. After some discussions regarding the difficulty in obtaining/receiving sanction which ordinarily is granted for one year at one time while the eviction application ordinarily takes much longer time to be decided, it was agreed that it all depends upon circumstances of each case as to whether the sanction would or would not enure in favour of the landlord till the conclusion of the proceedings before the highest Court. Although the learned counsel candidly stated that there are many cases supporting the landlord in this behalf but without citing them he tried to distinguish them. Be that as it may, it is not denied that the force of authority on this and related question is against the petitioner.
4. Apart from the above consideration there is another important feature of the case. Learned counsel admitted that the building is in a dilapidated condition. He also admitted on the pointing out of the learned counsel for the respondent/caveator that all other tenants have vacated the building, presumably because of its condition and further that it is, going to be re constructed by the respondent landlord. Despite all this it does not appeal to reason that resistance by the petitioner to vacate the premises (so as to 13 facilitate the re‑construction) is based on some bona fide reasons, particularly when it is not denied that after re‑construction petitioner would have a right to reoccupy in accordance with the conditions provided in the law. For all these reasons we do not consider it a fit case for grant of leave to appeal. The same is accordingly refused.
5. M.BA./Z‑144/S Petition dismissed.