MUHAMMAD ASHRAF KHAN Versus ABDUL QADAR

MUHAMMAD MUNIR KHAN, J. ‑‑‑This petition for leave to appeal which is directed against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, dated 6‑2‑1993 arises from the facts that on 19‑7‑1975, Abdul Qadar and 3 others (respondents‑legal representatives of Ghulam Bari, since dead) tiled suit for dissolution of partnership and rendition of accounts against Muhammad Ashraf Khan (petitioner) in the Court of Civil Judge, Lahore. The suit was resisted. Issues were framed. The parties led their evidence. The preliminary decree for the rendition of accounts was passed by the trial Court on 29‑4‑1989. The appeal filed by the petitioner 'against this decree was dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Lahore on 18‑10‑1989. The revision petition filed by him against the judgment of the appellate Court was also dismissed on 6‑2‑1993.

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised the following points before this Court:‑‑

(i) That the alleged partnership deed (Exh. P.1) is not a genuine document and the signatures of the petitioner thereon were obtained fraudulently by Ghulam Bari (predecessor‑in‑interest of the respondents);

(ii) that in any case, under section 42 of the Partnership Act, by the death of Ghulam Bari, the firm stood automatically dissolved in the year 1964. So, neither the respondents (legal heirs of Ghulam Bari) can be treated as partners in the firm, nor can they claim dissolution thereof or the rendition of accounts; and

(iii) That the partnership deed (Exh. P.1) only speaks of the inheritance of the respondents in respect of the share of a deceased partner.

3. We do not feel persuaded to agree with him. There are concurrent findings of facts by the trial Court and the appellate Court that the partnership deed (Exh. P.1) was a genuine document and was duly executed by the petitioner. The concurrent findings of facts arrived at by the two Courts below were not challenged by the petitioner before the High Court. Before us, the learned counsel for the petitioner has admitted that the signatures on the partnership deed (Exh. P.1) are of the petitioner. So, no exception can be taken to the conclusion drawn by the Courts below from the evidence on record.

4. As regards point No. (ii), section 42 of the Partnership Act will not help the petitioner.

The same may be reproduced advantageously:‑‑

"42. Dissolution on the happening of certain contingencies.‑Subject to contract between the partners a firm is dissolved‑‑

(i) if constituted for a fixed term, by the expiry of that term;

(ii) if constituted to carry out one or more adventures or undertakings, by the completion thereof;

(iii) by the death of a partner; and

(iv) by the adjudication of a partner as an insolvent."

The plain reading of the provision of law reproduced above will show that this provision is subject to the contract between the partners. In the partnership deed (Exh. P.1), it has clearly been stated that:‑‑

So, on the death of Ghulam Bari, the respondents had automatically become partners in the firm.

5. An examination of Receipts (Exh. P.9 to Exh. P. 16) shows that after the death of Ghulam Bari, his legal heirs had been receiving their share of profits from the petitioner on 6‑8‑1965, 2‑11‑1965,12‑11‑1965 and 5‑9‑1970. So, the contention of the learned counsel at No. (iii) that the partnership deed (Exh. P.1) only speaks of inheritance of the respondents in respect of the share of a deceased partner and nothing more, is without substance. The learned counsel has failed to point out any non‑reading or misreading of the material evidence by the Courts below.

6. We do not see any cogent reason to interfere with the well‑reasoned judgment of the High Court. Accordingly, leave to appeal is refused.

A.A./M‑2180/SC ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Leave refused.