NAVEED NAWAZISH MALIK Versus GHULAM RASOOL BHATTI

SALEEM AKHTAR, J‑‑‑ This application under sections 3 and 4 of the Contempt of Court Act, 1976 read with Article 204 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and Order XXVII of Supreme Court Rules, 1980 arises from the following facts.

2. The petitioner being a landlord filed an ejectment application on 31‑5‑1986 under section 13 of Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 seeking ejectment of respondent No.1 from Shop No.4, Property 46.7‑C, Commercial Zone, Liberty Market, Gulberg Lahore. On 5‑11‑1986 the learned . Controller passed order under section 13(6) of the Ordinance directing respondent No.l to deposit arrears as well as future rent in the treasury. As he committed default his 'defence was struck off on 15‑2‑1987 and he was ordered to be ejected. He challenged this order in appeal which was dismissed but in the writ petition filed by him the case was remanded to the Controller to decide it on merits. The learned Controller after hearing the case ordered for ejectment on 22‑12‑1991 directing respondent No. 1 to deliver vacant possession of the shop to the petitioner, Respondent No. l filed appeal against it which was dismissed on 28‑7‑1993. Second appeal was dismissed on 30th November, 1993. Respondent No.l then filed civil petition for leave to appeal in this Court. After considering the contentions raised by the parties it was observed that:‑‑

"We find no legal basis to interfere in the above‑noted finding in this regard. This petition having no substance is, therefore, dismissed and leave refused.

At this stage learned counsel for petitioner prayed that some time may be granted to the petitioner to vacate the shop in dispute and possession thereof deliver to the respondent. Mr. Najmul Hassan Kazmi, Advocate, learned counsel for caveator, on instruction, agreed to allow the petitioner to vacate the shop and deliver its possession without any objection whatsoever within eight months from the date of this order. With the consent of the learned counsel for the parties the petitioner shall vacate the shop in dispute and deliver its vacant possession to the respondent on or before 15th August, 1994, without any objection. There shall be no order as to costs."

From the above order it is clear that at the request of respondent No. 1 and with the consent of the advocates for the parties respondent was ordered to vacate the shop and deliver vacant possession on or before 15th August, 1994 without any objection. It seems that respondent No. l did not vacate the premises within the specified time. However respondent No.2 filed a suit in the Court of Senior Civil Judge, Lahore on 4‑8‑1994 against the petitioner for perpetual injunction alleging that he is an occupant of Shop No.7‑C, Liberty Market, Gulberg Lahore, the disputed shop, at a rent of Rs.3,000 per month, and had also given Rs.10,00,000 as Pagri and paying regular rent to the petitioner. The petitioner was interfering with this possession and threatened to dispossess him. An interim injunction seems to have been issued against the petitioner on 4‑8‑1994 restraining him from dispossessing respondent No.2 illegally. As the notice was not returned by the process‑server, on 10‑8‑1994 a fresh notice was given and the case was adjourned to 5‑9‑1994. The interim injunction was to continue. It seems that on 2‑9‑1994 the petitioner filed application for execution of the ejectment order to which respondent No.2 filed objections in which he narrated about the litigation between the petitioner and respondent No. I and also that the Supreme Court had dismissed his petition for leave to appeal. It was further stated that in the light of the order of the Supreme Court respondent No. l handed over vacant possession of the shop to the petitioner on 14‑7‑1994. During the time when the shop was vacant respondent No.2 negotiated with the petitioner who agreed to rent out the same at the rent of Rs.3.000 per month and Rs.10,00,000 as Pagri. The possession was handed over on payment of the said amount and on 16‑7‑1994 respondent No.2 had opened a Boutique to the name of '786 Boutique'. He also referred to rent deed of the shop original of which was alleged to be with the petitioner and the same was written in the presence of witnesses. He also alleged to have paid advance rent of 1 months but the petitioner started threatening him to eject and that he would teach a lesson to him for appearing as witness against him in the ejectment case. Respondent No.2 then filed suit and obtained interim injunction. Respondent No.l also filed similar objection repeating the same facts and stated that the petitioner by concealing correct facts wants the ejectment with mala fide intention. The petitioner filed a rejoinder to this reply and denied all the allegations. He stated that respondent No.2 was carrying on business Benami for respondent No. 1. He denied having received possession from respondent No.l or any amount from respondent No.2 or given him the disputed shop on rent. He further stated that respondent No.2 had always been in close association with respondent No. 1 and not colluded with him for frustrating the order of the Court. The learned Civil Judge on 3‑10‑1994 dismissed the objection filed by the respondents. Respondent No.2 filed appeal before the District Judge which was dismissed on 29‑11‑1994. Respondent No. l then filed Constitution petition in tote High Court in which by order dated 5‑12‑1994 it was ordered that respondent No.2 shall not be dispossessed subject to the condition that he shall continue to deposit Rs.3,000 per month in the Court of the Rent Controller. When the petitioner appeared and objected to the order being passed the learned Judge modified his order dated 5‑12‑1994 to the extent that the order passed would be without prejudice to the right of either party. When it was brought to the notice of the Court that a contempt petition has been filed by the petitioner in the Supreme Court the learned Judge ordered that the order dated 5‑12‑1994 shall be subject to the order passed by the "learned Supreme Court". During this proceeding the petitioner had filed an application for contempt on 2‑9‑1994 and process was issued to the respondents. They submitted their reply and reiterated the same pleas which were raised in the objections to the execution application. The case was then set for recording the evidence of the parties. The affidavits of the parties and respondents' witnesses were filed and those available on the date of hearing were cross‑examined. The evidence of the respondents in a nut shall is that in compliance with the order of the Supreme Court respondent No. I delivered vacant possession of the shop to the petitioner on 14‑7‑1994 on execution of a deed which was witnessed by two witnesses. Thereafter on 16‑7‑1994 the petitioner under a Rent Deed executed in presence of the witnesses rented out the same to respondent No.2 who is now in possession of the shop as a tenant.

3. Mr. Najam-ul-Hassn Kazmi learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that with a view to frustrate the order passed by this Court with the consent of the parties, Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 conspired with each other and concocted a false story of delivery of possession and renting out the shop to respondent No.2. This action has been taken merely to deprive the petitioner of the fruits of the decree and further to obstruct clear and smooth flow of the stream of justice. The learned counsel further contended that the respondents have knowingly flouted the order, obstructed the process of justice and frustrated the order of the Court. Ch. Muhammad Hasan, Advocate for respondent No.l and Mr. Jawahar Naqvi, Advocate for respondent No.2 contended that the petitioner having obtained the possession rented out the shop to respondent No.2 and has falsely denied the delivery of possession which was made in presence of witnesses and therefore the question of breach of order or violation of any undertaking or obstructing the course of justice does not arise. To substantiate their contentions the learned counsel for the parties have referred to the statement of the witnesses recorded in these proceedings. The petitioner has appeared, filed his affidavit and reiterated facts stated in the petition. He was cross‑examined by Ch. Muhammad Hasan and Mr. Jawahar Naqvi who denied all suggestions regarding taking of possession of the shop in dispute, renting it out to respondent No.2, receiving rent or Pagri or the opening of Boutique 786 in the disputed premises. He also denied the execution of the deeds alleged to have been executed by him. He did not examine any other witnesses and relied various orders which were passed from time to time. Respondents besides themselves examined four witnesses.

4. The first question is whether respondent No. l delivered vacant possession of the shop to the petitioner on or before 15‑8‑1994. In this regard the respondents have relied on a document Exh.RW 1/1 which is a photo copy of the deed alleged to have been executed by respondent No. l in presence of two witnesses namely Iftikhar Ahmed and Rashid Chowdhry as well as by the petitioner. This is a declaration by respondent No. l that he has complied with the order of the Supreme Court and handed over possession with telephone No.876411 to the petitioner and from this date (14‑8‑1994) "he has no concern with the shop". Respondent No.l sticks to his statement with regard to this document. This document was got attested by the notary public as alleged by the respondent. The original documents has not been produced alleging that the petitioner had kept its original in his possession. In order to cast doubt on the authenticity of this document the learned counsel for the petitioner has pointed out that considering .the contents of the document as it was a declaration by respondent No.l there was no need for the petitioner to have signed it. In ordinary circumstances when possession is obtained from a tenant it is the landlord who acknowledges to have received the possession and signs the document. Furthermore when such a document is executed for delivery of possession the original is normally kept by the tenant and not by the landlord. Be that as it may, the petitioner has denied signature on this document. A perusal of the document will show that on the right side of the margin the following words have been written:‑‑

These words have been written over the stamps of the Notary Public which facts shows that the natorial stamps were fixed first and these words were written afterwards. From these facts it can be inferred that after the attestation was made these words were added. Under it is the signature of the petitioner. This signature as stated earlier has been denied and the matter was not referred to any handwriting expert. Only respondent No. l and Iftikhar Ahmed one of the marginal, witness have been examined. One witness namely Rashid Chowdhry who had filed affidavit‑in‑evidence did not appear on the date of hearing for cross‑examination. Hence his affidavit has been excluded from consideration. Iftikhar Ahmed R.W.2 who is the attesting witness of Exh.RW 1/1 has stated that Ghulam Rasool had signed before he had arrived for affixing his signature. The attestation was not done in his presence. He only signed and went back. He also stated that he could not say that Exh. RW 1/1 is a forged document or not. It was also stated by him that the petitioner had also signed before he arrived thus neither the petitioner nor respondent No. l had signed this document in his presence. Therefore the main document by which delivery of possession by respondent No. l is alleged to have been given to the petitioner has not been proved. Respondent No. l had produced only a photo copy of RW 1/1 alleging that the original had been retained by the petitioner. There is no other eye witness to establish that possession was delivered to the petitioner. The delivery of possession by respondent No. l to the petitioner has not been proved.

5. In support of~ the fact that after obtaining possession from respondent No. l the petitioner let out the shop to respondent No.2 reliance has been placed on photo copy of rent deed Exh. RW 3/1 alleged to have been executed on 17‑7‑1994, by the petitioner and two witnesses namely Abid Masood and Shahzad Bashir. Abid Masood R.W.3 filed his affidavit stating that the petitioner had agreed in his presence to rent out the shop to respondent No.2 on monthly rent of Rs.3,000 and received Rs.10 lacs as Pagri. He stated that the petitioner had not signed this document. No receipt was executed for payment of Rs.4,500 as rent Rs.10.00,000 were paid on 17‑7‑1994 and before this date the petitioner and respondent No.2 did not have a talk in respect of the shop. The terms and conditions were settled on 17‑7‑1994 and possession was delivered on the same day. He admitted that in EXh.RWI/1 it is stated that the possession was delivered to Amjad Waheed Butt on 16‑7‑1994 but he was not aware of anything about possession. Another unattested photo copy of the same rent deed Exh.RW3/2 was shown which he admitted to bear his signature. This document finds certain interpolations particularly as regards the residence number of the petitioner and number of his national Identity Card. Respondent No.2 also appeared and was cross‑examined. According to him RW3/1 was prepared by a petition‑writer and was delivered to him on 17‑7‑1994. According to him the petitioner had first delivered to him photo copy and then got attested after rectifying certain mistakes. He also admitted that Exh.RW3/1 does not bear the signature of the petitioner nor it bears its initial on the cuttings. According to him he had agreed to deliver possession of a shop on 16‑7‑1994 orally but physical possession was delivered on 17‑7‑1994. When his attention was invited to Exh. RW 4/4 the affidavit which he had filed in the Court of Rent Controller in execution proceedings where it was written, that he had obtained possession of the shop on 16‑7‑1994 and was running a Botique he stated that he had signed it without reading it which was prepared by his advocate. Likewise when his attention was drawn to Exh.RW 4/5 4 writ petition he had filed in which it was stated that he had obtained possession on 16‑7‑1994 he explained that it was delivered orally but physical possession was given on 17‑7‑1994. The‑ original of Exh.3/1 was not produced although in the plaint filed by respondent No.2 seeking injunction against the petitioner in Exh.RW4/7 a form under Order VII, R. 14, C.P.C. signed by him (respondent No.2) the original of Exh.3/1 is stated to be in his possession. He has however explained that he had signed a blank form which was filled by his advocate. The advocate was not examined . Shahzad Bashir RS‑5 the other marginal witness stated that he had signed Exh.RW3/1 at about 10‑30 a.m. in the office which is in the land adjacent to the disputed shop but he was unaware who owns this office. He admitted that possession of shop was not delivered in his presence nor such thing had happened earlier in his presence. The rent of Rs.4,500 was paid but no receipt was executed in his presence. The other witness Jabarial Qamar R.W.6 stated that the opening ceremony of 786 Boutique was inaugurated on 17‑7‑1994 at 5‑00 p.m. and that respondent No.2 had acquired possession of the said shop from the petitioner on rent. There were many persons present but none from the adjacent shops were seen there. On the basis of these statements and documents respondent No.2 claims to have obtained possession of the disputed shop on rent from the petitioner. Exh.RW3/1 is the anchor sheet of the respondents' case. All the witnesses examined to prove this document have stated that it was not signed by the petitioner. What is the value of this document and how it can bind the petitioner. Even if it is admitted that this document was duly signed by the witnesses and respondent No.2 it is merely a declaration in which the petitioner though shown as party No.2 has not signed it. Respondent No.2 and the witnesses by signing a declaration could not bind the petitioner. A document creating right and liability of a party can bind him down if he has signed it or is admitted by him expressly. Furthermore, the discrepancy in obtaining possession in different documents creates serious doubts about the authenticity of the claim made by respondent No.2. The original of Exh.RW3/1 has also not been produced although as stated earlier at the time of filing suit respondent No.2 claimed to be. in its possession. The interpolations in the address and the National Identity Card number of the petitioner also make it doubtful. The explanation offered by respondent No‑2 about these corrections is merely an afterthought. Amongst the two marginal witnesses of RW‑3/1 none has stated that the possession was delivered in their presence. No witness from the neighbouring shops was examined to prove that the possession was delivered to respondent No.2.

6. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 had vehemently argued that R.W.6 has stated that the opening ceremony was inaugurated on 17‑7‑1994 and many persons had attended it. Even if it be true it does not prove that respondent No.2 had obtained the possession from the petitioner under a rent deed or otherwise. The learned counsel also referred to the photographs which were placed on record to prove that inauguration was held and several persons had attended 'it but this also cannot prove that possession was obtained from the petitioner. It is an admitted position that respondent No.2 is closely associated with respondent No.l and had been his witness in ejectment proceedings. His brother has business relations with respondent No.l. All these facts lead to the irresistible conclusion beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner had neither obtained possession from respondent No.l nor delivered the possession of the disputed shop to respondent No.2 under the tenancy agreement. Respondents Nos.l and 2 had thus contrived and conspired with each other to have the possession of the shop in the name of respondent No.2 with a view to obstruct the execution of the ejectment order and also to frustrate the order passed by the Court.

7. This brings us to the question whether on these findings respondents Nos. l and 2 have committed contempt of Court.

8. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that respondent No. l had given an undertaking to vacate the premises but has not only resiled from it but contrived a device to deprive the petitioner of the fruits of the decree by forging documents and both have thus violated the order of this Court and committed contempt of Court. The term Contempt of Court has not been defined but jurists and judges have provided abundance of material which provide guideline for determining what is Contempt of Court. In Oswald's Contempt of Court it has been defined as follows:‑‑

"To speak generally, Contempt of Court may be said to be constituted by any conduct that tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or disregard, or to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during the litigation. "

Article 204 of the Constitution confers jurisdiction on the Supreme Court and a High Court to punish any person who "abuses, interferes with or obstructs the process of the Court in any way or disobeys any order of the Court". Section 3 of the Contempt of Court Act in general terms indicates the area of exercise of jurisdiction by the Courts in a contempt case: To disobey or disregard an order, direction or process of Court which a person is legally bound to obey, wilful breach of an undertaking given to a Court, any act intended to or tend to bring the authority of the Court or the administration of law into disrespect or disrepute and to obstruct, interfere, interrupt or prejudice the process of law or the due course of any judicial proceeding fall within the category of contempt of Court.

9. At this stage it may be pointed out that from time immemorial Courts being the sole institution to dispense justice amongst person and person, and State and person have been venerated, respected and safeguarded against onslaughts which may bring them in disrespect or disrepute. Any attempt to disobey or show disrespect to any order or direction issued by a Court or to interfere or prejudice the administration of law and justice has been not only disfavoured but made punishable. Such a respect and veneration is inherent in the Courts and administration of justice for the unique and enviable position the Courts hold in the governance and administration of the State. The Courts hold a pivotal position to dispense justice which is the cornerstone of a stable society. Dispensation of justice is an attribute of God delegated to man for which he is directly accountable to God. Justice imparted by Courts have greater degree of respectability and public acceptance than those who intend to perform such act beyond the realm of judiciary. It is the sole arbiter of the right of people; it; serves as a bulwork, a safety valve between the people and the State administration. It is a forum where aggrieved people not only make claim but complain and express their vent up grievances for determination of their rights. In Such unique position in the constitutional set up whose independence is guaranteed, is entitled to all respect, regard and veneration. To keep the respect and confidence in the judiciary alive, it is essential that wilful disobedience of its order, obstruction in the administration of law or disrespect to the Courts' must be viewed seriously. The law therefore makes such actions or inactions and acts of omission or commission punishable. This is so with the pious object to keep the stream of justice unpolluted, the edifice of justice untarnished and the fountain of justice clean, clear and pure. Administration of justice can be effective only if its image and respect remains unchallenged, the majesty and dignity of law Courts is not compromised and confidence of the people is not shaken. The dignity and discipline should be maintained from within and outside. The jurisdiction of the superior Courts in contempt cases is intended to protect itself from any action tending to obstruct the impartial administration of justice or impair the dignity of the Court. Here reference can be to the following observation in Sir Edward Snelson v. Judges of the High Court of West Pakistan (PLD 1961 SC 237):‑‑

"The power of committal for contempt is given to such superior Courts in order that they may swiftly and summarily perform one of their most important duties. which is to protect themselves against wilful disregard or disobedience of their authority, by visiting with prompt punishment any conduct which tends to bring their authority and the administration of justice into scorn or disregard. It is evidence that a Court of Justice which has no power to vindicate its dignity or which having the power fails to perform the duty of vindicating its dignity would swiftly lose all hold upon the public respect and in consequence the maintenance of law and order through the agency of the Courts of Justice would be rendered impossible. The dignity and authority of the Courts has a link with the supremacy and majesty of the law. Any conduct which is calculated to diminish that dignity or authority is a criminal contempt which a Court is under duty to punish. The Courts of Justice are a creation of the sovereign authority, but their mainstay rests in the public confidence, and anything which is calculated to withdraw the public confidence from them has the character of a libel to be visited by action in contempt. "

Any form of interference in the flow of course of justice amounts to contempt. Such act should be intended to interfere with due process of law and course of justice.

10. In the present case we are concerned with the complaint that an order was passed by this Court with the consent of the parties which has been disobeyed and violated. The learned counsel for the respondents argued that mere breach of undertaking given by respondent No. l cannot amount to Contempt of Court. The learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to Mst. Kishwar Sultan Jehan Begum v. Aslam Awais and 3 others (PLD 1976 Lahore 580 (F.B.). In this case Full Bench was constituted to determine the question "whether or not the breach by a person of an undertaking given to the Court by a party or its counsel amounts to Contempt of Court". It was ruled:‑‑

"An undertaking given to the Court by a party or his counsel has exactly the same force as an order made or an injunction granted by a Court; once an undertaking is given in the Court by a party or on his behalf by his counsel he becomes bound to fulfil the same. After the Court has sanctioned a particular course of action or inaction according to the statement of a party, the party places himself in a perilous situated if later he commits a breach of his undertaking, arid such a conduct on his part amounts to contempt of Court."

On the other hand the learned counsel for respondent No .l has relied on Brig. (Retd.) Muhammad Iqbal Malik and another v. Mst. Iram and 4 others (1988 MLD 2663) in which breach of an order passed on a compromise application was held not to be contempt of Court. The main reason being that no undertaking was given by the party to the Court. The Court had only recorded the compromise in which the contemner has given on undertaking to the other side and not to the Court. The learned counsel also referred to Nisha Kanto Roy Chowdhury v. Smt. Saroj Bashini Goho (AIR 1948 Calcutta 294). In this case on presentation of a compromise application in .a suit for ejectment it was decreed by the Court. On failure to comply with the decree contempt application was moved. It was not allowed as from the compromise deed it was concluded that no promise was made to the Court but to the party. The same observation was made in Bukhtiarpur Bihar Light Railway Company Ltd. v. State of Bihar and others (AIR 1951 Patna 231). The learned counsel also referred to Badri Dass'v. Labhu Mal (AIR 1959 Punjab 322) where breach of undertaking by the defendant was complained but as the statement in Court on the basis of which decree was passed was based on undertaking given in a private compromise between the parties it was held that the undertaking contained in the statement was not given to the Court and no contempt was committed. The same principle was reiterated in Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and another (AIR 1979 SC 1528). The consensus principle which emerges from a review of these authorities is the law recognizes distinction between an undertaking given to party and undertaking given to a Court. In the former case the Court records compromise between the parties and passes a decree/order and it does not amount to an undertaking to Court. Therefore, if in such a case breach is committed by any of the parties it will not amount to contempt of Court. But a party promises to the Court or gives an undertaking to the Court which is recorded or on the basis of such undertaking order is passed then breach of such undertaking shall be contempt of Court. We may however clarify that if on the basis of any compromise application of consent statement of the parties any direction or order is issued by the Court then the parties are bound to comply with it and breach of such an order will amount to contempt of Court. Mere non‑compliance with a consent order or compromise decree will not amount to contempt of Court unless such consent or compromise has been recorded by the Court and on that basis direction has been given in the order.

11. The learned counsel for respondent No. l further contended that as execution proceeding in respect of the same breach, for obtaining possession has been filed no contempt proceeding could be taken against the petitioner. The learned counsel has relied on Said Ali and others v. Government of the Punjab and others (1982 SCMR 169). The ratio of this judgment is not applicable here which is distinguishable on facts. In this case the allegation was that the order for status quo was breached. It appeared that cross‑criminal cases had been registered at police station with regard to the occurrence which had been subject -matter of the contempt proceedings. In such circumstances as question of facts of possession, trespass and damage, physical and personal and of property, was involved it was left to be decided by the criminal Court in appropriate proceedings having better opportunity for determining such questions. This is not the situation here as execution application filed by the petitioner was allowed by two Courts and objection of respondents was dismissed. Respondent No.2 had filed a writ petition in which tie learned Single Judge who had stayed the execution proceeding on coming to know of the contempt proceeding order that the stay order "shall be subject to the order passed by the Supreme Court". Hardly much is left now to be decided by the High Court. Moreover in writ petition factual controversies cannot be decided for which the proper forum is the present proceeding in which witnesses have been examined. Reliance has been placed on Dr. M.O. Ghani, Vice‑Chancellor, University of Dacca v. Dr. A.N.M. Mahmood (PLD 1966 SC 802) where it was observed that for disobedience of an order of injunction issued under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 effective machinery is provided by rule 2 of Order XXXIX of the C.P.C. which was quite sufficient to deal with a situation of the kind that arose in the circumstances of the case. On the other hand the learned counsel of the petitioner has referred to Bahawal alias Bhaloo v. The State (PLD 1962 SC 476) where Hamoodur Rehman J. (as he then was) observed as follows:‑‑

"It is no doubt the respect due to a Court itself is owed also to its processes but mere failure to obey any process of the Court, when other methods of enforcing the process are available, does not amount to a contempt of Court unless the person served with the process has done something more to exhibit a disrespect for the process of the Court, as, for example, used insolvent or indecent expression or violent or profane language on being served with such a process or assaulted or ill‑treated the process‑server. "

In this connection relying on In re: Clements, Republic of Costa Rica v. Erlanger (1876) 46 LJ Ch.375 at 385 it was further observed:‑‑

"We respectfully agree with these observations and would venture to add that it is. of the utmost importance that a committal for contempt should not be made unless the disobedience shown is of such a serious nature as to indicate that the alleged contemner is deliberately out to flout the order of the Court and to treat it with some degree of contumaciousness. "

12. With respect we follow the principles enunciated in this observation which in our view applies to the present case. A perusal of the order of this Court passed on 15‑12‑1993 quoted above will show that when the Court decided not to grant leave the question of handing over possession of the shop to the petitioner arose. The ejectment order could have been executed straightaway but respondent No. l sought time to vacate the premises which perhaps otherwise would not have been granted. On the statement made by the learned advocate for respondent No. l in his presence, this Court allowed 8 months' time to hand over possession of the disputed shop to the petitioner as requested and promised by him. While recording the promise of respondent No.l and with the consent of the petitioner this Court ordered that respondent No. l shall vacate the shop in dispute and deliver its vacant possession to the petitioner on or before 15‑8‑1994. Thus on the statement of respondent No. l assuring this Court to vacate the premises a particular date, that the said order was passed. There was not only the promise made to the Court but the Court passed an order on the basis of such promise giving direction to respondent No.1 to that effect. The breach of such order would amount to contempt of Court. There is nothing in the order to show that respondent No.l had given any undertaking to the petitioner and not to this Court. Even if for argument sake it may be accepted that no undertaking was given by respondent No.1 the fact remains that the Court had passed a clear order with a direction to vacate the premises and hand over possession to the petitioner on or before 15‑8‑1994. Any violation of such order could attract the provisions of Contempt of Court Act. Any wilful disobedience to an order' of the Court by contumacious conduct with a view to obstruct the course of justice or to conspire and collude to frustrate the order passed by any Court will amount to contempt of Court. From the evidence on record it is fully established that the respondents have with mala fide intention acted contumaciously in flagrant violation of the order by forging documents and producing false evidence. Respondent No.2 admits the knowledge of the order passed by this Court and, therefore, it can safely be concluded that knowing about the order he assisted respondent No.l in contriving a device to frustrate the order passed by the Court and by wilful disobedience showed disrespect to this Court and tried to pollute the fountain of justice and obstruct the smooth running of administration of law. We are disturbed with the growing tendency particularly in property matters where after a decree is passed in favour of a party, the rights are finally determined by Courts, documents are forged similar as in this case, false evidence is created and produced to resist and frustrate the execution of the decree passed by the Court. In order to achieve this object they reagitate the same controversy or enter into frivolous and false litigation and drag on the decree‑holder for years depriving him from reaping the fruits of decree. This growing tendency was noted with concern in Abdul Majid and another v. Qazi Abbas Hussain Shah (1995 SCMR 429) in which notice was issued to the advocate and Civil Judge whose apology was accepted with warning. The Presiding Officers of the Court must examine with care and caution when such controversies arise. In the present case the objections raised by respondent No.2 on factual plane were rejected by the executing and Appellate Court. There was therefore nothing left to be considered in the writ petition muchless to grant stay against the petitioner. We therefore hold that the respondents are guilty of committing contempt of Court and convict the respondents under section 4 of the Contempt of Court Act. We sentence respondent No. l Ghulam Rasool Bhatti son of Ahmed Din to six months' simple imprisonment and fine of Rs.5,000; in default of payment of fine, he shall suffer further S.I. for one month. Amjad Waheed Butt son of Abdul Majeed Butt respondent No.2 is sentenced to three months' simple imprisonment. They be taken into custody and sent to jail.

FAZAL KARIM, J.‑‑ I respectfully agree but would add a few observations on the criminal liability of the second respondent; Amjad Waheed Butt, for the contempt of this Court. He was not a party to the proceedings culminating in this Court's order dated 30‑11‑1,993 and the argument was that he was not bound by the undertaking given by first respondent, Ghulam Rasool Bhatti, to this Court, namely, that he would vacate the shop within eight months of that order.

2. The term "Contempt of Court" is of ancient origin; it has been criticised as inaccurate and misleading, suggesting in some contexts that it exists to protect the dignity of the Judges. In truth "it is not the dignity of the Court which is offended ....A petty and misleading view of the issues involved ...it is the fundamental supremacy of the law which is challenged". Lord President Clyde in 'Johnson v. Grant' 1923 SC 789. Contempt of Court means an interference with the administration of justice and "it. is unfortunate that the offence should continue to be known by a name which suggests to the modern mind that its essence is a supposed affront to the dignity of the Court". (Lord Ackner in Attorney‑General v. Times Newspapers Ltd. (1974) AC 273, 322). The sole purpose of proceedings in contempt is to give our Courts the powers effectively to protect the rights of the public by ensuring that administration of justice shall not be abstructed or prevented. (Salmon LJ in Morris v. Crown Office (1970) 2QB 144, 129).

3. The question was considered recently by the House of Lords of England in one of the cases known as Spycatcher cases namely "Attorney‑General v. Times Newspapers Ltd." (1922) 1 AC 191. The Attorney‑General brought actions in the Chancery Division of the High Court against the publishers and editors of the newspapers, the "Observer" and "The Guardian", for permanent injunctions restraining them from publishing material from Mr. Wright's memoirs and the injunctions were granted. The memoirs were published by other newspapers who were not parties to those actions and the question was "whether a publication made in the knowledge of an outstanding injunctior6 against another party, and if made by that other party would be in breach thereof, constitutes a criminal contempt of Court upon the footing that it assaults or interferes with the process of justice in relation to the said injunction". It was observed that it was of the utmost importance to formulate with precision the question which fell to be decided; the question for the decision was not whether such an injunction was binding upon those other newspapers; the question was quite another one, namely, whether it was a contempt of Court for those newspapers to publish with the intention of impeding or ‑prejudicing the administration of justice by the Court. In approaching that question it is, it was observed, necessary to bear in mind the nature of the criminal contempt of Court as described by Lord Diplock in "Attorney‑General v. Leveller Magazine Ltd. " (1979) AC 440, 449. He there said:‑‑‑

"Although criminal contempts of Courts may take a variety of forms they all share a common characteristic: they involve an interference with the due administration of justice either in a particular case or more generally as a continuing process. It is justice itself that is flouted by contempt of Court, not the individual Court or Judge who is attempting to administer it."

Thus the ground of decision against the second respondent, as in the Times Newspaper case (1922) 1 AC 191), is "the knowing impedance of and interference by him with the administration of justice", which is a contempt of this Court. This is a very well‑recognised ground under the general law of contempt and has now received legislative recognition in section 3 of the Contempt of Court Act, 1976.

N.H.Q./N‑468/S Petition accepted.