QADIR BAKHSH and 2 others Versus WAHID BAKHSH
This appeal arose from an order of the Lahore High Court confirming an interim injunction in a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell land. The appellants challenged the injunction, arguing that the High Court lacked the authority to stay proceedings on the revenue side, citing Section 56(b) of the Specific Relief Act 1877. The core legal question was whether the High Court could grant an injunction to stay proceedings of a court or authority not subordinate to it. The Supreme Court observed that the litigation over the interlocutory matter had persisted for over six years, causing unnecessary delay. The Court held that the High Court acted justifiably in granting the injunction to avoid further complications and the multiplicity of proceedings. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, declining to interfere with the High Court's discretion, and directed that the main Regular First Appeal be decided by the competent court within three months. The judgment emphasizes the court's inherent power to manage proceedings to prevent procedural abuse and multiplicity of litigation.
- Can a High Court grant an injunction to stay proceedings of a court or authority not subordinate to it?
- Is the grant of a temporary injunction justified to avoid the multiplicity of proceedings?
- Should the Supreme Court interfere with an interlocutory order of the High Court when the main appeal remains pending?
- Section 56(b), Specific Relief Act 1877
FAQIR MUHAMMAD KHOKHAR, J.--- This appeal, by leave of the Court, is directed against order, dated 17-6-1998, passed by a learned Division Bench of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, in C.M. No.475 of 1998 in R.F.A. No.25 of 1998 whereby ad interim injunction already granted was confirmed.
2. The respondent No.1 instituted a civil suit for specific performance of an agreement, dated 27-8-1990 for the sale of the suit-land allegedly executed on behalf of the legal heirs of Mst. Jan Begum alias Janu for a consideration of Rs.4,70,000 out of which a sum of Rs.70,000 was allegedly paid as earnest money in two instalments. The civil suit was dismissed by the trial Court, by judgment and decree dated 12-3-1998. The respondent No.1 filed R.F.A. No.25 of 1998 in the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench along with an application C.M. No.1/C of 1998 for grant of temporary injunction. The Lahore High Court, by order, dated 26-3-1998, admitted the appeal for regular hearing and directed maintenance of status quo in the meanwhile. The appellants moved C.M. No.475 of 1998 for clarification of the said order which was dismissed by the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench by the impugned order, dated 17-6-1998 whereby injunctive order, dated 26-3-1998 was confirmed.
3. Leave to appeal was granted by this Court on 17-11-1998 to consider whether an injunction could not be granted by the High Court to stay the proceedings of another Court which was not subordinate to it.
4. The learned counsel for the appellants argued that during the pendency of the civil suit, the Tehsildar/Assistant Collector, First Grade, by order dated 3-11-1993, had directed the ejectment of Nasir Khan son of the respondent No.1 from the suit-land. However, the possession of the disputed land was restored to the respondent No.1 by order of the Civil Court whereby the appellants and others were convicted and sentenced for contempt of Court. It was further submitted that the appellants were bona fide purchasers of the land. There was no legal justification for the High Court to pass the impugned orders, dated 24-3-1998 and 17-6-1998 which had the effect of staying the proceedings and orders passed on the revenue side. The learned counsel relied on the judgment in the case of Muhammad Siddique and others v. Haji Talib Hussain and others 1985 SCMR 1918 and the provisions of section 56(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
5. On the other hand, the learned counsel for respondent No.1 submitted that the provisions of section 56(b) of the Act did not govern the matter of grant of temporary injunctions. It was further contended that the High Court was amply justified to grant temporary injunction to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. The learned counsel pointed out that during the pendency of R.F.A. No.25 of 1998 in the High Court, the pecuniary jurisdiction of a District Court being an Appellate Court was enhanced by the Legislature. Therefore, the District Judge was empowered to entertain and decide an appeal if subject-matter, did not exceed Rs.25 lacs.
6. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length. We find that more than six years have already passed in litigation before this Court and the High Court over an interlocutory matter of temporary injunction. During this period the appeal in the main case could have been finally decided by the competent Court. The learned counsel for the appellants could not satisfy us as to under what law and by whom the proceedings on the revenue side were taken nor any documents were placed on record in support of the plea. Therefore, we do not consider it necessary to finally determine the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. The High Court justifiably made the impugned orders to avoid further complications and multiplicity of proceedings. This is not a fit case for interference with the impugned judgment.
7. For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed accordingly, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. It is, further directed that the Regular First Appeal of the respondent No.1 shall be decided by the competent Court within a period of three months of the communication of this order.
S.A.K./Q-3/SC Appeal dismissed.