Ch. FAYYAZ-UR-REHMAN KHALID Versus AMIR JAVED
The matter arises from a petition challenging orders passed by the High Court and the revisional court which had interfered with the Trial Court's order condoning delay and restoring a dismissed suit. The core legal question is whether a revisional court exercising jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 can reverse discretionary findings of a Trial Court regarding the condonation of delay without establishing any illegality, jurisdictional error, or material irregularity. The Supreme Court held that the revisional court and the High Court erred in substituting their own view for the lawful discretion exercised by the Trial Court, especially when the Trial Court's findings were neither arbitrary nor perverse and the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 adequately explained the delay while the petitioner was incarcerated. The key principle laid down is that a revisional court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 cannot act as an appellate court to overturn a Trial Court's lawful exercise of discretion in condoning delay unless the case falls strictly within the jurisdictional grounds specified in section 115.
- Whether a revisional court exercising jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 can reverse the discretionary findings of a Trial Court in condoning delay without establishing jurisdictional error?
- Can a revisional court substitute its own findings as an appellate court when the Trial Court's order is neither arbitrary nor perverse?
- Is an application for condonation of delay required when a proceeding is filed within the standard statutory period?
- Section 115, Code of Civil Procedure 1908
- Section 5, Limitation Act 1908
- Section 506, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 364, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
ORDER
MUHAMMAD SHAFI SIDDIQUI, J.--- Question that arises out of the present lis is whether the "revisional court" exercising jurisdiction under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ('C.P.C.') could reverse the discretionary findings reached by the Trial Court in exercise of its lawful jurisdiction while condoning the delay in filing of application for restoration of suit.
2. We have heard the petitioner and respondents Nos. 1 and 3, who are appearing in person and perused the available record. In terms of paragraph 3 of the order of the Civil Judge, Kasur dated 05.03.2016, the court found that the suit filed by the petitioner against the respondents was dismissed for non-prosecution on 04.12.2014 when the petitioner remained absent. The restoration and condonation applications disclosed that he was behind bars from 15.05.2014 to 01.07.2015 in connection with FIR No. 504/13 for offences under sections 506 and 364 of the P.P.C. and thus was prevented to appear and unaware of the proceedings of the case nor any order was communicated to him when he was behind bars. The petitioner produced on record copy of the order dated 12.05.2015 whereby the petitioner was granted bail by the Lahore High Court in the aforesaid case. In consideration of such facts the discretion was exercised by Trial Court and the application for restoration was accepted and the delay in filing the application was condoned as the grounds mentioned therein were found plausible by court. This discretion as exercised in terms of judicial order was challenged by the respondents in revision petition filed under section 115 of the C.P.C.
3. Indisputably the revisional court has limited jurisdiction under section 115 C.P.C. which includes, (a) when trial court found to have exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law, (b) failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. Nothing of such exercise (a to c) has been expressed by the revisional court. It is to be kept in mind that revisional court cannot be substituted as appellate court to replace its own findings when findings of Trial Court are neither arbitrary or perverse to enable the revisional court to exercise jurisdiction with the frame described above. All it found, in terms of paragraph 8 was that the restoration application was barred by time. A perusal of the paper-book reveals that the application for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 was available which escaped the attention of the revisional court. We are not in agreement with the reasoning assigned by the learned Additional District Judge, Kasur which was appreciated by the learned High Court through the impugned order that such grounds as disclosed in the restoration application could have been considered had it been filed within thirty days of order. Had the application been filed within thirty days, the condonation application was not required. Condonation application is filed when statutory period is lapsed. Such delay is then required to be explained in the condonation application which the petitioner did and the Trial Court was in consonance with the grounds mentioned therein when it accepted the applications both for restoration and condonation. Additionally, when a lawful jurisdiction was exercised by the Trial Court then the revisional court followed by High Court in writ jurisdiction cannot reverse it by expressing their own views over and above the lawful discretion exercised by the Trial Court unless found within frame of section 115 of the C.P.C.
4. For what has been discussed above, the impugned orders of the High Court and that of the revisional court are set aside and the order dated 05.03.2016 of the Trial Court is restored. The suit to be decided expeditiously in accordance with law preferably within a period of three months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. This petition is converted into an appeal and allowed in the aforesaid terms.
UN/F-17/SC Appeal allowed.