Asadullah Versus Zamran
Zaheer-ud-Din Kakar, J .--- Through the instant criminal appeal filed under section 417, Cr.P.C. the appellant has impugned the judgment dated 25.05.2024. passed by the Additional Sessions Judge-VI, Quetta (the trial Court), whereby respondent No.1/accused has been acquitted in case FIR No.200 of 2021 dated 13.12.2021, under Sections 337-ADF P.P.C., registered at Police Station Industrial Area, Quetta. The appellant/injured has also filed an application for condonation of delay with the appeal.
2. Allegation against the respondent/accused as per FIR is that on 13.12.2021 at about 1:15 p.m. on Sirki Road near Qasim Property, he attacked upon brother of complainant namely Asadullah by means of dagger, due to which he sustained injuries.
3. After regular trial, the respondent No.1/accused was acquitted of the charge vide impugned judgment dated 25.05.2024, passed by the trial Court. Hence, this criminal acquittal appeal.
4. Arguments heard. Record perused.
5. Perusal of record reveals that the impugned judgment was passed on 25.05.2024. The law reflects for a room of one month for the aggrieved person to file an appeal against acquittal under Section 417(2-A) Cr.P.C. whereas the facts of the present case suggest that the appellant acted beyond this circumference, filing the present appeal on 05.07.2024, instead of the recommended deadline of one month i.e. 25.06.2024. The appellant has filed the instant appeal with the unexplained delay of about 10 days. For convenience Section 417 Cr.P.C, is reproduced as under:
"417. Appeal in case of acquittal. (1).....................
(2) ..
(2-A) A person aggrieved by the order of acquittal passed by any Court other than a High Court, may, within thirty days, file an appeal against such order.
(3)
(4)
6. The limitation for filing of appeal against acquittal is provided as 30 days in the section supra, as far as the arguments of learned counsel for the appellant regarding condonation of delay is concerned, section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay is not applicable to section 417, Cr.P.C, as clearly laid down in section 29 of the Limitation Act (IX of 1908), which is reproduced as under:
(1) .
(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefor by the First Schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed therefor in that Schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law:
(a) the provisions contained in section 4, section 9 to 18, and section 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law; and
(b) the remaining provisions of this Act shall not apply."
7. Hence, it is clear that if there is a special provision of limitation provided under the relevant law then section 5 of the Limitation Act will not be applicable for condoning the delay. Reliance is placed on the case titled Muhammad Sharif and others v. The State and others [1] .
In the case of Noor Hussain v. Muhammad Saleem [2] , the Supreme Court has held that:
"2....... Notwithstanding the fact that the delay is only of one day, we do not consider it a fit case for condonation of the delay as Muhammad Salim son of Muhammad Ramzan (respondent No.1) has acquitted the right to live, while others have acquired the valuable right of liberty.
The petition is, therefore, dismissed as barred by time.
8. As per dictum laid down by the Supreme Court, it is well settled principle of law that delay of each day has to be satisfactorily explained, as after expiry of limitation period a vested right is created in favour of the other party which could not be easily brushed aside as the law always helps the vigilant and not the indolent. It is held by the Supreme Court in a case titled as Water and Power Development Authority v. Aurangzeb [3] , that: "it is well settled that after the prescribed period of limitation has elapsed, the door of justice is closed and no plea of injustice, hardship or ignorance can be of any avail unless the delay is properly explained and accounted for."
9. Undisputedly, the appeal is time barred and no justification has been shown during the arguments by learned counsel for the appellant. Thus, the instant appeal being time barred is dismissed in limine.
JK/6/Bal. Appeal dismissed.