MST. TASNIM KHAWAR SHAH Versus STATE
Mst. Tasnim Khawar Shah, during her posting as Manageress of the Co‑operative Handicrafts (1968) Limited, The Mall. Lahore, who was incharge of the entire stock of the Society, was alleged to have committed criminal breach of trust to the tune of Rs. 1,00,520.36. A case under section 409 P. P. C., and section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, was registered by the Anti‑Corruption Establishment, on 5‑2‑1975. After investigation, the challan was submitted against her in the Court of Special Judge, Anti‑Corruption. Lahore.
2. Mst. Tasnim Khawar Shah filed this petition under section 561‑A, Cr. P. C. for quashing the proceedings pending against her in the Court of Special Judge, Anti‑Corruption, Lahore.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner was not a public servant and thus challan could not be submitted against her in the Court of Special Judge, Anti‑Corruption, Lahore. He drew my attention to the By‑law No. 24 of the Co‑operative Handicrafts (1968) Limited. Lahore, where it is laid down that "the committee may appoint a General Manager and one or more Managers and other staff and may require them to provide security or surety as deemed sufficient subject to rule 31 of the Rules framed under the Act. They will work under the supervision and general control of the committee". The powers and duties of the General Manager have been given in Bye‑law No. 25. The learned counsel read out the provisions of section 65‑B of the Co‑operative Societies Act, 1925, where it is laid down that "every officer of a Society, including a Co‑operative Bank shall be deemed to be a public servant within the meaning of section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code". Section 65‑B was inserted by the Co‑operative Societies (Second Amendment) Ordinance, West Pakistan No. XVII of 1966. The learned counsel read out the definition of the word "officer" as given in section 3 (d) of the Co‑operative Societies Act, 1925, and contended that the word "officer" did not include Manager and since the Manager was not empowered under the rules or under the Bye‑laws of the Society to give directions in regard to the business of the Society, the petitioner could not be considered to be a public servant.
4. The learned counsel for the State contended that the petitioner was a Manageress in the Co‑operative Handicrafts (1968) Limited and she was a public servant at the time when she committed criminal breach of trust. It was also contended by the learned counsel for the State that although the word "officer" as used in common parlance connotes the holder or incumbent of an office of authority, yet the definition has been interpreted by judicial authorities to include all incumbents of offices high or low irrespective of their status. He placed reliance on Ishfaq v. The State (P L D 1968 Lah. 1124).
5. The meaning of the word "officer" in the Dictionary is given as under :‑
"Holder of public, civil, or ecclesiastical office, appointed or elected functionary, president, treasurer, secretary, etc. of society."
In case the word "officer had been defined under the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925, only to included a Chairman, Secretary, Treasurer, Member of Committee or other person empowered under the rules or under the Bye laws of the Society to give directions in regard to the business of such society, the argument of the learned counsel .for the petitioner would have carried weight. But the word "officer'" has been used in wider tern and besides other meanings it includes a Chairman, Secretary, Treasurer, Member of the Committee or other person empowered under the rules or under the by‑laws of a Society to give directions in regard to the business of such Society.
6. In view of the circumstances of the case, I cannot accept the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner who was a Manageress at the relevant time, was not an officer within the meaning of section 3 (d) of the Co‑operative Societies Act, 1925. She was a public servant at the relevant time and could legally be proceeded against under sec tion 409, P. P. C. and section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. It is not a fit case for quashing the proceedings. The petition is dismissed.
Petition dismissed.