MUNICIPALCOMMITTEE, NANKANA SAHIB THROUGH ITS CHAIRMAN vs ABDUL
This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order that set aside a prohibitory order issued by the S.D.M. Nankana Sahib under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The petitioner, the Municipal Committee, had sought to prohibit the respondents from operating a private market for the wholesale sale of fruits and vegetables, claiming it was unauthorized. The core legal question was whether the S.D.M. was justified in invoking Section 144, Cr. P. C. to prevent the respondents' business activities. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, noting that previous disputes between the parties had been resolved through a compromise and discharge order, thereby eliminating any genuine apprehension of a disturbance of public tranquility or affray. The Court held that Section 144 cannot be used to protect the commercial interests of a municipal market against private competitors. The key principle established is that the extraordinary powers under Section 144, Cr. P. C. are reserved for preventing public disorder and cannot be utilized as a tool for regulatory enforcement or protecting municipal commercial interests.
- Can Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 be invoked to protect the commercial interests of a municipal market?
- Is an order under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 justified when there is no apprehension of a disturbance of public tranquility?
- Does the quashing of an order under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 preclude a municipal committee from prosecuting a party for operating an unauthorized market under other applicable laws?
- Section 144, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898
- Section 107, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898
- Section 151, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898
ORDER
1. WAHIDUDDIN AHMAD, J.-The dispute between the parties is in respect of the business carried on by the respondents in the market other than the market established by the petitioner---Municipal Committee. The S. D. M. Nankana Sahib, who is the Chairman of the petitioner-Municipal Committee, on the 24th August 1970, issued an order under section 144, Cr. P. C. Pro--hibiting the respondents from continuing their business in their market. This order was challenged in Criminal Revision No. 884 of 1970 in the Lahore High Court. A learned Single Judge, by order dated the 23rd September 1970, accepted the revision and set aside the order of the S. D. M. Nankana Sahib. This order is being challenged in this petition for special leave to appeal.
2. In support of the petition, Mr. Hamid Mukhtar, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that respondent No. 1 was a licensee for felling the vegetable and sugarcane in retail and was not a licensee for establishing a private market or to make sale in whole-sale or auction of the vegetable, fruit and sugarcane within the limits of Nankana Sahib. He, therefore, contended that . S. D. M. Nankana Sahib was perfectly justified in issuing an order under section 144, Cr. P. C. The contention of the learned counsel has not impressed us. It is true that there was a dispute between the fruit sellers of the old vegetable market, Nankana Sahib, and the vegetable market set up by the Municipal Committee. An action was taken against the parties under sections 107 and 151 of the Criminal Procedure Code. These proceedings which were pending before the S. D. M., were compromised by the parties and the order of discharge was passed by the learned S. D. M. On the 21st August 1970. In these circumstances, the High Court was perfectly justified in observing that there was no apprehension of any disturbance of public tranquility or affray and the learned S. D.
3. M. Was not justified in issuing an order under section 144, Cr. P. C. On the 24th August 1970. The contention of the respondent that the said order was made in order to protect the interests of the persons carrying on business in the vegetable market set up the Municipal Committee has considerable force. The High Court was, therefore, perfectly justified in observing that there was no cause left for taking action under section 144, Cr. P. C.
4. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that by quashing the order under section 144, the petitioner-Municipal Committee is prevented from prosecuting the respondents for carrying on business in an unlawful place. This apprehension is illusory. No order has been passed by which the petitioner has been precluded from prosecuting the respondents for auctioning or selling of fruits in whole-sale at a place other than the licensed fruit market set up by the petitioner.
5. It is open to the petitioner to prosecute the respondents on this ground if the same is available to them. There is no force in the petition, which is dismissed.