ABDUL HAMID KHAN Versus STATE

ABDUL MAJEED MALLICK, J. ‑This appeal arises out of the judgment of the Special Court, dated 15‑9‑1980, whereby the appellant was convicted and fined Rs. 2,000, and in default of payment of fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 15 days, under section 5 of the Ministers, Members of Assembly and Council (Declaration of Assets) Ordinance, 1979.

2. The allegation for which the appellant was convicted relates to furnishing of incorrect declaration of the value of a house situate in Islamabad, in compliance with the provisions of section 3 of the Declaration of Assets Ordinance. It was alleged in para. 3 of the complaint that the appellant declared the value of House No. 17, Street No. 50. Sector F‑4/7. Islamabad, in the sum of Rs. 1 Lac whereas the value of the house, determined by the Declaration of Assets Inquiry Commission, was Rs. 2,70,200. Thus, he was liable under section 5 of the Ordinance, for wilfully declaring incorrect value of the house.

3. Section 3 of the Ordinance called the Ministers, Members of the Assembly and Council (Declaration of Assets) Ordinance (hereinafter referred as Declaration of Assets Ordinance) contemplates that any person who, at any time, during the period of December, 1970, and August, 1977, was a Minister, Presidential Assistant or Member of the Legislative Assembly or during the period of July, 1975, and August, 1977, was a Special Assistant or Adviser to the Prime Minister or Member of the Council, was liable to submit to the Chief Executive his statement of properties and assets in accordance with the schedule given in the Ordinance, within 15 days from the commencement of the Ordinance. Part (1) of the schedule relates to properties and assets held at the time of becoming Minister, Presidential Assistant, Special Assistant, Adviser to the Prune Minister, Member of the Assembly or of the Council. In column (7) of the Schedule, the declarant was required to disclose approximate value of the property. Part (11) of the Schedule relates to the details of the properties and assets held by the aforesaid public representatives at the time when they ceased to hold one of the aforemen tioned public Offices. Column (7) of Part (II) Schedule is identical to column (7) of Part (1) of the Schedule.

4. In column (7) of Part (1) of the Schedule, the appellant declared the value of the house as Rs.1 lac. The relevant column of Part (1I) of the schedule was left vacant and no value of the house, whatsoever, was entered therein. An omission to disclose value of the house at the time, when the appellant ceased to hold the office of Prime Minister, in view of the learned Judge of the Special Court was violative of section 3 of the Ordinance.

5. It is well‑known norm of construction that penal statutes are construed strictly. When the words imposing a penalty are clear and district Court cannot extend the scope of punishment by forced construction.

6. Section 5 of the Ordinance contemplates punishment when a person required to furnish declaration of assets under section 3 of the Ordinance fails to furnish declaration or makes false or incorrect statement. In the instant case, the appellant furnished the requisite declaration but failed to enter approximate value of the house in column (7) of part (II) of the Schedule relating to the period and value of the property at the time when he ceased to hold public office. An omission to disclose approximate value of the property is altogether different from making a false or incorrect statement. The distinction is obviously there. The Legislature in its wisdom introduced two checks on the declaration of properties and assets. The first C check is that the declaration should not be false; and secondly, it may not be incorrect. There is no 3rd check to include that it may not be incomplete. Thus, in our view, an incomplete declaration or an omission to fulfil on of the entries does not bring a declarant within the scope of liability or, punishment.

7. It is evident from the record that the house in question was under construction in 1975, when the appellant was returned as an Assembly member. The assessment of the value of the house was made by Mr. Muhammad Ilyas Sulehria in April, 1978, when the construction was yet t to be completed. Under the circumstances, the appellant, who was not supervising the construction himself, was not expected to declare the value of the house. His omission to disclose the value at the relevant time cannot be termed mala fide.

8. The learned Judge of the Special Court based his finding on the testimony of Mr. Muhammad Ilyas Sulehria, who assessed the value of the house vide Exh. P C and PC/I. The witness failed to show the criterion o formula on the basis of which he made his assessment. The presumption is that the assessment was based on the current rate of prices. Notice can be taken that the tendency of the prices of construction material and labour continued upward. It is admitted by the witness that a construction mad under a private supervision would cost less than the one made in public sector. This leads to the conclusion that value assessed by the witness was not a final verdict. Exh. PB is the report of Inquiry Commission. The Inquiry Commission allowed the appellant to furnish supplementary statement, including the value of the house in question. It is evident from the inquiry report that the appellant was not held liable for furnishing incomplete declaration. The Inquiry Commission on the other hand held the appellant guilty for his failure to render accounts of the amount spent on the house.

The net result of the aforesaid observations is that the appellant is not found guilty. The judgment of the learned Judge of the Special Court is set aside and the sentence is quashed.

Appeal allowed.