SALAR KHAN Versus MUHAMMAD AYUB

ORDER

MUHAMMAD AKRAM KHAN, J.‑‑ This is a revision petition which has been brought in the High Court by Bilara Khan. The State did not appeal against the order for acquittal and, therefore, this revision was moved by Bilara Khan the complainant who lodged the F.I.R. on 29‑3‑1978 in the Police Station Bagh regarding the alleged occurrence. It is an old case and, therefore, we are not going to wait for Sardar Sayyab Khalid, Advocate for the petitioner.

2. It was alleged that between the night &of 28th and 29th March, 1978 (at mid‑night) the accused persons entered the house of the complainant after breaking open a window tied up the complainant with rope and after throwing grounded pepper in the eyes of the inmates of the house, forcibly took away Mst. Begum Jan, who was said to be a minor girl of 13/14 years. In the meantime, the complainant somehow freed himself and chased the accused persons. He ran after them for about 70 yards and set Mst. Begum Jan free from the clutches of the accused persons who fled away;

(b) A case under section 456/363, A.P.C. was registered against the accused persons and the police started investigation. The Police put up a challan against the following persons on 25‑4‑1978 before the learned Sub‑Judge/Magistrate 1 st Class, Bagh:‑

(1) Muhammad Ayyub Khan son of Muhammad Akbar Khan.

(2) Abdul Rashid Khan.

(3) Muhammad Anwar Khan son of Bashir Ahmad Khan, caste Maldial, resident of Village Seri.

(c) The accused persons denied the charge and the learned Magistrate acquitted all the three accused persons on the grounds:‑-

(i) Five eye‑witnesses are the inmates of the house of the complainant;

(ii) The prosecution has not been able to produce the S.H.O. Muhammad Rafiq and the Doctor Muhammad Rahim;

(iii) There was delay in the F.I.R.;

(iv) The prosecution was not able to prove the prosecution case beyond any reasonable doubt; and

(v) The benefit of doubt was given to the accused.

3. The complainant, being aggrieved by the order of acquittal, first tried to lodge an appeal through the State as he averred in para. 2 of this Revision Petition, but when the State did not lodge the appeal, the complainant himself, filed this Revision against the said order of acquittal, dated 25‑9‑1975.

4. The main grounds to set aside the impugned order is the Revision Petition are the following:‑

(a) That the mere fact that five prosecution witnesses are the inmates of the house does not detract their evidence. They were the material witnesses who saw the occurrence which took place at mid‑night. Therefore, they should have been believed by the learned trial Magistrate regarding the offence of lurking house‑trespass:

(b) That the F.I.R. is meant simply to put the machinery of law into motion and, therefore, delay in lodging the F.I.R. per se, is not a ground to reject the prosecution story. Moreover, this delay has been amply explained. The accused admitted their guilt and' a 'Panchayat' set over the matter and, therefore, the delay is very well‑explained. In the village, such 'Panchayats' often sit to effect a compromise especially when the attempt to take away Mst. Begum Jan was failed;

(c) That the prosecution has proved beyond any reasonable doubt that the accused persons broke the window and through it they entered the house and thus committed lurking trespass into the house of the complainant at mid‑night and tried to take away the girl with them but the attempt failed;

(d) That the learned Magistrate misdirected himself to give the benefit of doubt to the accused persons. The five eye‑witnesses (the inmates of the house) i.e:‑

(1) Balora Khan.

(2) Rehmat Bi,

(3) Begum Jan,

(4) Hazoor Fatima, and

(5) Saliqa Bi. should have been believed;

(e) That nothing turns out by the non‑production of the Doctor because Mst. Begum Jan was not raped. Nor hymen was found intact by the Doctor. Moreover, a Doctor is not a necessary witness to prove the case of lurking house‑trespass to commit an offence. Similarly the non‑production of the S.H.O. is not fatal to the prosecution case:

(f) That it is a case of lurking house‑trespass and the offence under section 456/363, A.P.C. has been made out. The Court is competent to pass any sentence under any section if the case under that section is made out; and

(g) That the trial Court has unnecessarily discussed the aspect of throwing pepper into the eyes of the inmates of the house. Even if this aspect is disbelieved, the lurking house‑trespass is proved.

5. The prayer is to set aside the impugned order of acquittal and remand the case to the Court below (the trial Court) for passing the sentence under law for committing lurking house‑trespass under section 456/363, A.P.C.

6. On the other hand, it was argued by Mr. Shahad Ahmed, Advocate on behalf of the acquitted persons:‑-

(i) That the order of acquittal was proper and justifiable under law. The prosecution failed to prove its case under section 456/363, A.P.C. and, therefore, the High Court should not upset the order of acquittal.

(ii) That there is a double presumption of innocence in favour of the acquitted persons;

(iii) That the five alleged eye‑witnesses were rightly disbelieved by the learned Magistrate because they were related to the complainant and were related inter se;

(iii) That the five alleged eye‑witnesses were rightly disbelieved by the learned Magistrate because they were related to the complainant and were related inter se;

(iv) That there are material contradictions in the prosecution evidence and, therefore, the trial Court passed the order of acquittal in this case; and

(v) That the benefit of doubt was rightly given to the accused persons.

7. We have heard the learned counsel for the non‑petitioners Mr. Shahad Ahmad, Advocate and with his help gone through the statements of some prosecution witnesses. We have perused the record of the case carefully.

8. Delay in F. I. R. per se, is not fatal to a prosecution case. In this connection, we refer to:‑

1978 S C M R 136; P L D 1978 S C 1; P L J 1978 S C 41 and 1979 S C M R 230.

It may be fatal under some circumstances as held in P L D 1977 S C (A J & K) 1 where there was a delay of 27 days or in P L D 1978 S C 114 where there was the delay of only 7 hours. But here in this case the delay is well explained.

9. The relationship of witnesses, per se, between themselves or with the complainant, is no ground to discard their evidence.

Reference is made to:‑-

P L D 1978 S C (A J & K) 96; 1978 S C M R 136; P L D 1978 Lah. 1209; P L D 1979 S C (A J & K) 23; 1979 PCr.LJ Note 142 at p. 90; P L D 1982 Lah. 577; 1983 P Cr. L J 1507 and P L D 1983 S C AJ&K) 211.

10. The inmates of a house are not to be disbelieved when their presence is natural. Reference is made to:--

P L D 1969 S C 552; 1969 S C M R 822; 1970 S C M R 432 and 1984 S C M R 1.

The case of 1970 S C M R 432 is very important because the occurrence in that case also took place at mid‑night.

11. It, is also to be noted that "reasonable benefit of doubt" is to be given to an accused person or accused persons as held in:----

1974 S C M R 215 and P L D 1977 Lah. 1383.

12. It is not a difficult case. The prosecution has failed to prove its case under section 456/363, A.P.C. and to that extent the verdict of the trial Court is correct. But et the same time, we cannot shut our eyes to this aspect of the prosecution story that the three accused persons entered the house of the complainant at mid‑night through a window, tied up the unfortunate complainant and after throwing grounded pepper into the eyes of the inmates of the house, searched for Mst. Begum Jan with the torch‑light and then perhaps took her forcibly away but she escaped from the clutches of those accused persons. We may, not believe the story of taking away Mst. Begum Jan put the entry to the accused persons at mid‑night with a criminal intention is a matter which should have been considered by the trial Court. Then some accused persons are challaned under certain sections of the Penal Code and the offence under those sections is not proved but some other offence is made out by the prosecution evidence, the accused, persons can be very well convicted and sentenced for the other offence; which is proved before the Court.

13. This prosecution of law is well‑settled right from the case of Begu v. Emperor A I R 1924 P C 130 to M. Bhutto's case P L D 1979 S C 53 (355‑356). There is a plathora of rulings or, this point. A few authorities are:‑

A I R 1925 P C 130; P L D 1956 S C (Pak.) 440; P L D 1960 Lah. 15; P L D 1961 Lah. 212; P L D 1962 Kar. 756; P L D 1963 Dacca 806 and 1971 S C M R 756.

The case of the Privy Council is the basic authority in which the charge was under section 302, P.C. The offence of murder was not established but the accused was convicted and sentenced under section 202, P.C. which was made out by the prosecution.

14. When an acquittal order is passed and it appears that the disposal of the case was made or, insubstantial grounds and was, therefore, not honest the order cannot be upheld (Muhammad Hussain v. The State 1968 S C M R 428).

15. There is no warrant either in principle or an authority for the proposition that section 423 (1) (a) , Cr.P.C. does not authorise a High Court to find the accused guilty of an offence other than that with which he has been charged nor is there any sufficient ground for holding that !he power contained in sections 236, 237 and 238, Cr.P.C. cannot be exercised by the High Court hearing an appeal under section 423 (1)(a), Cr.P.C. Ramaswamy Nadar v. The State (P L D 1958 S C (Ind.) 247).

16. As it is a revision and not an appeal, as we have found that in this case, the trial Court has failed to weigh and assess the prosecution evidence and has failed to see if some offence other than under section 456/363, A.P.C. was made out. We are not going to discuss the evidence at this stage because we propose to remand this case and, therefore, do not want to prejudice the trial Court.

We, therefore, accept this revision petition, set aside the impugned order, dated 29‑9‑1979 maintaining the order of the acquittal under section 345/363, A.P.C. and direct the trial Court to hear the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and pass the proper order afresh. The trial Court shall see if some offence other than under section 456/363, A.P.C. is established. It can be said from the petitioner's side that the offence of lurking house‑trespass stands established by the prosecution evidence but we leave this matter open to be decided by the trial Court in the light of our observations made above.

M.Y.H. ‑‑‑ Case remanded.