MUHAMMAD KHAN Versus DIVISIONAL FOREST OFFICER, KOHAT
ORDER
This is an appeal by one Muhammad Khan against an order dated 5‑6‑1975 whereby he was discharged Prow service and was further directed to pay the cost of plants with respect to which he was department ally proceeded and was consequently discharged from service.
2. There is, in my view, no jurisdiction to admit this appeal. In this context, it may be stated at the very outset that the impugned order was passed on 5th of June, 1975 and was communicated to the appellant by the authority concerned. It must have reached the appellant within a day or two. The present appeal whereby this order is sought to be set aside was instituted on 16‑7‑1975. It will thus be seen that the appeal was filed more than thirty days after the order was passed, and communicated to the appellant.
3. It was contended by the learned counsel for the appellant appearing before me that limitation for filing the present appeal, was governed by section 8 of the North‑West Frontier Province Service Tribunals Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as tae Act) which. provides a period of ninety days for the filing of appeals like the present one. I am afraid, the viewpoints so expressed cannot prevail. It may be pointed out that section 8 of the Act to which reference was made, and on which reliance has been placed, by the learned counsel for the appellant, has reference to those appeals only which arise as a result of the abatement of any suit, appeal or application pending in any Court immediately before the commencement of the Act and it cannot be stretched so as to cover the present case regarding which there was no suit, appeal or application pending in any Court immediately before the commencement of the Act. The instant case would instead be governed by section 4 of the Act which provides that any civil servant aggrieved by any, final order, whether original or appellate, made by a departmental authority in respect of any of the terms and conditions of his service may, within thirty days of the communication of such order to him, prefer an appeal to the Tribunal.
4. As regards condonation of delay it is settled law that in order to have the benefit of section 5 of the' Limitation. Act, which has been made applicable to the appeals before North‑West Frontier Province Service Tribunal, it is the duty of the appellant to explain delay for every day that elapses beyond the period allowed by the law for filing an appeal, and he is bound to show that there has been no negligence, inaction or want of bona fides on his part before he can claim an extension of time. An appeal out of time must show on the face of it the reason for delay and there must be an express prayer for the condonation of the delay before the Court or the Tribunal may consider the appellant's explanation, with a view to the exercise of discretionary power under the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act. In the instant case, the appellant has neither is submitted an application for the condonation of delay nor has he explained the delay for preferring the appeal beyond the period of limitation provided by the Act. Even the counsel for the appellant, during the course of his arguments, could not account for the delay and merely contented himself by saying that floe limitation for appeals like the present one was governed by section 8 of the Act. As already indicated, the legal position so taken up by the learned counsel for the appellant is not tenable. In this view of the matter, there cannot be the slightest doubt about the fact that there was no sufficient ground for preferring this appeal beyond the period of limitation provided by section 4 of the Act.
5. It would be noticed from the foregoing discussions that the present appeal was barred by limitation, and that there was no sufficient ground for the condonation of delay in preferring the appeal beyond the period of limitation. The result; therefore, is that the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed, in limine.