Pakistan Case Law
1988 PLC(CS) 643

WAPDA Versus MAQSOOD AHMAD

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Citation1988 PLC(CS) 643
CourtPunjab Labour Appellate Tribunal
Case No.Appeal No. GA‑62 of 1986
Date1986-01-21
Judge(s)Sardar Muhammad Abdul Ghafoor Khan Lodhi, Appellate Tribunal
ResultAppeal dismissed

The decision dated 16‑12‑1985 recorded by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No.3, Lahore at Ferozewala has been challenged, whereby the order of suspension of the respondent was set aside and he was directed to be re‑instated in service with consequential benefits.

2. On the charge of corruption a criminal case was got registered against the respondent which is still pending. He was proceeded against departmentally and was brought under suspension. The departmental proceedings ended in the exoneration from the charge and he was re‑instated in service. As the criminal case is pending against the respondent he was again suspended on t4‑10‑1985 under the instructions of the Ministry of Interior. The learned lower Court has set aside the order of suspension on the ground that under Standing Order 15(5) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 an employee cannot be kept under suspension for an indefinite period. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the respondent was suspended under the Civil Servants Rules, according to which, an employee can be suspended for three months at a stretch and the said period can be extended. He has also argued that according to section 17(1‑B), all WAPDA employees are civil servants, therefore, Labour Courts have no jurisdiction.

3. To avoid the applicability of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 there are two conditions. One is that the establishment should be either running by the Government or under the authority of the Government. WAPDA is not a department of the Government but is an autonomous body. It is not running under the authority of the Government either. It is a statutory body running under the authority of WAPDA Act. Authority of an enactment is not so weak so as to require the authority of a sovereign body. WAPDA Act allows some kind of control of the Government but the authority under which WAPDA is functioning is of the Act. Mere control is not sufficient to say that WAPDA is running under the direct authority of the Government. So far as second condition is concerned, it is doubtful if the rules of WAPDA are statutory. No doubt, they have been framed under the WAPDA Act but they have not teen published in the official Gazette of the Central Government. Thus, Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 applies and as under Standing Order 15(5) only for the purposes of inquiry an employee can be suspended and the total period of suspension is 28 days only, the order of suspension for three months at a stretch was in violation of the said Ordinance.

4. No doubt, all WAPDA employees are by virtue of section 17(1‑B) of WAPDA Act, civil servants but they are so only for the purposes of the Service Tribunals Act. Where the said Tribunal has no jurisdiction, Labour Courts retain their jurisdiction if of course the employees concerned come within the definition of workman according to the nature of their duties. The Civil Service Tribunal has no jurisdiction to deal with questions of suspension as an order of suspension is not final. The suspended employee remains in service and only is not required to discharge his duties. Section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act clearly says that the said Tribunal has jurisdiction when a final order has been passed involving terms and conditions of service. The section reads as under:‑

"Any civil servant aggrieved by any final order, whether original or appellate, made by a departmental authority in respect of any of the terns and conditions of service may within thirty days of communication of such order to him, prefer an appeal to the Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter. "

So, the Civil Services Tribunal has no jurisdiction and thus, the Labour Courts retain their jurisdiction in such matters. The order of suspension being against the provisions of Standing Order 15(5) has been rightly set aside by the learned trial Court.

5. As a result, the appeal fails and is thus, dismissed in limine.

A.E. /91/Lb.P ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Appeal dismissed.

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