1988 PLC(CS) 485
The facts relevant for disposal of this appeal are that the appellant is working as Inspector of Police. The appellant was communicated the following adverse remark‑s:‑
Date of communication
Period
Remarks.
(i) 1‑2‑1987
1‑1‑1986 to 30‑4‑1986
Integrity Controversial. Remarks of the Second Countersigning Officer. An over pitched report, down graded to category B . A very controversial police officer who for financial or moral integrity.
(ii) 18‑11‑1986
1‑1‑1985 to 31‑12‑1985
Integrity‑Controversial
(iii) 20‑12‑1986.
8‑8‑1984 to 31‑12‑1984
Integrity‑Controversial
The appellant received these adverse remarks one after the other and submitted two sets of representations against the same. The representation for expunction of adverse remarks at Serial Nos. (ii) and (iii) was dismissed by the respondent No. 3 vide order dated 20‑5‑1987 while the other representation in respect of A.C.R. at Sr.No.(ii), remained under consideration for statutory period of 90 days. Since the respondent No.3 failed to decide the same within 90 days, therefore, the appellant filed the present appeal within next 30 days.
2. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned District Attorney for the respondents and gone through the parawise comments as well as service record of the appellant.
3. In view of the facts and law points raised, I have decided to take up three reports in two groups. I have placed Annual Confidential Report for the period from 1‑1‑1986 to 30‑4‑1986 in the first group while the second group is comprising of other two reports. Now I proceed to take u p first group covering A. C. R. for the period 1‑1‑198 6 to 30‑4‑1986. This report can conveniently be split in two parts for purposes of discussion i.e., remarks by the second Countersigning officer and remarks by the Reporting Officer.
4. The learned counsel for the appellant argued that remarks of the second Countersigning Officer dated 11‑1‑1987 and conveyed to in respect of the report at Sr.No.(i) were unjustified. As the second Countersigning Officer i.e., Deputy Inspector‑General of Police, Rawalpindi Region took over the charge of the Range on 1‑3‑1986 while the appellant was transferred from his jurisdiction on 30‑4‑1986. It is submitted that according to Instruction No.4, the minimum period for writing the reports is 3 months while in the present case the appellant has worked under the second Counter signing Officer only for a period of about two months. The learned Advocate has placed reliance o n 198 2 P L C (C. S.) 426 in this behalf.
5. The learned District Attorney has submitted that this instruction is only in respect of the Reporting Officer and does not apply to the Countersigning Officer. I have noted from comments tat respondent No.l has raised the same point but referred to para 6 of the Standing Order 32. The relevant instructions read as under:‑
"4. Minimum period for writing of reports.
The minimum period during which an officer is expected to form a judicious opinion about the work of his subordinate for the purpose of writing a report on his work and conduct has been prescribed as three months. The report recorded in respect of period less than the minimum prescribed period should be ignored."
While para 6 reads as under:‑
"6. Minimum period of writing of reports‑ he minimum period during which an officer is expected form a judicious opinion about the work of his subordinate for the purpose of writing a report on his work and conduct has been prescribed as three months. It is not necessary that the three months period must fall in one calendar year; it can be partially in one year and partially in the next year. The report recorded in respect of a period less than the minimum prescribed period should be ignored. If a reporting officer in such circumstances comes to know facts about which he cannot remark but which he feels should not go un-remarked, he should report such facts separately to his superior officer who will decide himself whether or not to mention the matter in the annual confidential report.
It is clear from the bare reading of the instruction No.4, as well as para 6 of I.G.P's Standing Order 32 reproduced above that it is l no‑where specified that these instructions apply only to the "Reporting Officer" and not to 'the 'Countersigning Officer'. The word used is 'officer' which in my considered opinion covers both the 'Reporting Officer' and the 'Countersigning Officer'. Moreover, this period, as is clear from the text of the instructions, has been prescribed so the 'officer' could make a judicious opinion about the work of his subordinate. This leaves no scope for the argument that either para 6 or instruction 4 deals with Reporting Officer above. I, therefore, hold that the remarks of the second Countersigning Officer must be expunged for this technical defect.
6. The remarks of the 'Reporting Officer' are, also, liable to be set aside not on merits but on technical ground. The reports are to be completed in accordance with the instructions formulated by the Government of the Punjab for writing 'Confidential Reports'. In this case, although not argued yet I have noted, that the 'Reporting Officer' in all the three impugned A.C.Rs. is one and the same person i.e. Mr. Muhammad Yaqub, S.P. Respondent No.l. Whereas as per instruction No.41, if an official received adverse remarks for two successive years from the same reporting officer then such official should be placed under another reporting officer. The instruction No.41 reads as under:‑
"41. Action in case of recording adverse remarks by same reporting officer for two successive years‑‑In order to guard against personal likes and dislikes an official receiving adverse remarks for two successive years from the same reporting officer should be placed under another reporting officer."
Para 17 of Inspector‑General of Police, Punjab's Standing Order, 32 makes exactly the same provision and reads as under:‑
"17. Action in case of recording adverse remarks by same reporting officer for two successive years‑‑In order to guard against personal likes and dislikes an official receiving adverse remarks for two successive years from the same reporting officer should be placed under another reporting officer."
It is, therefore; clear that respondent No.l while recording 3rd executive report covering period 1‑1‑1986 to 30‑4‑1986 violated the instructions both of the Government and the respondent No.4. 1, therefore, expunge the remarks recorded by the reporting officer, the same having been recorded in utter violation of the instructions. The result of the above is that remarks in this A.C.R. are expunged on this technical ground, therefore, I need not go into merits.
7. There is definitely wisdom behind prescribing the instructions but it is regretted that generally these are ignored by the officials responsible for initiating, completing and conveying reports. It is for the Department Heads to emphasize the need for strict compliance of the instructions of the Standing order.
8. Now I proceed with the other two A.C.Rs. together because not only the remarks are the same but the factual and legal position remaining exactly the same, therefore, I decide the two reports together. The remarks objected to by the appellant in these reports are Integrity‑ 'Controversial. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant:‑
(i) Firstly that neither the Reporting Officer nor the Counter signing Officer in these two reports has referred to any complaint or instance.
(ii) Secondly that the appellant was awarded more than 100 Commendation Certificates and also given a special cash award of Rs.20,000, therefore, the remarks as to the Integrity are against facts.
(iii) Thirdly that the entries in column 15 i.e., Integrity are contradictory to the General Remarks.
9. Before discussing the merits of arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant, I would like to tabulate the grounds. The grounds on which the adverse entries in the A.C.R. can be expunged or struck down are as under:‑
(a) If the final authority dealing with report considered it to be biased or unjustified or inconsistent with facts.
(b) There is a violation of the Instructions prescribed to safeguard the rights of the officials, for example there should be minimum period of 3 months for an officer to make a judicious opinion of the work of his subordinate (instruction 4) recording of adverse remarks by the same Reporting Officer for 2 successive years etc. (instruction 41).
(c) The recording, completion and communication of reports in accordance with the schedule provided in the instructions.
Failure to observe the time schedule for initiating, recording and conveying reports is of no legal consequence, in view of dictum of the Supreme Court of Pakistan.
10. It is, therefore, clear from the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant noted above that he is seeking the expunction of the adverse remarks on the ground that the same are inconsistent with the facts and unjustified. The first argument, that there was no complaint, of the learned counsel for the appellant that the Reporting Officer and the Countersigning Officer have not deferred to any complaint or instance. In this behalf the learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on a case decided by this Tribunal as reported 1985 P L C. (C S) 545 of Allah Bakhsh v. Superintendent of Police, Faisalabad and another. Remarks in that case were expunged as the Tribunal found that there was no complaint against the appellant and the same were not convincing and without basis. While in this case the remarks recorded by the Reporting officer were fully subscribed by the Countersigning Officer and even by the second Countersigning Officer. I am afraid that this argument is legally misconceived as the Reporting Officer as well as Countersigning Officers are supposed to report the gist of their opinion in the A.C.R. There is neither any column specified nor space left for citing the instance nor it is otherwise prescribed in the instructions for writing A.C.Rs. The only limitation is contained in the later part of the instruction No.30 which reads as under:‑
"30 .The reporting officer should be in a position to justify his views, if called upon, to do so."
When apply this itself there is nothing wrong with the reports of the respondent No.l. I have gone through the service record of the appellant as well as the comments, the respondent No.l has fully justified the remarks in the justification report rendered to the respondent No.4 and also in the parawise comments submitted in this Tribunal. The respondent No.l has categorically stated that there were number of complaints against the appellant made to him by the different persons, even in the absence bias or mala fides this is no ground. It is lastly pointed out that in the 'General Remarks' the appellant had been described as a smart and energetic police officer which contradict the entry in the column of Integrity. I am afraid that legally and logically this argument has no basis as good physical health etc., does not mean that his integrity is also sound.
Secondly, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that l the appellant was awarded more than 100 commendation certificates and he was also given special cash award of Rs.20,000. It is submitted on the strength of these commendations and cash award that the remarks controversial in the integrity column are against the facts. I am afraid that his arguments instead of going in favour of the appellant in fact directly go against him because this fact is sufficient to establish that the remarks of respondent No.l are impartial appraisal of the appellant. The report even otherwise is convincing for the reason that the appellant had been given due credit for his good points. Now, therefore, he should not grudge if his weak points are also pinpointed out.
11. The result of this discussion is that the adverse remarks recorded in report at Sr. No.(i) are expunged in toto for the reasons that second Countersigning Officer had not the opportunity to see the work of the appellant for three months and the same reporting officer had written the third successive report in violation of instruction No.41. The appeal is accepted to this extent while for the period 1‑1‑1985 to 31‑12‑1985 and 8‑8‑1984 to 31‑12‑1984 is dismissed.
M.Y.H. /133/Sr.P Appeal partly accepted.