1983 PLC(CS) 714

DECISION

This appeal is directed against a decision of the learned Fifth Labour Court given on 26‑4‑1982, dismissing the grievance petition preferred by the appellant herein against the termination of his services by the two respondents herein.

2. The case of the appellant, as disclosed in his grievance petition filed on 2‑12‑1979, is that he was originally appointed with effect from 19‑4‑1978, as Additional Office Superintendent in the factory of respon dent No. 1, Messrs Pakistan Paper Products Limited. It appears that the services of the appellant were terminated by the first respondent on 30‑9‑1978. However, by letter, dated 1‑2‑1979, the appellant was appointed as a Sales Assistant in the establishment of the second respondent. Apart from the fact that this was a fresh appointment in a separate establish ment, there was a great difference in the emoluments which the appe111nt was to receive in the establishment of the second respondent from the emoluments of the post which he was holding with the first respondent. According to the appellant himself, with the first respondent he was in receipt" of a basic salary of Rs. 600 p.m. plus allowances of Rs. 209 while in the post of Sales Assistant with the second respondent he was getting a salary of Rs. 435 p.m. only of course with allowances thereon, The services of the appellant were terminated by the second respondent vide letter, dated 28‑8‑1979, with effect from 31‑8‑1979. The appellant, after giving a grievance notice, dated 1‑11‑1979, to the first respondent filed his grievance petition before the learned Labour Court on 2‑12‑1979.

3. Now as regards the termination of his services by the first respon dent on 30‑9‑1978, no grievance notice was given by the appellant within three months of such termination of services. Even if the grievance notice, dated 1‑9‑1979, be deemed to be a grievance notice in respect of the said termination of his services, the notice will. be hopelessly time barred and no grievance petition based on such notice would be main tainable.

4. In order to cover up his long delay in the service of the grievance notice and the filing of the grievance petition qua the termination of service of the appellant by the first respondent he has sought to show that the two respondents in fact are one establishment and that he was working for both the respondents at all times. This contention has no force. The two respondents are limited companies and accordingly 'are separate and distinct legal entities. Furthermore the services of the appellant were terminated by the first respondent by the written order, dated 30‑9‑1978, and he was asked to clear his accounts and take his dues from the Accounts Department. As already stated the appellant was appointed by the second respondent in an altogether different post and on much lower salary by the letter. date 1‑2‑1979. The appellant's appointment by the second respondent thus, cannot be considered to be a continuation of his old appointment by the first respondent.

5. As regards the termination of appellant's services by the second respondent with effect from 31‑9‑1979, vide letter, dated 28‑8‑1979, the stand of the second respondent from the very beginning has been that no grievance, as contemplated by section 25‑A, I. R. O., has been served on them by the appellant. No doubt the appellant has claimed that he had sent to the second respondent a copy of the grievance notice, dated 1‑9‑1979, which he had served upon the first respondent but not only the second respondent has strongly denied the service or the receipt of this notice but further the appellant has failed to adduce art iota of evidence of his contention that a copy of this notice was served upon the second respondent. Neither the postman through whom the notice is said to have been delivered to the second respondent nor a postal receipt in respect of the posting of this notice to the second respondent was produced. In the circumstances the learned Labour Court appears to have rightly come to the conclusion that no grievance notice was served upon the second respondent. It may further be pointed out that the appellant has failed to establish that he was a workman for the purposes of the Standing Orders Ordinance and was entitled to file u grievance petition under the provisions of clause (3) of Standing Order 12 read with section 25‑A,

1. R. O. and the second respondent employed not less than twenty workmen and hence the provisions of the Standing Orders are applicable to it. It was incumbent on the appellant to adduce such evidence in view of the stand of the second respondent that the appellant was not a workman for the purposes of Standing Order and that no time they had employed more than 15 to 16 employees.

6. For the reasons discussed by me above I find no merit in this appeal and dismiss the same in limine.

Appeal dismissed.