PAKISTAN INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (PVT.) LTD. Versus H. MAHMOOD SHERA

DECISION

This is an appeal filed by Messrs Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, Karachi, against an impugned order, dated 31‑8‑1985, passed by Sind Labour Court No.III, Karachi, who had allowed the grievance petition of the respondent under section 25‑A, I.R.O. 1969, directing the appellant Corporation to reinstate him in service with full back benefits.

2. Brief facts of the case are that the respondent was originally appointed as Draftsman on 6‑5‑1978 and he was confirmed in the employment, vide letter, dated 29‑8‑19'78 and that he had clean and un‑blemished service record to his credit. It was claimed by the respondent that he was required to serve at various places, of the appellant corporation and that wherever he was posted, he obtained good reports and that lastly, he was transferred from the Head Office to P.I.D.C. Printing Press at West Wharf, Karachi. Further the case of the respondent was that as he was working as an Artist, quite satisfactorily in the Printing Press, since November, 1982, therefore, on 7‑5‑1984, he had submitted an application to the Deputy General Manager, P.I.D.C. Printing Press requesting therein to grant the Pay Scale of an‑ Artist, but, his request was not heeded to. That, one Mr. Dilshad was employed as an Artist on Daily Wages basis and he was retained in service though he was junior to him. That, as he was pressing hard for the grant of Pay Scale of an Artist, which had annoyed the appellant corporation, therefore, there was an apprehension that he was removed from the employment and the said Mr. Dilshad, a junior to him would be retained so, he made an application to this effect to the Chairman of the Appellant Corporation on 15‑9‑1984, and this application too, was not replied. Lastly, the case of the respondent was that on 18‑9‑1984, his services were terminated by the appellant corporation very illegally and arbitrarily as 'no longer required' as per alleged Clause 7 of his appointment letter. Therefore, he served a grievance notice upon the appellant corporation and thereafter filed his grievance petition under section 25‑A, I.R.O. 1969 before the learned Labour Court.

3. The appellant corporation resisted the petition mainly on the ground that as the respondent was not found to be fit and qualified for the post of an Artist, therefore, his request for the grant of Pay Scale of an Artist was not accepted; therefore, his services were terminated as 'no more required', and that it was incorrect to say that Mr. Dilshad was junior to him. However, the appellant corporation had admitted the un‑blemished and creditable Service Record of the respondent. Lastly, it was the case of the appellant corporation that as the termination of services of the respondent was simplicitor and in writing; therefore, he was not entitled to maintain his grievance petition which was liable to be dismissed.

4. Both the parties filed their respective affidavits‑in‑evidence and they were duly cross‑examined. Thereafter, the learned Labour Court has allowed the grievance Petition of the respondent, hence, the present appeal.

5. I have heard Mr. Mahmood Iqbal the learned Advocate for the appellant corporation and Mr. Ch. Rasheed Ahmed, the learned Advocate for the respondent and have also carefully perused the record and proceedings of the case. It was argued by the learned Advocate for the appellant corporation that as the services of the respondent were terminated simplicitor under clause 12, sub‑clause (1) of the 'Nest Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 and that the respondent was allowed one month wages in lieu of notice, so, he was not entitled to maintain his petition. He further submitted that the termination was not on account of any misconduct and that the termination orders were rightly and lawfully issued by the competent authority. I see no force in the contentions of the learned Advocate for the appellant corporation. On the other hand, Mr. Ch. Rasheed Ahmad, the learned Counsel for the respondent has submitted that as the respondent was working as an Artist quite satisfactorily for more than two years and was demanding his re‑designation as an 'Artist' which had annoyed the appellant corporation; therefore, his services were terminated, allegedly simplicitor as 'no more required'; as such this termination was mala fide. He has further submitted that it is an admitted fact from the record that after the alleged termination of services of the respondent, one Iqbal Shahid was working in place of the respondent and that one Dilshad was appointed after the appointment of the respondent; therefore, it is proved from the admission of the witness of the appellant corporation that some persons were appointed and working as an Artist, after termination of services of the respondent. Mr. Ch. Rasheed Ahmad, the learned Counsel for the respondent has further submitted that the termination of services of the respondent was contrary to the provisions of the Standing Orders Ordinance 1968, mainly basing on the alleged Clause 7 of the appointment letter of the respondent and this Clause too, was in contravention of the provisions of Section 12(3) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. Mr. Ch. Rasheed Ahmad, the learned Counsel for the respondent, in this respect, has relied on an authority reported in 1985 .P L C at page 722, wherein it has been held that 'services no longer required' is no ground when such post was not abolished. As such, it was not, the case of the appellant corporation that the post was abolished, but, from the evidence on record, it has been fully established that some other‑ persons were posted to work as an Artist in the Printing Press of the appellant corporation after the alleged termination simplicitor of the services of the respondent. Further, there is no charge‑sheet on record. In view of this factual and legal position, I hold that the termination of the services of the respondent, was quite, unjust, illegal and mala fide As such, the learned Labour Court has, rightly passed the impugned order and I find nothing' wrong with the said order. I, therefore, hold that the respondent is entitled to be reinstated in service with full back benefits.

6. For the reasons stated by me above, I see no reason to interfere with the impugned order and would maintain the same. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed and the respondent is directed to be reinstated in service with full back benefits forthwith.

A.E./1210/Lb.S Appeal dismissed.