1993 PLC(CS) 510

AZRA MOHSIN Versus IMAM HASAN ASKARI (A.S.)

Citation1993 PLC(CS) 510

CourtSindh Labour Appellate Tribunal

Judge(s)Agha Ali Hyder, Appellate Tribunal Mrs. AZRA MOHSIN

DECISION

The circumstances in which this appeal has been preferred, briefly put, are as under:

2. The petitioner as alleged had been working with the respondents since 1983 as a Librarian. It appears that she had remained on leave for some time and when she reported for duty she was informed by the Principal that her services stood terminated. The termination letter was received on 29‑9‑1990. As she had been summarily removed from employment, she had given a grievance notice and later on filed the petition before the Labour Court.

3. The petition came to be resisted inter alia on the ground that the respondent was a Charitable Trust by the name of `Shah‑i‑Karbala Trust Rizvia Society' doing social and charitable service and as it was being run on donations the provisions of `Labour Laws' were not applicable to it. The other contentions also came to be denied.

4. The petitioner appeared as her own witness while Mirza Aftab‑i‑Alam Kizilbash, Advocate, who is the Trustee of Shah‑e‑Karbala Trust Rizvia Society and Honorary Chairman of the Governing Body of the respondents as the nominee of the Trust, appeared on behalf of the respondents.

5. The Labour Court coming to the conclusion that the school, which was being run by a Charitable Religious and Educational Trust, could not be dubbed as an Industrial or Commercial Establishment, the jurisdiction of the Labour Court was not attracted. As a result the petition came to be dismissed.

6. The `Trust Deed' has been brought on the record and a look at its contents hardly leaves any doubt that its aim and object is to serve the needy and the disadvantaged people, and espouse other worthy causes. Its funds are raised from donations, from the fee realised from the students, and rents from the tenants of the Trust buildings. Mr. Kizilbash has stated that the fee being charged from the students generally was Rs.120 per month and a very considerable number of the students were being given concessions ranging up to 50% of the total fee. The petitioner suggested that the fee was Rs.150 but it is not necessary to dilate on the same.

7. It was however, not even suggested, and probably could not be suggested, that its funds could be used for any other purposes than narrated by Mr. Kizilbash.

8. Mr. M.M. Jeelani, learned counsel for the appellant, in support of his contentions that the petition would lie, referred to the cases of Miss Adam Nishat v. Beacon's House Public School (Pvt.) Ltd. 1990 PLC page 675 and Anjuman Faizul Islam v. Pakistan and others 1988 PLC 937.

9. As for the Beacon's House case, admittedly it was run on commercial basis, being a Joint Stock Company. As for the other case mentioned earlier, that was a dispute between the school and the Government for levy under the Old‑Age Benefits Act, 1976, and it was said that the cause for which it was called upon to make the contribution was for a beneficial purpose. The status of the school was not in question.

10. As against this there is an array of cases in which the contrary view has been held (See Employees' Union Jamia Karachi v. Registrar of Trade Unions and others 1981 PLC 403. In Ghulam Sarwar and another v. Principal, Government Training College, Khairpur 1982 PLC: 771). It has been clearly laid down in the said cases, that in the institutions where education was being imparted to the students, could not be termed as `Commercial Establishments' and therefore section 25‑A, I.R.O., could not be invoked against them by any of their workmen.

11. Otherwise too it has been held in Medical Education Uplift Fund of Seventh Day Adventist Association of Hospitals in Pakistan v. Vth Sindh Labour Court and others PLD 1978 Karachi 536, that petitioner seeking relief under section 25‑A, I.R.O., has to satisfy that he was a workman within the meaning of the definition in section 2(1) of the Standing Orders Ordinance. That definition clearly precludes, the petitioner before me, to seek any remedy from the Labour Courts.

12. It is true that the termination order is open to serious objection, but that would hot be open to scrutiny here.

13. As a result I will uphold the impugned order and dismiss the appeal.

H.B.T./2163/Lb.S Appeal dismissed.