KHANPUR GUL Versus NATIONAL MOTORS LIMITED, KARACHI
DECISION
This appeal calls in question the order of the Labour Court No. 2, Karachi whereby the appellant's petition for reinstatement under section 25‑A of the I.R.O. came to be dismissed. Shortly stated it had arisen in the following circumstances:‑‑
The appellant had joined the services of the respondent as a Watchman on or about 20‑6‑1973. In the month of May 1977 some vacancies having arisen for the post of General Clerk IV, the appellant had submitted his application for the same. The qualifications for appointment were Matric degree and 2 years' experience. The appellant had mentioned in his application that he was a matriculate, and having worked as a peon for the last one year in the Sales Department "had sufficient knowledge of office work of routine". The appointment came to him in the month of November, 1977 and nothing untoward happened, till on the 20th of May, 1985 he was served with a show cause notice which reads as follows:‑‑
"You are aware that the company announced certain permanent vacancies in Sales Department vide notice dated 26‑4‑1977 and you applied for the post of General Clerk IV against the said notice. The educational qualification for the appointment of the said post was Matriculation. In your application for employment in the column of `qualification' you mentioned yourself as Matriculate and submitted a Photostat copy of Matriculation Certificate Sr. No. 117913, Roll No. 4205. Relying upon the said certificate the company appointed you as General Clerk IV vide letter, dated 20th November, 1977. In the course of an exercise to verify all degrees, certificates, diplomas submitted to us by our employees, we sent several certificates including yours to the Higher Secondary Board, Peshawar for verification.
Consequent to the above verification, the Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Peshawar has verified that the photostat copy of the certificate produced by you bearing Sr. No. 117913, Roll No. 4205 was not issued to you but was actually issued to one Mr. Eid Muhammad. The photo stat copy of matric certificate produced by you is take and is not genuine.
The above act on your part constitutes fraud and dishonesty in connection with company's business as envisaged under Standing Order 15(3)(b) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968.
You are directed to show cause in writing within three days of receipt of this letter as to why disciplinary action should not be taken against you.
(Sd.)
HAROLD A. NEIK,
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND PERSONNEL MANAGER."
He replied to the same. However, that did not satisfy the respondent and a domestic enquiry was ordered.
2. The appellant sought adjournment on the ground that his wife was seriously ill and had been hospitalised, and there was too much strain on him as well. After some delay the enquiry was taken up on the 11th of June. The appellant participated and brought a co‑worker by the name of Zaheer (sic) to assist him in his defence, but was reluctant to sign the proceedings. He had also made an application that he be allowed the use of a tape recorder as he had genuine apprehension about the impartiality of the Enquiry Officer. It was a novel request, and the application was rejected. Anyhow a beginning was made but from the 18th of July he totally boycotted the proceedings and the rest of the enquiry was conducted ex parte. After the conclusion of the enquiry proceedings the appellant came to be dismissed from service on the 25th of July, 1985.
3. The appellant had sent a grievance notice on the 21st of September, 1985 which was replied to, but as the demand of the appellant had not been acceded to, he filed the petition before the Labour Court.
4. The allegations came to be denied in the reply filed on behalf of the respondent. The Labour Court coming to the conclusion that the appellant had perpetrated a fraud by claiming to be a matriculate and also that the enquiry was conducted in a fair and proper manner, dismissed the petition culminating in this appeal.
5. There is nothing of note from the time the appellant joined as a Clerk in 1977 till 1985. It appears that Major‑General Muhammad Ikram Cheema, the Managing Director of the respondent on the 23rd of December, 1984 sent a letter to the Vice‑Chancellor of the Karachi University saying that they had reasons to believe that some of their employees had submitted fake degrees to support their educational requirements. The letter went on to say that "we are enclosing herewith a list of employees alongwith photo stat copies of degrees submitted by them which are issued from your University. We would require you to verify genuineness of such degrees and are accordingly deputing our representative to present the same to you. We are willing to pay the required fee/charges if any etc." Similar letters came to be dispatched to the Vice Chancellor of the N.E.D. University of Engineering and Technology, to the Vice‑Chancellor of the Peshawar University, the Vice‑Chancellor of the Punjab University, the Secretary, Board of Intermediate Education, the Secretary, Board .of Secondary Education of Sindh at Peshawar and a number of other institutions in the country.
6. It appears that in that context 27 Certificates of S.S.C./Intermediate Examination were sent to the Secretary, Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Peshawar and by their letter dated 3‑1‑1985 the respondents were informed that two of them were not genuine. It was said that the one pertaining to the appellant had actually been issued to one Eid Muhammad who had appeared from Government High School Dam Killi (Kohat). The respondent had then sent attested copies of the two certificates for further action. It was undertaken by the respondents that any expenses "chargeable will be paid by our area representative, who will be contacting you in person". Correspondence followed and the authorities assured that the "original admission form will be shown to the Court or to you as and when required as the case may be". This letter was signed by the Assistant Secretary of the Peshawar Board. A photo stat copy of the Admission Form was also dispatched. This is dated 13‑5‑1985. It was on the receipt of this letter that the show‑cause notice was issued to the appellant on the 20th of May, 1985. In the reply to the show‑cause notice the stand maintained by the appellant was, that he had been given the job of the clerk not on the. basis of his Matric degree, but on the strength of the experience alone, and he had cleared the examination from Karachi later in 1980.
7. On the showing of the appellant himself he had got his Matriculation degree from Karachi, was 3 years after he had got the job as a clerk. The appellant was confronted with the application on the record and he admitted his signature thereon. It clearly mentions that he had the Matriculation degree. Later follow the lines about the experience.
8. Matric degree, as to be found from the Notice announcing vacancy, being the sine qua non for appointment, it is unimaginable that he should have succeeded in securing the job on the basis of his experience, gained only as a peon attached to the Sales Department. Patently he had lied and sneaked into a higher cadre by posing to have a degree which he did not have. He was confronted with a number of other documents also. He tried to wriggle out but had to admit that the application in question bore his signature as did 3 other documents having a bearing on the case, including the notice for employment put on the Board. No exception can be taken to the approach adopted by the respondent. They had taken meticulous care to get all the particulars and details before proceeding against him and even the appellant admits that he had no Matriculation degree up to 1980.
9. The enquiry conducted also does not show any bias against the appellant. There could be no question of any bias and there was no malice involved. It all rested on the basis of information received from Board authorities who had been approached by the respondent not only against the appellant but other employees as well. There is nothing to doubt that the information received did not depict the truth. The appellant knew that the odds were heavy and the walls looked to be closing against him from all sides. It was therefore that he adopted delaying tactics asking for adjournments for one reason or another. The respondent however had accommodated him and had requested the company's doctor to see and verify about the ailment of the appellant's wife from the Hospital where she was admitted. He was however told that she had been discharged from there the same day earlier. All this is not denied.
10. He had made insupportable demands like the permission to use tape recorder during the proceedings; if it could not be provided by the respondent he was prepared to bring it on his own. There is nothing to show that any papers had been withheld or that he had not been accommodated on a number of dates. Even when he was present he had declined to sign the proceedings. Later on from the 18th of July totally he had altogether boycotted the proceedings.
11. This calculated and wanton act of the appellant to put a brake on the proceedings cannot nullify the results. He had only to blame himself. Certainly no fault can be found with the respondent. There is enough case‑law on the point. (See the case of Dawood Cotton Mills PLD 1981 SC 225). I am of the opinion that the proceedings which are so carefully drawn and discussed are free from any bias, and its findings were properly acted upon by the management.
12. Lastly it was urged that there were a number of employees who had made false statements in regard to their qualifications and they have been spared. The suggestion was that the management had taken a lenient course while dealing with them. S. Niaz Ahmed the Deputy Manager who had appeared on behalf of the respondent however stated in cross‑examination that out of all the persons named only Saif Ali, Farman and Saleem were in service but they were demoted to lower grades, the others were no more with them. Any way this assertion even if true which it is not, can never be a ground to interfere with the order of dismissal passed by the authorities after proper consideration.
I am clearly of the opinion that the impugned order is not open to any challenge. The appeal therefore stands dismissed.
H.B.T./2185/Lb.S
Appeal dismissed.