JUNAID AHMAD Versus PREMIER MERCANTILE SERVICES (PRIVATE) LIMITED KARACHI

DECISION

These ten appeals call in question the common order of the Labour Court No. IV dismissing the applications filed by the petitioners under section 25‑A of the I.R.O., 1969.

2. The facts forming the background of the appeals are that the petitioners who were working with the respondents for a number of years as Assistant Mechanic, Mechanical Helper and the like jobs had formed a Union on 7‑11‑1989 in the name and style of M/s. Premier Mercantile Services Workers' Union and the list of the office‑bearers had been communicated to the respondents vide letter dated 13‑11‑1989. Apprised of the intention of the petitioners, the respondents did their best to pressurise them to withdraw the applications from the Office of the Registrar of Trade Unions, and on their refusal to accede to the demand, the respondents on or about 15‑11‑1989 refused them entry to attend to their work and had told them that they had made alternate arrangements. They had, therefore, sent grievance notices on or about 2‑12‑1989 which remained un replied. It was thereafter that separate petitions were filed before the Labour Court.

3. The respondents in their written reply denied that the petitioners had been in their employment. It was also alleged that as stevedors, which the respondents were, their work was being done by the Dock Workers retained by the K.P.T. Board, and in that context they referred to certain pronouncements of the Supreme Court. The other contentions also came to be denied.

4. The petitioners were their own witnesses, out of whom with the consent of the parties, only Junaid Ahmed was cross‑examined. Syed Ali Ashraf the Manager was the sole witness on behalf of the respondents.

5. The Labour Court came to the conclusion that the provisions of Standing Orders Ordinance were not applicable and therefore the petition did not lie.

6. It was also found that the averments made by the petitioners about their employment were also not proved. The petitions were, therefore, dismissed resulting in these appeals.

7. The respondents are stevedors and their function is to load and un load cargo, mainly from aboard the vessels at the Karachi Port. They had detailed the special arrangements for obtaining the services of the dock workers under the Karachi Dock Workers (Regulations of Employment) Scheme, 1973. I have referred to them at some length in an earlier judgment pronounced by me today and I will confine myself only to a few provisions here.

8. There is no gain‑saying the fact that the dock workers are under the control of Dock Workers Board as envisaged in the scheme. The powers of the Board are to be found in clause 8 of the said scheme. The service record of every registered dock worker is to be maintained by the Administrative Body formed by the Board as to be found in clause 23 and then there is a guaranteed minimum wage payable to every dock worker in a month as detailed in clause 29. Clause 35(2) reads as under:

"A registered dock worker in Register I who is available for work shall be deemed to be in the employment of the Board." and sub‑clause (2) of clause 40 reads as follows:

"The Board shall by regulation determine the wages earned commensurate with the actual output of registered dock workers."

9. The other salient feature of the case to be noted is that any worker entering the KPT Area, where the West Wharf is situated, has to obtain an 1 entry pass which also bears the name of the employer.

10. The employment of dock workers privately by the respondents therefore is wide of the mark.

11. Nothing has been brought on the record to show as to what would be the number of Mechanics and Mechanical Helpers needed by stevedors in the Karachi Port Area and whether some assistance is also rendered by the Port Authorities themselves. It is, however, unimaginable that the stevedors‑‑and there must load full of them at the Port Area‑‑would be retaining any army of mechanics, helpers and electricians to operate the machines that they might be using. Any way entry within the Port Area being through entry passes only, which also mentions the name of the employer, it was not difficult for the appellants to produce evidence in a convincing way as to how many persons, if at all, were on the pay roll of the respondents. The entire record will be there just for the having. Nothing of this sort was attempted.

12. It cannot, therefore, be said that the appellants had succeeded in establishing that the respondents had twenty workers working with them. There is also nothing except the word of the appellants, in support of the assertion that they were the employees of the respondent. It was for the appellants to put some constructions on the assertion and they have failed to do. The impugned order, is therefore, not open to any exception.

13. In the result, I will affirm the order and dismiss the appeals.

H.B.T./2201/Lb.S

Appeals dismissed.