Pakistan Case Law
1995 PLC(CS) 613

AZMAT HUSSAIN GARDEZI Versus SECRETARY, INDUSTRY/PRINTING AND STATIONERY DEPARTMENT, AZAD JAMMU AND KASHMIR

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Citation1995 PLC(CS) 613
CourtSupreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir
Case No.Service Appeal No. 715 of 1993
Date1994-12-19
Judge(s)Raja Bashir Ahmad Khan, Chairman and Khawaja Abdul Hamid Member
ResultAppeal dismissed

RAJA BASHIR AHMAD‑ KHAN (CHAIRMAN): ‑ ‑This service appeal is directed against the Order No.STS/2/3896‑3901/93, dated 19‑8‑1993 v of respondent No. 1 whereby the order of promotion of appellant Syed Azmat Hussain Gardezi dated 8‑9‑1992 as Machine-man in NPS‑7 was vacated and respondent No.2 was promoted as Electro‑Platter.

2. Briefly stated the facts are that the appellant was originally appointed as Metal Malter in NPS‑2 on 9‑5‑1979. The respondent No.2 was appointed as Peon in NPS‑1 on 24‑4‑1979. The respondent No. 2 was later on promoted as Technical labouror on 5‑3‑1980 and was again promoted as Pressman in NPS 3 on 13‑11‑1991. The appellant was promoted as Machine-man in NPS‑7 on 8‑9 1992. The respondent No.2 filed an appeal against the promotion of appellant before respondent No. 1 who, by accepting the said appeal set aside the order of promotion of appellant and proceeded to order the promotion of respondent No.2.

3. We have heard the counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record.

4. The parties have raised the question of limitation and have submitted that the first appeal before the respondent No.l was time‑barred and the, present appeal before this Tribunal has also been filed beyond the time allowed under the law. The contention of counsel for the appellant is that the respondent No.2 filed an appeal on 6‑12‑1992 against the order dated 8‑9‑1992 of promotion of appellant and thus the first appeal of respondent No. 2 before the respondent No.l was time‑barred. The reply to this contention by the other side is that the respondent No.2 was not a party in the order whereby the appellant earned his promotion. The order was not officially communicated to him and he cannot be penalized for the default of other persons. The contention raised on behalf of respondents appears to be genuine. The respondent No. 2 was not a party in the proceedings whereby the appellant was promoted. Respondent No. 2 was not heard by the Authority when the order of promotion of appellant was passed. The order was, therefore, passed at the back and without notice to respondent No.2. It is, therefore, not possible to hold that the appeal filed by respondent No.2 before respondent No.l was time‑barred. The respondents have contended that the appeal is hopelessly time‑barred and, therefore, liable to be dismissed. Appellant in para. 8 of his appeal said that the impugned order was not communicated to him and he came to know about the said order on 16‑12‑1993 when the respondent No.l issued, directions for implementation of the order. The appellant has also reiterated this fact in his replication. In order to disprove the fact of communication of the order the appellant has stated on 1‑9‑1994 that the order of respondent No.1 was not communicated to him before 16‑12‑1993. The appellant has denied his signature on the register of distribution of mail i.e. Dock Bhahi. The respondents have confronted him with his signatures on his Identity Card, affidavit attached with application for suspension of the impugned order and Vakalatnama and other documents mentioned in his statements. When his admitted signatures are compared with the disputed signature on Exh. DA and even seen by the naked eye the irresistible conclusion is that the disputed signatures and the admitted signatures are of the appellant and he has denied his signature on Exh. DA to avoid the operation of law of limitation. The impugned order was received by the Printing Press and the entry of the order is found on Exh. DC and this order was communicated through Exh. DA to Syed Azmat Hussain Gardezi on 22‑8‑1993. The communication of the order has been made through the usual course of business and it will be presumed that in due course of business the appellant has received the order. Since the order was communicated to the A appellant on 22‑8‑1993 and he filed this appeal on 20‑12‑1993 which is beyond the time allowed to file the appeal and thus hopelessly time‑barred. We hold accordingly and declare that the appeal is liable to be dismissed on this score.

5. The next contention of the appellant is that under Departmental Rules the promotion against the post of Machine-man NPS‑7 can be made of the persons who have been declared eligible under the Rules issued under Notification No. S&GADA‑4(43)/86/90, dated 1‑2‑1990. Respondent No. 2 was promoted as Pressman B‑3 on 13‑11‑1991. A Pressman under the Rules can only be promoted if he has five years experience as such. Respondent No.2 did not posses the required experience and he was not eligible to be promoted and he was thus not an aggrieved person and his appeal before respondent No.2 was not competent. The eligible persons under the rules are as follows:‑

"13. Machine-man. By promotion on the basis of Seniority‑cum - Fitness from Stone

Toucher (Sangsaz) B‑5, with 3 years' experience, if no suitable Stone Toucher available then from Paperman B‑3 and Pressman B‑3 with 5 years' experience, if no such suitable officials available then from Khalasi, Litho Inker/Metal Malter/ Technical Labourer Type Cooli/Galiman/ Packer/Machine Cooli/Cleaner Cooli/Electric Cooli B‑2 with 6 (six) years service as such."

6. Sain Khan respondent No. 2 was initially appointed as Peon on 2‑4‑1979 and he was promoted as Technical labourer on 5‑3‑1980. A Technical Labourer is one of the eligible persons under the Rules if he has six years 8 service as such. Sain Khan was promoted as Technical labourer on 5‑3‑1980 if his service as Technical Labourer is taken into account and combined with the service as Pressman the total length of his experience will be more than twelve years. From this aspect of the case we are of the view that Sain Khan was eligible to be promoted and impugned order was rightly passed by respondent No.1.

7. In view of the above discussion we see no force in this appeal which is hereby dismissed with order as to costs.

H.B.T./271‑S/AJK Appeal dismissed.

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