MIAN MAHMOOD Versus WATER AND POWER DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (WAPDA)
This service matter originated from an appeal before the Punjab Service Tribunal, which dismissed the appellant's service appeal in limine on the ground that the Reporting Officer was not impleaded as a necessary party. The appellant challenged this dismissal before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The core legal questions were whether the Deputy Superintendent of Police was a necessary party when the allegation was that he was not the Reporting Officer, and whether the failure to implead him warranted the dismissal of the appeal. The Supreme Court held that the impugned order was unsustainable. The Court noted that the competent authority and the Superintendent of Police were already impleaded, and the Tribunal possessed the authority to direct the appellant to implead necessary parties rather than summarily dismissing the appeal. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the Tribunal's order, and remanded the case for a fresh hearing, emphasizing that procedural defects regarding the impleadment of parties should be cured through directions rather than immediate dismissal of the proceedings.
- Does the failure to implead a party in a service appeal automatically render the appeal incompetent and liable for dismissal in limine?
- Does a Service Tribunal have the power to direct an appellant to implead a necessary party instead of dismissing the appeal?
- Is a Reporting Officer necessarily a required party in a service appeal where the competent authority has already been impleaded?
1. MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, CJ.‑‑‑ In this service matter the dismissal of service appeal of the appellant by Punjab Service Tribunal has been brought under challenge. The impugned order reads as follows:
2. "Present: Mr. MA. Riaz, Advocate, counsel for the appellant.
3. Ch. Manzoor Hussain, DA. for Respondents.
4. Heard. Record perused.
5. During hearing it has been pointed out by the learned District Attorney that in the instant appeal the appellant has not impleaded the Reporting Officer as a party, although the Reporting Officer was a necessary party and due to this omission the instant appeal is incompetent and not maintainable under the law. This contention of the learned District Attorney is fully substantiated from the record. Consequently the instant appeal being incompetent and not maintainable in its present form in dismissed as such in limine.
6. Announced:"
7. Leave to appeal was granted to examine:
(i) Whether the Deputy Superintendent of Police was at all a necessary party when the allegation is that he was not the Reporting Officer?
(ii) Whether the non‑impleadment of Deputy Superintendent of Police could entail dismissal."
8. Learned counsel for the respondents stated that the Deputy Superintendent of Police was not the competent authority in this case. The Deputy Inspector‑General being the competent authority was duly impleaded before the Tribunal. In addition the Superintendent of Police was also impleaded as a respondent. Learned counsel for the appellant stated that if the Tribunal would have desired the appellant would have impleaded also, the Deputy Superintendent of Police. He even now undertakes to implead him as a party. Not only this the Tribunal had ample power instead of dismissing the appeal to direct the appellant to implead the Deputy Superintendent of Police or any other person as a party For all these reasons the impugned order is not sustainable. This appeal is allowed. The impugned order is set aside. The case is remanded to Punjab Service Tribunal for re‑hearing of the appeal, which shall be deemed to be pending.
9. M.B.A./M‑1763/S ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Case remanded.