FARIDUZZAFAR AND OTHERS vs GHULAM MUHAMMAD AND ANOTHER
This petition for leave to appeal arose from execution proceedings where a decree was granted against the petitioners on 17-10-1967. On 16-12-1969, the parties entered into a compromise allowing the respondents two months to pay the decretal amount, staying execution until 16-2-1970. The respondents failed to pay, and the petitioners filed a fresh execution application on 2-9-1974. The core legal question was whether the execution application was barred by limitation. The Supreme Court held that the time spent up to the compromise date and the granted two-month grace period was correctly excluded, and time began to run from the failure to satisfy the decree on 16-2-1970, rendering the 1974 application within time. Furthermore, the Court declined to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal to help the petitioners escape obligations under a compromise they solemnly undertook.
- Whether the period consumed up to the date of a compromise and the granted time for satisfaction of a decree is excluded for limitation purposes in execution?
- When does time begin to run for filing a subsequent execution application after the failure of a judgment debtor to abide by a compromise?
- Will the Supreme Court exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal to assist parties in escaping obligations under a solemn compromise decree?
ORDER
1. ' NASIM HASAN SHAH, J.-A decree was granted against the petitioners on 17-10-1967. During the course of the execution proceedings, on 16-12-1969, the parties arrived at a compromise whereby the respondents agreed to pay the decretal amount within two months, after selling their land and the execution proceedings were stayed for a period of two months i. e. Upto 16-2-1970. The respondents, however, failed to abide by their commitment, constraining the petitioners to move for execution again. The proper application in this behalf was submitted on 2nd September, 1974.
2. The question arose whether this application was within time?
3. ' The learned Judge in the High Court appears to have held that the period taken in connection with the execution proceedings upto the date when the compromise was effected and two months' time granted for the satisfaction of the decree i. e. Upto 16-2-1970 need not be counted and that the time began to run only after the failure of the petitioners to satisfy the decree i. e. After 16-2- 1970. On this hypothesis the application submitted on 2nd September, 1974 being within six years was, therefore, within time.
4. ' Sh. Abdul Rashid, learned counsel for the petitioners, attempted to argue that the period consumed in the first stage of the execution proceedings i. e. Upto 16-2-1970 could not be excluded because the execution of the decree was not stayed by the order, dated 16-12-1979.
5. This does not appear to be a correct appreciation of the situation. In any case, such pleas cannot induce us to exercise or discretionary jurisdiction of granting leave to appeal to assist the petitioners to escape from their obligations under a decree, which they solemnly undertook to satisfy.
6. ' This is, therefore, not a fit case for grant of leave to appeal.
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