STATE PETROLEUM REFINING AND PETROCHEMICAL CORPORATION LIMITED Versus LATEEF SIDDIQUI
This matter arises from civil petitions filed against a judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal regarding the dismissal of an employee from the State Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical Corporation Limited. The core legal questions involve whether the Service Tribunal possesses the jurisdiction under the law to convert an order of dismissal from service into compulsory retirement in the absence of a specific provision for compulsory retirement in the corporate service rules, and whether the Tribunal erred in its findings concerning the proof of charges, limitation condonation, and the master-servant relationship. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider the contentions raised by both parties regarding the vires of the Tribunal's judgment and the extent of its powers in modifying departmental penalties, while suspending the operation of the impugned judgment pending the final hearing.
- Can the Service Tribunal convert an order of dismissal into compulsory retirement when the employer's service rules do not provide for the penalty of compulsory retirement?
- Whether the Service Tribunal has the jurisdiction to modify a departmental penalty under the master and servant framework?
- Did the Federal Service Tribunal properly exercise its discretion in condoning the delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act 1908?
- Section 5, Limitation Act 1908
ORDER
CH. MUHAMMAD ARIF, J.-- -Through this common order we intend to dispose of Civil Petitions Nos.348-K and 355-K of 2001 which have been resorted to by State Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical Corporation Limited and Dr. Lateef Siddiqui respectively against the judgment dated 14-3-2001 passed by the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad, hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal, in Appeal No.771-K of 1999 titled Doctor Lateef Siddiqui v. State Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical Corporation Limited with, among others, the following observations:--
"18. As regard the question of limitation is concerned, it is not the case of the respondent that the appellant had not faced prolonged litigation right from Civil Court to Hon'ble High Court and thereafter Hon'ble Supreme Court. The decision, which was made in favour of the appellant, was subsequently challenged by respondent No. 1 before Hon'ble Supreme Court where on joint statement of advocates for the parties the appellant was required to file appeal before this Tribunal with specific direction to file application for condonation of delay, which was to be considered sympathetically. Such an application was filed by the appellant, which was duly supported by an affidavit where all these facts have been given, even otherwise no solid ground has been taken by the respondent on this score excepting the bar of limitation in the parawise comments. Since the appellant has been able to justify such prolonged litigation, we allow the application under section 5 of Limitation Act and condone the delay.
"
19. The appellant being custodian of the organization was required to have safeguarded the interests of the organization but this sort of plundering and looting the finances and so also the temporary misappropriation of funds have persuaded us to arrive at a conclusion that action should have been taken against the appellant by respondent No.1 but the way in which he has been dismissed appears to be too harsh. We are in agreement with the authorities cited by Mr. M.L. Shahani, but considering the allegations and the previous working of the appellant, we modify the order of dismissal into that of compulsory retirement from the date of the impugned order, i.e. 26-11-1995 with a direction to the respondent to allow all the benefits to the appellant viz. 50% of the salary and benefits retained during the period of suspension, bills and so also other pensionary benefits."
2. Mr. Qamarul Islam Abbas, learned Advocate Supreme Court appearing in support of Civil Petition No.348-L of 2001 has contended that in the absence of any provisions in the Service Rules of the petitioner-Corporation for inflicting punishment of compulsory I retirement from service' upon any of its employees, the Tribunal was in error in converting the order of 'dismissal from service' into one for `compulsory retirement'. He referred to the Tribunal's definite findings of.
(i) commission of offences by the, respondent-employee;
(ii) such 'serious charges' standing proved; and
(iii) the relationship between the petitioner-Corporation and respondent-employee being that of Master and Servant to contend that the Tribunal over-stepped its jurisdiction under the law while converting the order of respondent-employee's dismissal from service into 'compulsory retirement'.
3. Mr. Akhlaq Ahmad Siddiqui, learned Advocate-on-Record appearing on behalf of the private respondent/caveator in Civil Petition No. 348-K of 2001 and for the petitioner in Civil Petition No. 355-K of 2001 contended that the Tribunal is in error in imposing major penalty or 'compulsory retirement' despite having found that:
(i) there has been breach of natural justice;
(ii) none of the irregularities was proved against his client;
(iii) the Inquiry Officer had already cleared him on rest of the charges: and
(iv) his client was dismissed from service on 26-11-1995 without considering that there was not an iota of evidence against him to justify such order. -
It was also contended that the Tribunal could not convert the order or dismissal from service into any other penalty without setting aside the former order and establishing/discerning any nexus in that behalf with the proposed punishment/order.
4. Both sides are seriously contesting the vires of the impugned judgment of the Tribunal dated 14-3-2001.
5. Leave is granted to consider the pleas raised by the learned counsel for the parties, detailed in paras 2 and 3-post:
6. Meanwhile, the operation of the impugned judgment dated 14-3-2001 shall remain suspended.
S.A.K/S-318/S Leave granted.