Pakistan Case Law
1986 PTD 280

NEW INDIA INVESTMENT CORPORAFION Versus INCOME-TAX OFFICER

⭐ Prefer in Google
Citation1986 PTD 280
CourtCalcutta High Court
Judge(s)Dipak Kumar Sen

ORDER

New India Investment Corporation Limited, the petitioner, was at the material time and still is an assessee within the meaning of the Income‑tax Act, 1961. The petitioner's income it is alleged consists of inter alia, profits from dealing in shares, dividends, interest, on loans and interest from Government securities. The petitioner maintains its account in accordance with the mercantile system.

2. It is alleged that in 1970, the petitioner advanced money on interest to Bagla & Co. At the beginning of the accounting year 1972 the balance due from Bagla & Co. was Rs.12.10 lac. Bagla & Co. it is alleged had financial difficulties and on the 3rd August, 1972 an agreement was entered into by and between the petitioner and Bagla & Co. which provided that Bagla & Co. would repay the principal amount of the advance in instalments and that no interest would by charged by the petitioner in respect of the amounts outstanding in the past and also in the future. It is alleged that this agreement was entered into by the petitioner on the ground of commercial expediency. In the profit and loss account of the petitioner for the accounting year 1972 the amount of interest accrued up to the 31st December, 1971 being Rs.32,050.69 was written off as a bad debt.

3. The petitioner alleges that it had also advanced money on interest to Central Cotton Mills Limited which became a sick undertaking closed down on the lot June, 1970 and remained closed till the 3rd March, 1972 when the management thereof was taken over by the Government of India and thereafter by the National Textile Corporation Limited. From the Balance Sheet of Central Cotton Mills Ltd., as on‑the 31st March, 1971 it appeared that there was little chance of recovery of the unsecured loan advanced by the petitioner. The Sick Textile Undertaking (Nationalisation) Ordinance, 1974 under which compensation was payable for taking over of the undertaking provided that such compensation would be utilised first for payment of secured loans and other prior claims and thereafter for payment of unsecured loans. By reason of the aforesaid and as advised the petitioner did not provide for interest due on the said loan amounting to Rs.1,16,100 in the accounting year 1972.

4. On the 21st June, 1973, the petitioner filed its return of income‑tax for the assessment year 1973‑74 showing a nil total income and claimed refund of Rs.45,269 being the tax deducted at source. The audited profit and loss accounts, Balance‑sheet and Director's Report for the accounting year 1972 were filed with the return. In the accounts, the said Rs.32,050.69 was shown written off as an irrecoverable debt and deductible in the computation of the total income of the petitioner. It was disclosed that no provision for interest due on the loan to Central Cotton Mills Ltd. had been made. Other particulars of the petitioners' income ? were fully disclosed.

5. On the 19th March, 1976, the I.T.O. Central Circle XXXII, Calcutta the respondent No.l herein made an order of assessment on the 17th March, 1976 under section 143(3) of the I. T. Act, 1961 of the income of the petitioner for the assessment year 1973‑74.

6. In t‑he said order the respondent No. 1 determined the total income of the petitioner for the said assessment year at 119.50,230. In computing each income the respondent No. 1 disallowed the said claim of bad debt; of Rs.32,051 and also made an addition of Rr.1,16,100 as interest accrued and receivable from Central Cotton Mills Ltd.

7. The petitioner contends that tile aforesaid addition and disallowances were illegal and arbitrary. The petitioner contends further that apart from the said additions and disallowances the respondent No. 1 did not allow relief to the petitioner under section 80K of the I.‑T. Act, 1961 and made an allowance less than what the petitioner was entitled to under section 80M of the said Act.

8. The petitioner also contends that in making the said assessment the respondent No. 1 made variation in the income or loss of the petitioner by an amount exceeding Rs.1 lac. On the basis of the said order of assessment the respondent No. 1 issued a notice, dated the 17th March, 1976 under section 156 of the I. T. Act, 1961 for the said assessment year and determined the amount of tax refundable to the petitioner at Rs.10,394 instead at Rs.45,269. The respondent No. 1 also issued a notice under section 274 read with section 271 of the said Act, dated 17th March, 1976 initiating proceedings in penalty against the petitioner.

9 The petitioner contends that under sections 144‑A and 144‑B, which came into force on and from the 1st January, 1976, in an assessment to be made under section 143 of the I. T. Act, 1961 where the I.T.O. proposed to make any variation in the income or loss returned prejudicial to the assessee and if the amount of such variation exceeded the amount fixed by the Board under subsection (6) of section 144‑B of the Act. The I. T.O. was required in the first instance to forward a draft order of the proposed assessment to the assessee on receipt whereof the assessee was given an option to prefer an objection to the proposed order. If any objection was preferred by the assessee within the prescribed time the I.‑T.O. had to forward the draft order with the objection to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income‑tax who was required to give directions for making the assessment to the I.T.O. after considering the records, the draft order and the objections and after affording the assesses an opportunity of being heard.

10. By an order made under section 144‑B of the Act the Central Board of Direct Taxes has fixed the amount of such variation at Rs.1 lac for the purpose of section 144‑B(1) of the Act.

11. The petitioner contends that in the instant case the respondent No. 1 having made variation in the income or loss returned by the petitioner for the said assessment year 1973‑74 exceeding Rs.1 lac by reason .of disallowance of the said addition of Rs.1,16,100 failed to comply with the provisions of section 144‑B of the said Act. The petitioner contends further that it was incumbent on the respondent No.1 to forward a draft order of assessment to the petitioner so that the petitioner could object to the same and that the matter could be finally determined by the Assistant Inspecting Commissioner. The petitioner contends that in the remises the said order of assessment, dated the 17th March, 1976 under section 143(3) of the I. T. Act, 1961 ultra vices the I.‑T. Act, illegal, without jurisdiction and a nullity. The petitioner contends further that the penalty proceedings following the said purported assessment is also wrongful and illegal,

12. The petitioner contends that on a proper construction of section 144‑B of the said Act, the variation referred to therein does not relate to the total income or loss but the income or loss as returned and in the event it is held that the Board in fixing the amount of Rs.1 lac has laid down that venation to the extent and over the said amount must he construed to mean the total income returned and the total income as assessed then such determination wa3 also ultra vices section 144‑B of the Act and must be interpreted to mean variation not in the total income or loss but in the income or loss as returned.

13. The petitioner moved the present application on the 15th April, 1976 when a Rule nisi was issued calling upon the respondents, namely, the Income‑tax Officer, Central Circle XXXII, Calcutta, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income‑tax, Range V (Central), Calcutta: the Commissioner of Income‑tax (Central) Calcutta; the Central Board of Direct Taxes and the Union of India to show cause why appropriate writs should not be issued directing them to cancel, recall and withdraw the impugned order of assessment and notices and proceedings following the same to refrain from proceeding further on the said impugned assessment, notices and proceeding and for setting aside and/or quashing the same.

14. Bimal Chandra Chatterjee, the I. T.O. Central Circle XXXII, Calcutta, the respondent No.l has affirmed an affidavit on the 25 th February. 1977 which has been filed in opposition to the petition. It is inter alia, alleged in this affidavit that at the beginning of the accounting period the balance of the principal amount with interest due from Bagla & Co. to the petitioner was Rupees 12.10 lac. This amount included interest of Rs.32,050.60. During the accounting period Rs.4.10 lac was repaid by Bagla & Co to the petitioner and subsequently Bagla & Co. paid the balance of the entire principal of Rupees 11.65 lac in the agreed instalments. Interest amounting to Ra.32,050.60 was however, not repaid.

15. It is alleged that as Bagla & Co. were able to pay the entire principal amount of Rs.11.65 lac, it could not be held to be financially unsound and there is no justification for non‑payment of interest of Rs.32,050.60. It is denied that the petitioner had forgone interest on the ground of commercial expediency. ????????

16. It is admitted that Central Cotton Mills Ltd. remained closed till 1972. It is alleged that thereafter the management of the undertaking of the said company was taken over by the Central Government and ultimately made over to the National Textile Corporation Ltd. The undertaking, it is alleged, has since commenced business and it is premature to anticipate that a loan of Rs.12.90 lac would not be repaid in future. The petitioner did not take any steps for recovery of the said loan undisputed by the National Textile Corporation. It is contended that following the mercantile system of accounting the petitioner should have provided for the interest accrued on the said loan which was considered as receivable and included in the petitioner's income.

17. It is alleged that as the petitioner failed to furnish dividend certificates in respect of a number of items, the I.‑T.O. had no other alternative but to complete the assessment by allowing credit on certificates already filed allowing deduction under section 80‑M of the I.‑T. Act, 1961 on the basis thereof as the assessment would otherwise have become time‑barred.

18. It is contended that the petitioner having submitted a 'nil return' and its total taxable income being determined to Rs.50,230, the variation did not exceed Rs.1 lac and section 144‑B of the Act was not attracted.

19. Banechand Malu, a Director of the petitioner has affirmed an affidavit on the 24th October, 1979 which has been filed in reply to the aforesaid affidavit of Bimal Chandra Chatterjee. It is, inter alia contended in this affidavit that under the Sick Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation) Act, 1914 no legal steps can be taken for recovery of any outstanding loan against the National Textile Corporation and, in any event, the said loan is not repayable by the said Corporation. The petitioner in the circumstances treated the loan as irrecoverable and did not provide for any interest, thereon. It is contended further that, in the instant case variations exceeding Rs.1 lac has been made in respect of the income returned by the petitioner and, therefore, the provisions of section 144‑8 of the Act were attracted.

20. Apurba Mazumdar the I. T.O. 'L' Ward Companies District II, Calcutta has affirmed a further affidavit on the 4th February, 1980 which has been filed In this proceeding with leave of Court. It is alleged In this affidavit that the petitioner accepted the impugned assessment and demanded Ra.10,394 found refundable. It is alleged further that on the 17th April, 1976 the petitioner preferred an appeal against the said order of assessment which is pending. One of the grounds taken in the appeal is that the impugned assessment was without jurisdiction. It is alleged that the hearing of this appeal has been adjourned from time to time on the ground of pendency of the present proceeding in this Court.

21. It is alleged that the petitioner intends too continue with two parallel proceedings in respect of the same subject‑matter and, therefore, is not entitled to' any relief in the present writ application which should be dismissed in limine. The petitioner is also not entitled in law to withdraw the appeal already filed.

22. Learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted at the hearing that the expression 'the Income or loss returned' in section 144‑B (1) of the Act meant and referred to different heads or items of income or loss shown in the return filed by the assessee. Such income or loss under each separate head had to be computed separately in accordance with various provisions of the Act relating to each head and was required to be shown in the return separately in different columns. The form of the return was prescribed under the Act and related to computation of income or loss under different heads.

23. Learned Advocate submitted further that the expressions 'total income' and 'income or loss returned' were distinct and separate concepts under the Act and were defined separately. The expression total income meant the aggregation of income computed under different heads referred to in section 14 of the Act.

24. It was next submitted that if the Income‑tax Officer made any variation in any of the items or heads of income or loss returned and such variation exceeded the specified amount. Section 144‑B (1) would be attracted, irrespective of the fact that the total taxable income or total loss was not varied beyond the specified amount. The income or loss returned could not mean and should not be equated with the expressions 'total income' or 'total taxable income'. The Legislature advisedly used the expression 'income or loss returned' and the same must be given a specified meaning.

25. Learned Advocate submitted that in the instant case an addition of more than one lac of rupees had been made under the head income from other sources and, therefore, the assessment came within the mischief of section 144‑B of the Act.

26. Learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted in conclusion that the pendency of the appeal against the order of assessment did not bar this Court from exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution inasmuch as the petitioner had challenged the impugned assessment as ultra vires the I.‑T. Act and as being without jurisdiction. The petitioner was prepared to give an undertaking that it would not press the above points in the appeal, which otherwise involved adjudication on the quantum and the method of assessment which could not be dealt with by this Court in this application.

27. In support of his contention learned Advocate for the petitioner cited the following:‑

(a) ??????? The Sales Tax Officer Navgaon v. Timber and Fuel Corporation reported in (1973) 31 S T C 585; 1973 Tax L R 2425 (S C). In this case, the assessee challenged an assessment made under the M.P. Sales Tax Act In the High Court of Madhya Pradesh by an application under Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground that the Sales Tax Authority concerned had no jurisdiction to initiate the said assessment proceedings. Prior thereto, the assessee had preferred an appeal against the assessment. The High Court held that though it was open to the assessee to proceed under the provisions of the Sales Tax Act against the impugned order, in the circumstances of the case it was open to the Court to Interfere with the impugned order at the initial stage Itself and quash the entire proceedings. On further appeal, the Supreme Court declined to interfere with the discretion exercised by the High Court.

(b) ??????? Municipal Council, Khurai v. Kamal Kumar reported in A I R 1965 S C 1321. This decision was cited for the following observations of the Supreme Court (at p. 1324):

"It is true that the High Court would not ordinarily entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution where an alternative remedy is open to the aggrieved party. Though that is so the High Court has jurisdiction to grant relief to such a party if it thinks proper to do so in the circumstances of the case. In the present case the High Court has chosen to exercise discretion in favour of the respondents and it would not be right for us to interfere with the exercise of that discretion unless we are satisfied that the action of the High Court was arbitrary or unreasonable. Nothing has teen brought to our notice from which it could be inferred that the High Court acted arbitrarily in granting the writ prayed for to the respondent."

(c) ?????? Tata Iron & Steel Co. Limited v. M.C. Upadhyaya reported in ? (1974) 96 1 T R I Rom. In this case, the petitioner challenged a notice under section 154 of the I. T. Act, 1961, the orders of rectification made pursuant thereto and the notices on demand thereon application under Article 226 before the Bombay High Court, was stated before the High Court that appeals Had been filers by tire petitioner against the rectification orders earlier grad that the petitioner intended to withdraw the pending appeals subject to the orders that may be passed In the proceedings before the High Court. The Bombay High Court accepted the submissions and heard the petition on merits.

(d) ??????? J.K. Synthetics Limited v. O.S Bajpai, I. T. Officer, Central Circle Kanpur reported in (1976) 105 I T R 864. In this case a learned Judge of the Allahabad High Court held that if an order had been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice, or without or in excess of jurisdiction or suffered from a patent error, the Court could legitimately interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution in spite of the existence of an alternative remedy and in spite of the fact that such alternative remedy had been resorted to.

28. The learned Advocate for the Revenue has contended to the contrary. He submitted that this application should be dismissed in limine in view of the pending appeals. In support of his contentions learned Advocate cited the following decisions: ‑‑

(a) ??????? Bharat Board Mills Ltd. v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner reported in A I R 1957 Cal. 702. In this case H. K. Bose, J. (as his Lordship then was) did not entertain a writ application on the ground that the petitioner by pursuing the remedies provided under the Bengal Public Demands Recovery Act had precluded Itself from taking recourse to Article 226 of the Constitution.

(b) ??????? Commissioner of Income‑tax (Central) Calcutta v. Rai Bahadur Hardutroy Motilal Chamaria reported in (1967) 66 1 T; R 443 (AIR 1968 S C 153).

(c) ?????? Dhaniram Gupta v. Union of India reported in (1973) 89 I T R 281 (Cal.). In this case Sabyasachi Mukharji, J (as His Lordship then was) held that where the alternative remedy of an appeal has been resorted to the same cannot be abandoned as under the scheme of the I.‑T. Act, an appeal against an assessment once preferred by the assessee cannot be withdrawn. His Lordship further held that in order to avoid conflict of decisions, the Court would hesitate to entertain an application under Article 226 of the Constitution where an appeal was pending. In the facts of that case the application was dismissed.

29. It is to be considered first whether the present application is maintainable in view of the alternative remedy by way of appeal provided under the I T. Act, 1961 which has been availed of. Apart from the decisions cited on behalf of the petitioner, the Supreme Court considered this question from time to time and laid down the law. In Union of India v. T.R. Varma reported in A I R 1957 S C 882 it was observed that the existence of another remedy did not affect the jurisdiction of the Court to issue a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution but that the existence of an alternate adequate legal remedy was a thing to be taken Into consideration in the‑matter of granting writs.

30. This has been reiterated 'by the Supreme Court subsequently, see A.V. Venkateswaran v. R.S. Wadhwani reported in A I R 1961 SC 1506; Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. I. T.O. reported in A I R 1961 SC 372; Collector of Monghyr v. Keshav Prasad Goenka reported in AIR 1962 S C 1694, Collector of Customs and Excise, Cochin v. A.S. Bava reported in A I R 1968 S C 13; Baburam Prokash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad reported in A I R 1969 S C 556.

31. It has been further laid down by the Supreme Court that where the petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of statutory authority and seeks a writ in the nature of prohibition the Court should not refuse to exercise discretion in favour of the petitioner though there may be an alternative remedy, see Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1955 S C 661; Collector of Customs and Excise, Cochin v. A.S, Bava reported in AIR 1968 S C 13.

32. The Supreme Court also observed in Hirday Narain v. I. T.O. Bareilly reported in (1970) 78 I T R 26; (A I R 1971 S C 33) that once a petition under Article 226 is‑entertained and heard on merits the same should not be dismissed on the ground of the existence of and alternative remedy.

33. In the instant case the petitioner has admittedly challenged they jurisdiction of the I. T.O. to vary the return submitted and make and order of assessment under section 143(1) of the Act. A Rule nisi has been issued and is now being heard on merits. A question of law arising on a new section of the I. T. Act is being considered by the Court as a matter of first impression. A large number of Rules are pending in this Court on the same point. ,

34. It appears that litigation may be shortened and multiplicity of proceedings pan be avoided if the question mooted before the Court is disposed of in this application. ?

35. For the reasons above I am not inclined to accept the preliminary objection of the Revenue that the Rule should be discharged on the ground that an alternative remedy has been invoked by the petitioner.

36. The main point on merits in the present application arises out of the interpretation of section 144‑B of the I.‑T. Act, .1961 and the scope and effect thereof. To appreciate the question it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the I. T.‑Act 1961. ??

Section 2(24).‑‑ 'income' includes‑‑ ????

(i) ???????? profits and gains;

(ii) ??????? dividend

(iii) ?????? voluntary contributions received by a trust created wholly or partly for charitable r religious purposes or by en institution established wholly or partly for such purposes, not being contributions made with a specific direction that they shall form part of the corpus of the trust or institution;

Explanation.‑‑ For the purposes of this sub‑clause, 'trust' includes any other legal obligation:

(iii) ?????? the value of any perquisite or profit in lieu of salary taxable under clauses (2) and (3) of section 17;

(iv) ?????? the value of any benefit or perquisite whether convertible into money or not, obtained from a company either by a director or by a person who has a substantial interest in the company, or by a relative of the director or such person, and any such company in respect of any obligation which, but for such payment would have been payable by the director or other person aforesaid;

(va) ????? the value of any benefit or perquisite taxable under clause (iv) of section 28;

(vi) ????? any capital gains chargeable under section 45;

(vii) the profits and gains of any business of insurance carried on by a mutual Insurance company or by a co‑operative society, computed in accordance with section 44 or any surplus taken to be such profits and gains by virtue of provisions contained in the first schedule;

(viii) ????? any annuity due, or commuted value of any annuity paid, under the provisions of section 280‑D;

(ix) ?????? any winnings from lotteries,, cross‑word puzzles races including horse races, card games and other games of any sort or from gambling or betting of any form or nature whatsoever:‑‑

Section 2(45):‑‑ 'total income' means the total amount of Income referred to in section 5 computed in the manner laid down in this Act.

Section 4(1):‑‑ "Where any Central Act enacts that income‑tax shall be charged for any assessment year at any rate or rates. Income‑tax at that rate or those rates shall be charged for the year in accordance with and subject to the provisions of this Act, in respect of the total income of the previous year or previous years, as the case 'may be, of every person."

Section 5(1):‑‑ Subject to the provision of this Act, the total income of any previous year of a person who is a resident includes all income from whatever source derived .....

Section 14:‑‑ Save as otherwise provided by this Act all Income shall. for the purposes of charge of income‑tax and computation of total income, be classified under the following heads of income:‑

(A) ?????? Salaries.

(B) ?????? Interest on Securities,

(C) ?????? Income from house property.

(D) ?????? Profits and gains of business or profession.

(E) ?????? Capital gains.

(F) ?????? Income from other sources.

Section 139(1).‑‑ "Every person, if his total income 'or the total income of any other person in respect of which he is assessable under this Act during the previous year exceeded the maximum amount which is not chargeable to income‑tax, shall furnish a return of his income or the income of such other person during the previous year in the prescribed form and verified in' the prescribed manner and setting forth such other particulars as may be prescribed."

Section 144‑B.‑‑ (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, wherein an assessment, to be made under subsection (3) of section 143 the I.‑T.O. proposes to make any variation In the income or loss returned which is prejudicial to the assesses and the amount of such variation exceeds the amount fixed by the Board under subsection (8) the I.‑T.O. shall in the first instance, forward a draft of the proposed order of assessment (hereafter In this section referred to as the draft order) to the assessee..

(2) ??????? On receipt of the draft order, the assessee may forward his objections, if any, to such variation to the .I.‑T.O. within seven days of the receipt by him of the draft order or within such further period not exceeding fifteen days as the I.‑T.O. may allow on an application made to him in this behalf.

(3) ??????? If no objections are received within the period or the extended period aforesaid or the assessee intimates to the I.‑T.O. the acceptance of the variation, the Income‑tax Officer shall complete the assessment on the basis of the draft order.

(4) ??????? If any objections are received, the Income‑tax Officer shall forward the draft order together with the objections to the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner and the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner shall, after considering the draft order and' the objections and after going through (wherever necessary) the records relating to the draft order issue, in respect of the matters covered by the objections, such directions as he thinks fit for the guidance of the I. T.O. to enable him to complete the assessment:

Provided that no directions which are prejudicial to the assessee shall be issued under this subsection before an opportunity is given 'to the assessee to be heard.

(5) ??????? Every direction issued by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner under subsection (4) shall be binding on the I. T.O.

(6) ??????? For the purpose of subsection (1) the Board may, having regard to the proper and efficient management of the work of assessment, by order fix from time to time such amount as it deems fit:

Provided that different amounts may be fixed for different areas:

Provided further that the amount fixed under this subsection shall in no case, be less than twenty‑five thousand rupees.

(7) ??????? Nothing in this section shall apply to a case where an Inspecting Assistant Commissioner exercises the powers or performs the functions of an I.T.O. in pursuance of an order made under section 125 or section 125‑A."

37. From the scheme of the Act, it appears that under section 139 a person is expected to furnish a return of his income when his total income becomes assessable having exceeded the maximum amount not chargeable to income‑tax. Under subsection (3) of the said section a person is also entitled to file a return showing a 'loss for any particular previous year. I take the view that what is expected to be returned is the total income or loss suffered by the assessee in any particular year.

38. Under section 2(45) of the Act 'total income' means 'the total amount of income' referred to in section 5 computed in the manner laid down in the Act.

39. I note that under section 14 of the Act computation of total income will have to tie done under classifications for various heads of income and that in the prescribed form particulars of income under different heads have to be furnished by the assessee.

40. The return, in my view, ultimately relates to and has to show the total income or loss, of the assesses. The different heads are required to be shown only for the purpose of computation. I hold that under section 144‑B the expression 'the income or loss returned' refers to total income or loss as shown in the return of the assessee after computation and not to the amounts shown under different heads of income.

41. It follows, therefore, that if the variation in such total income or loss exceeds the limit prescribed by the Board only then section 144‑B will come into operation and not otherwise. The said section does not refer to the various heads and cannot be invoked if in the calculation a variation over the prescribed limit occurs.

42. In the instant case, the assess" had filed a 'Nil' return which has been rejected by the I.‑T.O. who has computed the income at about Rs.50,000. The variation, therefore, is less than the prescribed limit of Rs.1 lac and thus, section 144‑8 of the Act is not attracted in this case. To give an example, if the return showed a loss of Rs.50,000 and the variation was made by computing the income over Rs.50,000 the total variation might have exceeded Rs.1 lac as a negative income of Rupees 50,000 would be converted into a positive income of over Rs. 50, 000.

43. For the reasons aforesaid, the petitioner fails in this application.

44. The Rule is, discharged.

45. There will be no order as to costs. It is made clear that the other contention of the petitioner in this application or in the pending appeal have not been adjudicated upon.

46. On the prayer of the learned Advocate for the petitioner, the operation of the above order is stayed for six weeks from date.

M.B.A. ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Order accordingly.

For educational and research use only — not legal advice. Verify against the official report before relying on it. See our Disclaimer.