MASTER ABDUL AZIZ GHAFOOR KHAN Versus CONTROLLER OF ESTATE DUTY AND ANOTHER
The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the judgment of the Sind High Court dismissing his constitutional petition, which challenged the initiation of proceedings by the Deputy Controller of Estate Duty under the Estate Duty Act, 1950, to reopen an estate duty assessment finalized in 1964. The core legal questions involved whether the petitioner, born after the death of the original property holder, qualified as an 'accountable person' with a derivative title, and whether the reopening of the assessment was barred by limitation or lacked jurisdictional requirements under the Estate Duty Act. The Supreme Court held that the contentions regarding the petitioner's status as an accountable person, the validity of reopening the assessment, and the limitation period required a fuller examination and a more authoritative pronouncement. Consequently, the Court granted leave to appeal to examine these statutory and jurisdictional issues.
- Whether a person born after the death of the original property holder can be considered an accountable person with a derivative title under the Estate Duty Act, 1950?
- Can a finalized assessment of estate duty be reopened after the expiration of the limitation period prescribed under the Estate Duty Act, 1950?
- What are the jurisdictional requirements for initiating proceedings to reopen an estate duty assessment under section 61 of the Estate Duty Act, 1950?
- Section 61, Estate Duty Act, 1950
- Section 58-B, Estate Duty Act, 1950
- Section 74-B, Estate Duty Act, 1950
- Section 4, Estate Duty Act, 1950
- Section 53, Estate Duty Act, 1950
ORDER
SHAFI‑UR‑RAHMAN, J. ‑The petitioner seeks leave to appeal against the judgment of the Sind High Court dated 15‑2‑1981 whereby a constitutional petition filed by him challenging the assumption of jurisdiction and the initiation of proceedings by the Deputy Controller of Estate Duty under Estate Duty :"pct, 1950 was dismissed with costs.
2. Abdul Ghafoor Khan the grandfather of the petitioner died on 4‑4‑1961 leaving his son M. R. Khan the father of the petitioner and a widow Hussan Ara. An assessment of Estate Duty in respect of property left by the deceased was, it is said, finalized on 12‑5‑1964 and the entire assess ment and levy paid on 16‑5‑1964. The petitioner was born in 1965 (29‑5‑1965). An effort was made more than once to reopen the case of the assessment and levy of the Estate Duty of Abdul Ghafoor Khan but the one which brought the petitioner to the Court was initiated, it is said, by a notice under sections 61, 58‑B and other provisions of Estate Duty Act on the assumption that there was under valuation of a escapement of duty.
3. The legal ground advanced before the High Court and reiterated before us is that the petitioner was not an accountable person in respect of the estate of Abdul Ghafoor Khan having been born in 1965. The other ground is of limitation that under section 74‑B of the Estate Duty Act the finalized assessment could not be reopened after more than four years of the assessment. It was also contended that under section 61 before its amendment on 1‑7‑1977 and after its amendment on that date such a proceeding could not be initiated as the jurisdictional requirements for reopening the case were entirely lacking.
4. It appears that the mainstay of the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner is not an accountable person at all i view of provisions of section 4 read with section 53 of the Estate Duty Act as the property did not come to him from Abdul Ghafoor Khan no was he in existence when the latter died. The High Court repelled this contention on the ground that the petitioner had a derivative title and was fully covered by the provision of the law. The question whether the petitioner had a derivative title or was an accountable person and whether the reopening of the assessment was within time and the jurisdictional requirement therefore stood satisfied are questions which, to our mind, require fuller examination and a more authoritative pronouncement. Leave to appeal is therefore, granted.
5. The petitioner shall furnish security of Rs. 2,000 (Rupees two thousand) towards costs. No prayer for interim relief has been made and no order in that context is passed.
Leave granted.